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1Chapter One
Introduction
 “The municipality must meet the user with respect, dignity, dialogue, and trust”
Mission statement from the municipality of Copenhagen
One day during the fieldwork, that I report in this dissertation, my eye was
caught by two peculiar pieces of office furniture. I was in the reception area in
a so-called local centre, which is one of eleven regional administrative units
in the social work administration of Copenhagen. The reception area is where
you report if you are a client in the social system. You enter the local centre
through an automatic glass door, you pass a small waiting room, you turn left
and enter the next room. If you arrive at a time when things are reasonably
quite, you will find two social workers sitting behind large desks. Behind
them there is a huge file cabinet with case files. On the tables, there are
scattered papers, more case files, and a couple of computers. On walls, there
are a few posters, one of which warns you about the effects of smoking
hashish. The office is nicely decorated with green plants, and it looks rather
neat and cosy. What caught my eye that day were the two reception counters
that were standing between the social workers and the entrance. They were
around the height of a bar counter and a bit wider than an average person.
They stood about two meters apart. These counters are where the clients and
the social workers physically meet. I remember thinking, that these counters
somehow send a friendly message. In other administrative offices and in
police stations, I have seen counters that split the room in two and form a
barricade between the clients and the administrators. However, these counters,
that you can walk around, seem to convey the message that the social workers
have no wish to hide. A little later I happened to look at the bottom of the
counters. To my surprise, I saw that they were attached to the floor by strong
bolts. This immediately evoked a different interpretation. Perhaps the
counters were secured in order to stop them from sliding on the floor. But
isn’t it likely as well that the bolts are there to prevent drunk clients from
knocking over the counters, and to prevent angry client from lifting and
throwing the counter? So the counters seemed to carry an additional message.
A message about what might go wrong in the meeting with the clients. The
friendly counters were also suspicious counters. 
2The bolted counters indicate some of the main themes in this thesis. First of
all it indicates that when a municipality “meets its clients” it is not simply a
meeting between two psychological entities. The clients are met by a
constellation of social workers, green plants, educational posters, and
counters. Along this line I will later argue that what the local centre does, its
competence, is not an exclusively human affair either. 
The second theme, that is suggested here, is the co-presence of different
logics. The counters are simultaneously friendly and suspicious; it is a ‘both-
and’ rather than an ‘either-or’. Similarly, I will argue, that the local centre is
swarming with different logics. Sometimes these logics struggle bitterly, but
at other times there are practical arrangements, such as bolts in the floor, that
allow the differences to co-exist. 
The image of differences, that are somehow made to co-exist, may apply to
objects other than the two counters in the local centre. The present text is one
such object. The text is a converging point of several series of events, it
contains different logics, and it ‘does’ different things. In the following, I will
tell four different origin stories of the present text. These stories indicate some
of the logics, which I have fitted or perhaps bolted together.  
First, I describe the project as an outcome of a particular institutional
affiliation; I applied for a Ph.D. scholarship, which was imbedded in a larger
project with a particular research agenda. In this context, I carefully defined
the aims of my project and my definition of competence. 
Second, I will depict the project as the outcome of a very productive contact
to the municipality of Copenhagen; I was introduced to a large organisation
development project, which reorganised more than 1200 social workers into
cross-professional teams. And I was granted access to one particular team,
which I followed for seven months. 
The third origin story is about philosophical positions. It portrays my project
as an outcome of a particular philosophical take on the empirical material
from the team project. My approach, which calls itself constructionist,
distinguishes itself from modernist and post-modernists positions. 
The fourth origin story, depicts this thesis as a consequence of a particular
theoretical choice. I present a spectrum of strategies for studying competence,
and I position myself within a so-called complexification strategy. With this
strategy, competence is studied as a relational effect rather than as an
underlying essential quality. 
Finally, I will present an broad outline of the chapters and the argument of
this thesis. 
3First Origin Story - Institutional Affiliation and Project Plan
The present dissertation is a part of a now finished five-year research project,
located in the Department of Psychology at the University of Copenhagen.
The broad project aimed to investigate the development of competence from
three different angles. One group of researchers studied competence through a
cognitive approach. A second group has focused on computer supported co-
operative work. Finally, there was a social psychological group of which the
present project is a part. This third group studied competence as development
and learning in workgroups. 
In the original description of the broad project a common definition of
competence was formulated by my colleague Ole Elstrup Rasmussen:
”Competence is the ability to handle knowledge and insight in such a way,
that sense is made in a situation which is characterised by rapid changes and
low predictability” 
However, the spirit of the project was never one of uniformity, so in my
project plan (Elgaard Jensen, 1997), I took the liberty of giving this initial
’definition’ a more social psychological flavour1. First, I exchanged the notion
of ’sense making’ with the broader notion of ordering. To me the former tends
to limit the perspective to human cognition whereas the latter opens the
perspective to broader transformational processes. Second, I stressed that
ordering is a process that involves negotiations and co-ordinated actions
among a number of people. These numbers might include a more or less well-
defined working group (cf. Kirkman & Rosen) but the processes of ordering
might also be related to a the broader network of working relations. Thirdly, I
referred to actor-network theory (e.g. Callon, 1986b) to argue the point that
ordering is an impure, heterogeneous process, which include numerous
‘entities’ such as tools, machines, texts, words, materials, humans etc. If this
ontological claim is accepted, then it follows, that a host of non-human
entities should somehow be allowed to enter the analysis on an equal footing. 
So to sum up my translations of the initial ‘definition’, I proposed to study
competence as processes of ordering in heterogeneous networks. 
In terms of methods, I was also strongly influenced by actor-network theory.
This ’school’ is almost exclusively developed from ethnographies of the sites
in which science and/or technology is developed. I decided that I too wanted
to study a site where things were in the making, not scientific facts or novel
technologies but new competencies. Furthermore, I felt that a case study
                                             
1 The two other participants in the social psychological group, Arne Prahl and Jesper Döpping made
somewhat similar translations.
4primarily based on observation would be a sine qua non to get a sense of the
materialities involved in the development of competence. 
Second Origin Story - Access and Data Collection 
With the formal acceptance of my project plan, I embarked on my three year
Ph.D. period; I began to do some in-depth reading, I took a number of Ph.D.-
courses, and to prepare myself for the fieldwork I wrote an article on method
(Elgaard Jensen, 1999b). I also made a number of contacts to companies and
organisations where I hoped to study the development of competence in and
around some working group. For various reasons all of these contacts were
futile, and as the months passed my eagerness and anxiousness to get into the
fieldwork grew. Eight months and still no data!
At that time my co-supervisor, Jesper Döpping, directed my attention to a
large team project that was going on in the municipality in Copenhagen. He
offered to make the first phone call, and he did so very successfully. The
person in the central administration he contacted, Lone Sørensen, was very
interested in ’external perspectives’ on their project, and she mailed me two
reports about the project. The first report detailed the preparatory discussions
before the launching of the project. The second report stated the official plan
and goals for the team project. 
From this material and the Internet homepage of the Municipality of
Copenhagen I gathered a first understanding of what the team project was.
First of all, I found out that the project was taking place in a particular
organisational unit called the Family and Labour Marked Administration
(FLMA). 
The FLMA is one of seven administrations in the municipality of
Copenhagen. Its area of jurisdiction is a very broad spectrum of social work,
social services and administration in relation to the labour market. The FLMA
consists of (a) twelve central offices referred to as ‘the central administration’,
(b) eleven local administrative units called the ‘the local centres’, and (c) a
large number of institutions such as day care institutions, residential homes
for elderly people, supported housing, drug addiction clinics and shelters.  
The team project was directed at the middle layer: the eleven local centres.
The key manoeuvre of the team project was to divide the local centres, with a
total of 1200 employees, into a number of cross-professional teams. After this
organisational change each local centre would consist of 4 teams: An adult
team dealing with the so-called hard cases, a family team dealing with all
cases involving children, a service team dealing with lighter cases, and finally
5a technical administrative team figuring in a role as controller and technical
back-up. 
From this initial reading about the team project, I inferred that each of the
teams would be the site of substantial development of new competencies. The
team members would be facing a fair amount of change in their working
conditions due to new tasks, new colleagues, new divisions of labour, and
new relations to external partners such as the other newly formed teams. And
thus I felt convinced that the team project would be a very interesting place to
follow the heterogeneous processes of old and new orderings.
In the following days I wrote a letter to my contact in the FLMA stating a
proposal for my engagement with the team project (appendix 1). The key
point of this proposal was that I would do participant observation in order to
identity conditions that would enable or restrain the development of new
competencies in a team. A few weeks later, I was invited to a meeting with
the board of the FLMA. 
At the board meeting, I did my best to present my project proposal. I
remember one of the board members asking me, if I would be able to evaluate
the effect of the team project. I answered that I imagined the work in the local
centres to be effected by numerous ‘agendas’, and therefore I did not believe
that it was possible to clearly single out the effect of the team project. 
Another issue that was discussed was the scope of my investigation. I
pronounced my preference for an extended period of observation with one
team. Some of the board member would have liked to see an investigation of
the interaction between all four teams in one centre. But they also understood
my wish to grapple with competence in more detail, and they therefore
allowed me to limit the study to one team. 
We talked at some length about how my observations might proceed. We
agreed that ideally I should follow a team during its initial formation and then
onwards for half a year. The majority of the teams were already started, but
there were still a few teams that had not begun ‘the team process’. If possible,
I should follow one these teams. We also agreed that it would be most
interesting for me to follow an adult team, because this type of team is
comprised of professional groups that have never co-operated before. The
director of the board promised to contact some of the team managers and find
a team that would volunteer to host me. 
The board requested that a reference group2 should be set up, and they
already had a clear idea about who the members should be: Two board
                                             
2 The reference group later worked out a formal collaboration agreement in relation to my project.
6members, a central administrator (my initial contact person), the manager of
the team to be selected, one representative of the employees in the team, and
my two supervisors. 
Finally, the board invited me to sit in on a series of meetings, each of which
introduced a newly formed team to the team project. The first of these
meetings was on the very next day. It goes without saying that I was
somewhat overwhelmed, but extremely pleased with this sudden change of
my empirical luck. I now had contact to the board of a huge organisation. I
was ‘legitimised’ and granted access. And I was to study a newly formed
team for an extended period of time. 
In the next couple of weeks I followed the introductory meetings of six
different teams. During this period, an adult team agreed to have me
following their process. In addition to the team manager, this team consisted
of 46 social workers, which were at that time divided into four different
professional groups. From then on, I went to a large number of the meetings
of this team. First, I observed the team during a one-day meeting with a
consulting firm, a so-called team training session. Later, I sat in a number of
team meetings in the local centre. I also followed smaller meetings within the
different professional groups in the centre. I followed several individual social
workers on entire workdays. I spent several days in the reception area
observing the work. I observed a number of meetings between social workers
and clients. I was allowed to read case files, and I did a few formal interviews
to get additional information. Last but not least, I should mention the most
valuable source of information, namely the numerous short conversations I
had with individual social workers and their manager during breaks. In these
short interchanges people gave me valuable explanations about what was
going on, and sometimes they expanded on their ‘public’ opinions and
actions. On these occasions I often just listened and asked questions for
clarification. But sometimes I also used the tactic of confronting the person
with views that I had heard from others; “But if the team manager heard you
say this, wouldn’t she argue that...?” or “But I don’t think the caseworkers
would agree with that, I have heard them claim that...” I probably shouldn’t
overestimate the efficiency of this strategy, but I do think that it sometimes
made me a more interesting conversation partner (bearing in mind my limited
knowledge about the daily business of the local centre), and hopefully it also
conveyed the message that I was trying to avoid taking over the view of one
particular party or group in the local centre. 
                                                                                                                              
See appendix 2. 
7Quite a number of times, I was asked to explain what I was doing and what
my project was about. The short hand explanation, which I always used, was
this: “I am interested in how competence develops in relation to the team
project. But since I do not know very much about the work in this local
centre, I am also very interested in understanding what your daily work is all
about” The social workers and the team manager replied to this in very
accommodating and friendly ways. They found time in their busy working
days to tell me about their work, they informed me about interesting meetings,
and they allowed me to be ‘a fly on the wall’. 
During all of my observations I took notes3. Lots of notes. Every time a
speaker said something on a meeting, I jotted down as many of his or her
words as possible. The following afternoon or evening I typed up my notes,
and to some extent I also reconstructed the statements and events through
memory. Along the way, I found a few ways to further this process. I learned
the names of most of the 46 social workers, which of course allowed me to
note who said what. I also developed a number of abbreviations for terms
often used in the local centre. And finally on the very practical level, I started
to use an A5 rather than A4 notepad. This made hours of note taking less
strenuous because it allowed me to place the pad on my lap some of the time
and thus change position. 
In the entire seven-month period of fieldwork, I made about 50 visits to the
local centre. From this I produced about 200 pages / 80.000 words of typed
field notes. In addition, I compiled an equal amount written material from
other sources: meeting papers, working papers, official reports on the team
project, articles from the house organ, projects and analyses on the FLMA.
Stories about the Team Project
To this point I have told one origin story about my institutional affiliation and
another one about the empirical opportunities that were opened to me in the
municipality of Copenhagen. The latter story contains a description of
structural change in relation to the team project. But there were much more
than organisational structures at stake in the team project. It had a bearing on
numerous other issues about daily work load, office space, case files,
                                             
3 I decided not to make tape recordings because of two problems. (1) In many work situations social
workers and clients were coming and going. This would make it impossible or at least very awkward
to ask late arrivers for permission to tape. (2) Several of the meetings, which I observed, had a large
number of participants, which would make it very difficult to identify the speakers and to get audible
recordings of everybody.
8professional demarcations, managerial politics, clients, services, regulations,
resources, co-operation and so on. In order to give the reader some sense of
these matters, I will continue this introduction with three stories about the
project told by the participants. I have two purposes in recounting these
stories; I want to give a further introduction of the empirical case, and I want
to indicate some of the special problems, which are related to the study of a
large, on-going, and hotly debated project. Subsequently, I will relate these
problems to philosophical positions. 
The first story is one that was frequently told by managers and central
administrators. It went like this:
The social work administration consists of a lot of different professional
groups, separated into different departments and offices, each
administering different parts of the social legislation. The users are made to
run the gauntlet between the offices, and the professionals do not co-
ordinate sufficiently amongst themselves. It is the professionals’
perspective rather than the users’ perspective that dominate the
administration. Each of the professional groups focuses on those specific
services, which they can offer instead of focussing on the actual needs of
the user in front of them. All this will be changed with the team project.
Sometimes I heard a completely different story about the team project. This
was the kind of story a professional (e.g. a caseworker) would tell me during a
smoking break with an air of confidentiality: 
The resources of the social work administration have been cut back year
after year. And there has been a steady outpour of legislative changes,
which we (the professionals) have to adjust to. On top of this, management
comes up with some new and ’brilliant’ project every few years. So far
every single project has failed to produce the promised results, and every
single project has taken up great amounts of time, which could have been
better used serving the clients. 
And then there is a third story about the team project. This one is gathered
from articles in the periodical published by the FLMA for its employees: 
In 1997 a study of the psychological work environment was conducted by
an external consulting firm. The primary stressor identified in this study,
was the type of work in which one caseworker has the sole responsibility
for a case. The recommendation was thus to organise the work in teams.
Following this, the local centres made a number of efforts to share the
responsibility of cases between groups of caseworkers. 
9In 1999, the team project expanded the idea of teamwork to all areas of
work in the local centres. In this project, the teams are comprised of
different professional groups, which have previously only co-operated on
an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, the team project empowers the team
members by removing a layer of middle managers.
The three stories, which I have reproduced here, indicate some of the
intriguing as well as frustrating questions confronting anyone who wishes to
study a project. First of all, there is a multitude of actors offering comments
on the project. Should I listen to managers, social workers, or the reports from
consulting firms? And how should I handle differences between these
sources? Second, the stories operate with different time frames. The first story
talks of before and after the solution of an age-old problem. The second story
portrays the team project as the repetition of the same folly. The third story
locates the team project in a progressive series of improvements. Which time
frame should I use? Third, the stories evoke different levels. Should a project
be studied on the level of the entire project (whatever that may be), or is the
‘real’ project to be found in the nitty-gritty details of work in a local centre?
Obviously these questions are both hard and uncomfortable. Any choice
seems inadequate, and the whole business seems messy. How should one
relate to this as a researcher? In the following I would like to identify three
philosophical positions in this issue. But since this is not a philosophical
treatise, I will use the list of positions to introduce rather than thoroughly
argue my own position. My hope is that the reader will judge the viability of
my position on the basis of the entire analysis that follows from it, rather than
on sketchy comments in this introduction. 
Third Origin Story - Philosophical Positions
The first philosophical position, which I would like to identify and to distance
myself from, might be called modernism or philosophical realism. Some of
my colleagues at the Department of Psychology, who promote one version of
this position, like to tell the tale of the blind men and the elephant. In the
poem by John Godfrey Saxe the tale goes like this: 
It was six men of Indostan 
To learning much inclined, 
Who went to see the Elephant 
(Though all of them were blind), 
That each by observation 
Might satisfy his mind.
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The First approached the Elephant, 
And happening to fall 
Against his broad and sturdy side, 
At once began to bawl: 
“God bless me! but the Elephant 
Is very like a wall!”
And the story continues with each blind man grasping a different part of the
elephant and pronouncing a different the version of what the elephant is. He
who grasps the trunk takes the elephant to be a snake. He, who grasps the tail,
takes the elephant to be a rope and so on. The conclusion by Saxe is that
“...each was partly in the right. And all were in the wrong!” The philosophical
realists, however, add a little to this conclusion by saying that the role of the
researcher is to be the one who rises above the quarrels, and sees the elephant.
Research is about identifying the objective reality behind all the partial and
differing versions. Perhaps this sounds innocent. But if we carry this position
to the team project, then we would depict all the actors of the social
administration as blind men hanging on to a whole that they cannot grasp
without the help of the researcher. Besides from the uneasiness that comes
with this rather self-celebratory metaphor, I find the elephant story misleading
because it obscures the role of the researcher. It depicts him as not seeing the
world from any particular perspective (he sees it all from tail to trunk).
Furthermore it depicts the researcher as disentangled from reality; as opposed
to the blind men, he doesn’t touch anything, he simply contemplates from a
distance4. This amounts to what Donna Haraway (1991) has called the God-
trick of seeing everything from nowhere. There are of course other and more
modest versions of realism. Karl Popper would stress the temporary and
contestable nature of truth. But the belief that useful knowledge comes in the
form of a singular account, which is universal rather than situated in nature,
remains the hallmark of the realist project. And this mode of knowledge
production, I suggest, sits uneasily with a politically volatile team project,
which comprises a multitude of divergent stories and actors. 
A second position on the disunity of the stories would be a post-modern
position. The point of this is to make a virtue of the necessity that stories and
perspectives differ. And the aim is to promote and celebrate the differences,
rather than to reduce them to a single coherent master narrative. This of
                                             
4 I thank David Metz for suggesting a critical reading of the elephant-story.
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course entails a harsh critique of the modernists’ pretensions to end the
conversation by claiming to tell the whole story. For post-modernists/social
constructionists such as Gergen (1995) it is precisely conversation, which is
the key metaphor for social life. His aim of research is to construct situations
that allow more voices to enter into the on-going dialogue. In this tradition, a
researcher would investigate a team project by somehow staging a
conversation between as many different voices as possible. I might note that
in a social constructionist frame, the idea of ‘a’ team project, doesn’t really
work. There are multiple voices, multiple realities, and thus multiple projects,
which may or may not come together. I find myself largely sympathetic to the
critiques of modernism, which are raised by post-modernists such as Gergen.
I like his open-endedness, and his commitment to a processual view of world.
But I also find his conversation metaphor profoundly problematic. Within
Gergen’s theoretical framework it is virtually impossible to explain why
certain types of voices, such as male, scientific, managerial, militant, racist
voices so often succeed to dominate5. Furthermore, if ontologies were simply
produced in conversation then the obduracy of institutions could not be
accounted for as anything but conversational effects. I find this explanation
far too limited, and in dire need of additional explanatory resources. 
A third position, the one that I will adopt in this dissertation, calls itself
constructionist. One way to introduce this position is to say that voices or
statements get loaded. Latour (1991) tells the story of a hotel manager who
faces the problem that his guests forget to leave their keys at the reception
desk before they leave the hotel. First, he tries to remind them: “Please, bring
back your keys”. The effect is negligible. He then puts up a sign: “Please
leave your room key at the front desk before you go out”. This has some
effect, but the majority of the guests still leave the hotel with their keys in
their pockets. Finally, the hotel manager talks to an ‘innovator’, who suggests
that he attach a metal block to each key. This works. Now the overwhelming
majority of the guests happily rid themselves of the keys at the reception
before they leave the hotel. Latour depicts this little story as a battle between
two ‘programs’: leaving vs. not leaving the keys. The first program gains
more and more strength by loading itself with more and more elements. A
verbal statement, a written sign, metal blocks. Consequently, the first program
becomes more and more convincing in a quite literal sense. The question
about how one voice becomes dominating - a mystery to the social
constructionist - is now no longer a mystery. The manager’s voice comes to
                                             
5 Or to take an example from the team project: why and how does an optimistic discourse about
organisational restructuring at some point manage to repress a ‘worried’ discourse about scarce
resources?
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dominate by enrolling a number of other elements into his network. Only,
constructionists would never reduce the event of the returned keys to the
effect of ‘a voice’. Instead they would attribute the effect to the entire
heterogeneous network, and they would note how the manager’s initial
statement is subtly changed during the process of network expansion (Law,
1999a). 
So with a constructionist approach the number of entities, which are included
in the analysis, is expanded from merely ‘social’ actors to entities of any kind:
texts, machines, materials, humans, words and the rest. This of course raises
different questions for someone who wants to study a team project. The
important questions are now: What gets connected and what gets
disconnected? Which programs are successful in enrolling allies (of whatever
kind)? And which programs are able to maintain their connections (of
whatever kind) over time? Finally, I might note that the constructionist view
of different and struggling programs would depict the team project as
something partially coherent. The team project is more heterogeneous than
the singular reality presumed by philosophical realists, but is also less
scattered than the multiple voices presumed by post-modernists (Law 2001,
Mol 2001). 
Constructionists of various traditions have developed a multitude of concepts
and metaphors to deal with the questions above. I will go into more detail
with a number of these in chapters 3 and 4. In this introduction, however, I
will move on to the fourth and final origin story. This last story describes my
project as an outcome of a particular theoretical and strategic choice in the
study of competence. 
Fourth Origin Story - Strategies in the Study of Competence
In 1995 the Confederation of Danish Industries (DI) carried out a project on
securing and measuring the effects of in-service training (Dansk Industri,
1995). The question was this: How can a company be certain that it obtains
the effect that it pays for, when it sends an employee on a course. More
specifically, the question was this: How can companies measure the
competence that an employee has gained? The answer to this question was
promoted at a meeting for a couple of hundred Danish training and personnel
professionals (including myself). The project managers outlined a solution
procedure based on two procedures. First, the course provider should
delineate some clear behavioural goals in the form of tasks that an employee
should be able carry out after taking a particular course. Second, the company
should systematically evaluate whether the employee were able to manage the
expected tasks. The purpose of these procedures were to create a transparent
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market. Through continuous goal setting and evaluation, the companies would
gain updated knowledge of which courses worked and which didn’t. And
consequently, the training budgets would be spent in a much more efficient
manner. 
The response from the audience was strikingly negative. A number ‘facts’
were pointed out, that ostensibly render effect measurement impossible. Not
all employees are equally motivated. Not all instructors in charge of a
particular course are equally good. Not all employees have the necessary
prerequisites for a given course. Not all classes taking a particular course have
an equally good group dynamic. Not all employees have equally good
opportunities to practice what they have learned. Eventually, some of the
course providers in the audience stated that it would be unfair if their course
was ditched on such a loose basis. They argued that the DI had built its
method on the assumption of ‘other things being equal’. But other things are
never equal. Finally, one person argued that, at the end of the day, the
decision of how to respond to an effect measurement is a political one. 
I suggest that the anecdote above represents two opposing strategies for
dealing with competence. The first is about purification. The competence of
the individual employee should be separated from other phenomena by
defining it more clearly and by evaluating it more systematically. Competence
is taken to be some essence, which can be disentangled from the rest, cleaned
up, boiled down, measured, and optimised.  
The second strategy is about complexification. The proponents of this strategy
deal with competence by relating it to all sorts of other phenomena: individual
motivation, instructor quality, group dynamic, opportunities for practice,
politics. The assumption seems to be that competence only makes sense when
it is placed in context, relation, or connection with something else.
The broad academic literature on competence can be viewed in terms of the
purification-complexification spectrum as well. Some authors are clearly
working to isolate competence, whereas others are in the business of relating
and contextualising it. In the following, I briefly present examples of theories
on competence at different locations on the spectrum. I will begin with the
purifying positions that differ the most from my own, and I will end with the
complexifying theoretical positions, which are the ones I am in the best
position to communicate with. 
Purifying competence - finding the underlying factors
Jörgen Sandberg, a Swedish phenomenologist and researcher in management
and organisation, opens an article in the following way: “Organisational
actions such as producing cars, treating illnesses, transporting and educating
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are always based on a certain kind of human competence”. Sandberg goes on
to define competence as constituted by the meaning the work takes on for the
worker in his or her experience of it (Sandberg, 2000, p.11). Furthermore,
Sandberg explains that each individual forms one particular conception,
which guides his approach to the work. Finally, Sandberg reports a study in
which he identifies three (no more no less) distinctly different conceptions
directing the work of engine optimisers on a Volvo factory. The purification
strategy is clearly evident in this line of work. Sandberg moves from a very
broad perspective (‘car production’) to a very small number of distinct and
underlying conceptions carried by individuals. 
Ole Elstrup Rasmussen, a Danish psychologist, represents a second, but rather
different example of the purification strategy. Rasmussen (1995) takes the
disputed distinction between leadership and administration as his starting
point. Behind this, he suggests, lie two fundamentally different human
activities. On the one hand there is qualified performance, which is about
“systematising a complicated occurrence, in such a way that a specific state of
objective is achieved” (ibid, p.60). On the other hand there is competent
performance which is about handling a “complex occurrence in such a way
that a sense making state is brought about” (ibid, p.61). Qualifications are
thus related to rule following and problem solving in relatively familiar
situations, whereas competencies are related to leadership and sense-making
in relatively novel situations. Elstrup Rasmussen has used the notion of
competence as the basis of heuristic method of textual analysis, which
attempts to reveal the specific organisation of the writer’s sense-making
capacities. The overall direction of this research is once again a strategy of
purification. Competence is regarded as a fundamental underlying process; it
explains very broad phenomena (such as leadership) and it can be studied by
isolating, purifying and revealing basic structures.  
Middle positions - matching persons and jobs
Continuing the game of arraying theories of competence on a scale from
purification to complexification, I will now move to the middle of the
spectrum. At this position, I will locate a number of authors, who
pragmatically deal with the question of how to make a good fit between the
demands of jobs and qualifications of the work force. These authors have no
particular interest in finding a few essential individual qualities, and neither
do they put strong restrictions on the number of dimensions by which they
describe the jobs. What is maintained, however, are some rather fixed notions
of the person versus the job. For that reason, I position them only halfway
toward the complexification strategy. 
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In the Danish context, a well-known example of this approach is the work of
the EVU-group in Roskilde University (Andersen et al., 1993) 6. The basic
premise of their work is the assumption that qualification demands (jobs) and
the process of developing qualifications (e.g. individual education) are two
entirely different ‘structures’. These structures have different bases and
different dynamics, but on the labour market, they enter into interplay.
Numerous projects in Industrial Sociology have developed concepts to
describe the ‘objective’ job demands. Productive vs. intensive qualifications,
innovative vs. negative qualifications, process-dependent vs. process-
independent qualifications (Andersen et al, p.72-74). But according to the
EVU-group, the subjective side of the equation has been overlooked or too
simplistically derived from the job analyses. Therefore, they propose a broad
model of individual qualifications spanning personal, professional as well as
societal qualifications. Furthermore, each type of qualification is divided into
three levels of depth ranging from a basic level of qualifications, which is
thoroughly integrated into the identity of the individual, to a very superficial
level of qualifications, which is related to a specific context.
The work of the EVU-group and others in this tradition have been
instrumental in raising pertinent questions about the development of the
labour market, the goals of the school system, risks of de-skilling, and hopes
for creating better jobs. However, criticisms have also been raised. Ellström
(1992) has pointed out that the tradition builds on the assumption that the
development of qualifications can be analysed and managed in a technical-
rational manner. This implies the voluntaristic view, that management is
based on relevant information, rational calculation, and control of the
implementation process. All of these assumptions have been refuted by
organisational theorists7. Strong ideological critiques have also been voiced.
Thus, Mathiesen (1998) has accused the EVU-group of lending support to a
neo-liberalist discourse of isolating and blaming the individual.
Much more could be said about this line of work, but what interests me here
are the different strategies for dealing with competence on the spectrum from
purification to complexification. The middle-range strategy of the EVU-group
attempts a pragmatic description of the interplay between ‘two structures’,
individuals and jobs. Many authors, in particular those employing a
complexification strategy, would find this too limited. To these I will turn
next.  
                                             
6 For a thorough review of similar HRM-literatures on competence see Bramming (2001, chap. 3).
7 E.g. March & Simon (1958) and March & Olson (1995)
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Complexifying competence - the description of relational effects
At the complexification end of the spectrum, competence is constantly related
to something else. Words like contextual, situated, mutually constitutive,
dialectical, interdependent, and relational appear with high frequencies. I will
take a look at two distinct examples8. 
Jean Lave & Etienne Wenger (1991) develop a conception of learning that
departs radically from the dominating individualistic and cognitive notions in
education research. Instead of describing learning as a process in the heads of
individuals, they locate learning in processes of participation. Two key
concepts are developed to analyse these processes. First, Lave & Wenger
choose to analyse social practice in relation to the so-called communities of
practice; groups of practitioners, activities, tools, etc, involved in some
common production for an extended period of time. Examples of this could be
the midwifes on the Mexican Yucatan peninsular, the tailors in a group of
Nigerian tailor shops, or a local section of Alcoholics Anonymous (ibid, chap.
3). Second, Lave & Wenger invent the term legitimate peripheral
participation. This term indicates the process by which a newcomer to a
community of practice gradually moves toward a fuller participation in the
community. Legitimacy is achieved when the person is formally accepted into
the community. This might take the form of an apprenticeship contract, but
there are many other possibilities. Peripherality is a positive term, which
indicates that the newcomer is given tasks that are relatively easy, and where
errors are relatively benign. Later he moves through a succession of more and
more difficult tasks. But despite the easiness of the initial tasks, the newcomer
is a real participant; the tasks are not ‘artificial school assignments’ but useful
and necessary contributions to the production processes of the community.
The concept of learning as legitimate peripheral participation works as a
conceptual bridge that allows Lave & Wenger to forge an intimate link
between the learning of the individual and the reproduction of the community
of practice. With this conceptual framework, the idea of competence is
thoroughly situated in the social practice of a community. In the words of
Jean Lave: “cognition [and she might as well have said competence, TEJ]
observed in everyday practice is distributed - stretched over, not divided
among - mind, body, activity and culturally organized settings (which include
other actors)” (Lave, p.1). The analytic strategy of Lave & Wenger is thus to
make sense of competence by attending to its embeddedness in communities
of practice. This is a strategy of complexification. 
A second example of the complexification strategy is the notion of material
agency in Actor-Network Theory (ANT). The basic assumption is that events
                                             
8 For a broad review of some of these literatures see Star (1992). 
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or transformations of the world should not be attributed to human effort alone,
but rather to the effects of a network of human and non-human entities (or
actants). Agency and competence are thus taken to be distributed, relational
phenomena, rather than something, which can be located or isolated in human
bodies. I have already mentioned one example of actor-network-theory
namely Latour’s story about the keys and the hotel manager. This story
provides a theoretical vocabulary for studying competence, or power, or
transformative effects by paying close attention to the processes by which
heterogeneous elements are associated into networks. A number of other
authors in or close to the ANT tradition have studied processes of
heterogeneous networks; i.e. how networks are constructed (e.g. Latour
1987), demolished (e.g. Callon 1986a), continually reformed (e.g. Singleton
& Michael), fine-tuned (e.g. Pickering), extended (e.g. Akrich), or uneasily
patched together (e.g. Law 2001). I will discuss this theoretical field at length
in chapters 3 and 4. In this introduction, I will simply note that these studies
take the notion of agency and competence far beyond the ‘isolated human’,
and they therefore represent a second example of the complexification
strategy9.
In this thesis I have chosen to pursue the strategy of complexification, and my
main focus will be on authors inspired by the ANT-tradition. Having said this,
I might now embark on some traditional academic exercise of denouncing
people, who have made the opposite theoretical choice by pursuing the
purification strategy. I might call them reductionists, and I might claim that
they only cover a limited part of a bigger picture. And then of course they
would make counter-arguments, accusing me of misconstruing what
competence really is, and they would say that I am missing the underlying
structure of competence. 
I don’t find such games particularly productive. First of all, I don’t believe
that we are able to give complete accounts of our reasons to follow a
particular strategy. We are all caught up in structures, discourses, networks,
trends, or what ever we want to call them, that are much more encompassing
than our awkward verbal accounts. Second, there is no particular reason to
                                             
9 Distinctions between theories of competence could of course be made in multiple other ways.
Recently, Metz & Westenholz (2000) have formulated a distinction between relational and
foundationalist paradigms. Foundational theories make a priori assumptions about the nature or the
essence of the entities, which are related, whereas the relational theories take the entities to be
mutually constitutive. Among other things, this framework can be used to identify differences in the
group of theories, which I have called ‘complexifying’. The two examples, which I have presented
(Lave and ANT), are both relational as well as complexifying. There are however theories, which
complexify in a foundational way. Chaos theories would be an example of this. They describe a vast
number of relations (complexification), which are all made out of simple, ‘given’ elements
(foundationalism). 
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believe, that a few well-chosen words in an introductory chapter would
convince others to leave their positions; sociology of science since Kuhn
(1962) has argued this point very convincingly. For these reasons, I am
perfectly happy to recognise that there are incommensurable paradigms all
around. Sometimes, we might find a battleground or a trading zone. But at
other times we might just do ourselves the favour of not pretending that our
terms have to power to explain others away. 
Outline of the Thesis
I have now described four different origin stories of my project, and thus four
different sources of the logics in my text. At this point, I will make a first and
awkward attempt to bolt it all together in a single question: How is it possible
to investigate the development of competence - i.e. heterogeneous orderings -
in the team project through a complexification strategy and with a
commitment to constructionism? 
The outline of my answer - this thesis -  is as follows: 
In chapter two, I try to clarify what it is to write an account of participant
observation. More specifically, I discuss how facts are constructed in social
science. The purpose of this discussion is self-reflective; I try to say
something about the production of the facts that I will later present. But I have
chosen to do parts of this reflection by proxy: I enter upon the reflection
through an analysis of a classic text by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. This
analysis leads me to picture explanations in social science as networks;
Accounts are relational webs organised in such a way that certain knots
(concepts) can speak on behalf of certain other knots (lesser concepts and
‘data’). Following this, I describe my own successive analytical attempts,
which finally produced the network that I present as an account of the
development of competence in the team project.   
In chapter three, I discuss a number of learning theories, which are presently
the predominant way of conceptualising competence in psychology and social
psychology. These theories all build on some notion of a learning system,
which adapts to its surroundings. I argue through a series of examples, these
putative systems tend to overflow. Processes of ordering constantly cross the
system boundaries, which the learning theories define. The notion of learning
is therefore problematic in a study of heterogeneous processes of ordering. So
although recent social learning theories pursue a complexification strategy in
the study of competence, I find it necessary to abandon the notion of learning,
because the very idea of learning presumes an unwarranted degree of closure.
As an alternative, I explore the metaphor of the network in the actor-network
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theory of the 1980’s. This metaphor, I argue, is much better equipped to study
evolving processes in which ordering comprises multiple entities, some of
which are material objects like counters. However, actor-network theory has
also been criticised for being overly concerned with a centred, managerial
view of ordering. This criticism is taken into account by some recent science
and technology studies, which are sometimes referred to as “the performative
turn“.
In chapter four, I explore the concept of performance, which can be defined as
“unbounded, materially heterogeneous, recursive processes or patterns that
can be imputed to the social”. I review a number works that deal with
performance in three different but supplementary ways. One
conceptualisation of performance describes the patterns of the social as a
number of interdependent mini-discourses or modes of ordering. A second
conceptualisation describes the patterns of the social as the performance of
different types of space. Thirdly, the patterns of the social have been
conceptualised through the notion of multiple objects. In this mode of
analysis, an object is analysed as an assemblage of practices, that is a set of
ways in which the object is ‘done’ or performed. The three different
conceptualisations of performance are the primary theoretical tools, which I
carry to my analysis of my empirical material in the two following chapters. 
In chapter five, I present four cases from my study of the adult team. These
cases form a chronological story that traces the initial discussions about the
team project, the work of subdividing the team into three smaller units, and
the subsequent fate of this arrangement. In parallel with the presentation of
this story, I do some initial analytical work by imputing a number of
‘patterns’, ‘logics’, ‘programs’, or ‘performances’ to the material. The
patterns which I articulate in the initial analysis are akin to performance-as-
modes-of-ordering. At the end of chapter five, I argue, that the modes of
ordering in each of the four cases combine into the performance of a
particular kind of space. The argument is thus that a different kind of space is
performed in each of the four cases. In continuation of this, I describe the kind
of work that maintains each of the spatial configurations as well as the kinds
of work that produces a shift from one configuration to the next. 
In the chapter six, I critically review my earlier depiction of my account as a
network. At this point I argue, that my key notions of spatial configurations
and modes of ordering are mutually implicated rather than organised in a
network of superior and subordinate entities. Drawing on this image of
implicatedness, I introduce the multiple-objects-version of performance as an
additional theoretical resource, which can feed on and feed the previous
conceptualisations. With this additional theoretical resource I embark on the
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analytical strategy of following a number of objects as they are translated
from one spatial configuration to another. This analysis explicates a number
of interdependencies as well as antagonistic relations between the spatial
configurations.
In chapter seven, I summarise the argument and discuss some possible
implications. In continuation of the previous analyses of interdependencies
between the spatial configurations, I argue that the obduracy of these ‘blocks’
in part depend on the development of temporary techno-social arrangements.
A crucial aspect of the development of competence in the team project is thus
the construction of a series of short-lived arrangements that prevent ‘blocks’
such as managerial rights and professional authority from colliding
catastrophically. The assertion that temporary arrangements are crucial to the
performance of ‘blocks’ suggests a supplement to the research agenda of
science and technology studies; previously this field has focused almost
exclusively on objects that are (or aspire to be) durable. Finally, I outline two
methodological procedures, which may guide the investigation of temporary
techno-social arrangements.
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Chapter Two 
On the Construction 
of Facts in Social Science
In the introduction, I described my access to the team project and how I
collected 200 pages of field notes. The question, which I will address in this
chapter, is what to do with this stack of paper. How is it possible to combine
these numerous scattered pieces of information into a coherent account?
Being a constructionist, I am of course not trying to make a too singular, too
grand, or too coherent narrative. But I still must bring some measure of order
to my pile of notes. 
But what exactly is so difficult about it? Steinar Kvale (1994) suggests one
answer. He has written about a question, which he sometimes gets from his
students. The question is this: How do I find a method to analyse the 1000
pages of transcribed interviews, which I have gathered? Kvale's answer is
"Never put yourself in a situation, where you can ask this question". That is,
do not collect this amount of material!
Kvale is undoubtedly right that sheer quantity will cripple the researcher’s
ability to deal with the material. But I think there is another and more
fundamental problem in qualitative research, a problem that I consider myself
faced with even though my material is well below 1000 pages. The problem is
how to combine different types of data. I will call this the combination
problem. 
An example from my own material will illustrate this. From the long list of
observations during one day, I can randomly pick out these four: 
• The tables in the meeting room are placed in a horseshoe formation.
• The chief consultant has been working in the consulting firm for 13 years. 
• The team manager suggests that the team should be divided into
geographical subgroups.
• A home advisor asks for another team meeting, where he can explain the
organisation of his professional group to the rest of the team.
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I cannot imagine that these four pieces of observation make a whole lot of
sense to the reader. And that is exactly the point. Data1 have to be connected,
framed, or combined in some way in order to become a coherent, meaningful
account. The question is how we as social scientists manage to do such
combination work? How does one link a request, a suggestion, a piece of
bibliographical information, and a particular arrangement of furniture? What
are the resources and methods for associating the numerous heterogeneous
elements that are collected during a field observation?
To amplify this question, I will make a contrast to a very explicit and elegant
example of data combination. The example is drawn from the teaching of
natural science in schools. When students have been introduced to the Gas
Law (P?V = N?k?T) most of them are able to juggle completely different types
of data, such as pressure, volume and temperature. With this formula the
students seem to know what can be fitted together, how to fit these entities
together, what the outcome of this combination is. The combination of
heterogeneous data is thus, in the context of schools physics, a relatively
simple but highly effective routine. This leads me to yet another formulation
of the combination problem: Do we, the social scientists, have any magic
formulas? And if we do, what are they? 
A Case Study of the Combination Problem - Latour &
Woolgar’s Construction of Facts
Although social science texts that report on field studies may be extremely
different there are certain textual moves, which can be anticipated. One would
always expect a number of different types of data to be introduced, and one
would always expect these data to be combined in some way or another in the
course of the text. For this reason it must be possible to dissect a social
science text line by line in order to reveal the combination tricks or magic
formulas, which are used by the author. 
In the following, I will apply this investigative procedure, this reverse
sociology, on a particular social science text. The text is chapter two in Latour
& Woolgars book “Laboratory Life - the construction of scientific facts”
(1979/1986). This chapter is an account of the daily practice in a
                                             
1 In this chapter I talk about data and ontology (or theory) as two different kinds. This is only partially
intended. When two entities are combined in a specific event, one of them may figure in the role of
substance (data), while the other may figure in the role of form (ontology). But, since all data are
theory-impregnated, the data-entity has already played the role of form in relation to other substances.
And since any theory will be the object of later interpretation, the theory-entity will later play the role
of substance. So when I talk about data and ontology I am not referring to inherent qualities, but to
relational identities in particular events. For similar arguments see Latour (1999, chap. 2) or Massumi
(1999, chap. 1).
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neuroendocrinological laboratory in California, based on an extended period
of participant observation by one of the authors.
Latour & Woolgar’s text is not an arbitrary choice. It is, for several reasons, a
fertile ground for an exploration of the combination problem. First, it could be
argued, that the text is an extra-ordinarily successful example of data
combination; it draws on a broad spectrum of empirical material, and it
concludes with a network-image of scientific fact construction, which is, even
today, highly influential and frequently referenced in the field of science
studies. So there is reason to believe, that Latour & Woolgar handled their
combination problem well, and that something can be learned from the way
they did it. 
Second, the text makes no attempt to disguise the combination work. On the
contrary, Latour & Woolgar make a virtue of presenting their research as an
active ordering process rather than a neutral reporting of facts. To emphasise
this constructionist perspective they have invented a fictional character, which
they call the anthropological observer. The text unfolds as a description of the
observer’s bewilderment at his first encounter with the laboratory, his
attempts at gathering information, and his work to create a meaningful
account. This account is of course gefundene Fressen in the context of my
discussion of the combination problem. 
Third, the text itself directly addresses the issue of how facts are constructed.
In due time, I will argue that the network-metaphor, which Latour & Woolgar
develop, is also applicable to the construction of facts in social science. 
As I said before, Latour & Woolgar analyse how facts are constructed by
natural scientists. In my analysis, I will piggyback on Latour & Woolgar
account in order to explore how they, a couple of social scientists, make their
facts. More specifically, I will analyse three different methods, which Latour
& Woolgar’s observer uses to combine data. First, he combines the data into a
description of the laboratory. Second, he sets up a functional explanation of
the laboratory practice. And third, he orders his data into an account of the
laboratory as a ‘knot’ in a large network of laboratories. The three methods
are used consecutively; the result of the description is reworked by the
functional account, which is again re-ordered by the network image. In the
course of this, new data types are continually added and the scope of the
explanation is enlarged. In the following, I will track this combinatory
accomplishment step by step. 
1. Description
The very first thing that the observer notices as he enters the lab, is what he
terms ‘the striking distinction’ between two areas: 
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One area of the laboratory (section B [..]), contains various items of
apparatus, while the other (section A) contains only books, dictionaries,
and papers. Whereas in section B individuals work with apparatus in a
variety of ways: they can be seen to be cutting, sewing, mixing, shaking,
screwing, marking, and so on; individuals in section A work with written
materials: either reading, writing, or typing. Furthermore, although
occupants of section A, who do not wear white coats, spend long periods
of time with their white-coated colleagues in section B, the reverse is
seldom the case. Individuals referred to as doctors read and write in offices
in section A while other staff, known as technicians, spend most of their
time handling equipment in section B. (Ibid, p.45)
The procedure, which the observer uses to produce this description, takes its
point of departure in a particular type of data: physical space. This type of
data is divided into A and B, and subsequently a number of other,
subordinate, data types are sorted under these rubrics. 
Data type Property Property
Physical spaces
(superior)
Section A Section B
Objects
(subordinate)
books, dictionaries... apparatus
Work processes
(subordinate)
read, write, type cutting, sewing, mixing..
Clothing
(subordinate)
do not wear white coats white coats
Placement of
people
(subordinate)
occupants of A spend time 
in A and B
occupants of B spend time 
in B
Naming of
people
(subordinate)
referred to as doctors referred to as technicians
Figure 1. The structure of the description
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Evidently, the observer manages to combine a number of data types with this
description. His method is to distribute the properties of the subordinate data
types under the superior data type (physical space). In this process the
subordinate data types are ordered in a way that supports the A/B-distinction
which was the starting point of the description.
If we take the combination of physical space and work processes as an
example, the observer’s method can be described by to steps: 
This seemingly naive description is a highly efficient way of combining
different data types. Within a few lines at least six different data types are tied
together with the effect that physical space seems like a well-established fact
in Latour and Woolgars text. A fact that is supported by a long series of
observation data.
Description as a combination method is not only effective; it is also low cost.
Let us assume that the temperature, the flooring, and the chronology is exactly
the same in section A and section B. Would this ruin the observers description
of the “striking difference” between A and B? Certainly not. A description
can be maintained as long as just some data types can be enlisted to support
the difference. From the example we can also gather that not even a clear
distinction is necessary. The description is not ruined by the fact that
occupants of A sometimes visit B, while the reverse is seldom the case. So
from this short analysis it seems safe to conclude that when it comes to
descriptions, almost anything can be combined!
But precisely because description is such a quick and effortless method of
combination, it is easy to produce alternative descriptions. With the
observer’s data one could have picked “work process” as the superior data
type. A distinction between mental labour and manual labour could then have
been drawn, and the properties of all the other data types could have been
organised under these headings. The description would now take the
following form: “There is a striking distinction between mental labour and
manual labour in the laboratory. Mental labour is carried out in the offices by
1. Work process is differentiated into a number of properties:
Read, write, type, cut, sew, mix...
2. The properties are distributed according to physical space:
Section A [read, write, type] vs. Section B [cut, sew, mix...]
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doctors with the aid of books, while manual labour is done by the technicians,
in the bench with the aid of apparatus”. Keine Hexerei, nur Behendigkeit!
The combination work of description is a useful first step, because it helps the
researcher get beyond his initial stage of bewilderment, as he confronts a
sizeable and diverse material. However, description is more than that. It is a
necessary prerequisite for establishing an explanation. If data are not made
data about something, then the text makes no sense. Some kind of active
ordering, which in the practice of social science, is achieved with the aid of
concepts, is necessary to move beyond the meaningless chaos of the “raw”
data.
The observer’s choice of physical space as the organising point of departure
have particular consequences; It appears below, that observer’s next move is
to raise the question: What is the relation between section A and section B?
This question can only be raised because A and B have been constructed as
realities through the description. The description constructs particular
realities, and with that particular possibilities for and constraints on the
questions that can be asked in the further investigation. 
I have shown that the description could easily have taken a different starting
point. This, however, was not meant to indicate that the observer’s choice of
physical space was arbitrary. Anthropology has a long-standing interest in the
physical structures created by different cultural groups. It is therefore no
surprise that Latour & Woolgar’s “anthropological observer” selects physical
space as his point of departure. An imaginary “psychological observer” would
have been more inclined to select different types of individual acts or
psychological functioning as his point of departure. In this case, the
distinction between mental and manual labour would be more likely. 
So the naive description draws on and reproduces particular scientific
traditions. Particular realities are constructed through this, and these realities
enable and constrain the further investigation. Description is simultaneously
light and heavy. On the one hand it is a quick and effortless juxtapositioning
of data types. On the other hand, description is a moment where scientific
traditions heavily manifest themselves in the selection of a superior data type,
and in the use of all other data types as means to construct the reality
announced by this superior data type.
2. From description to function
As I argued above, academic opponents and other sceptics can easily set up
one or more alternative descriptions. They simply have to select a new
superior data type. For that reason pure description rarely suffice as social
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scientific facts. So ambitious social scientists like Latour & Woolgar rapidly
move on to more advances types of combination work.
The observer uses the description to pose the next problem: What is the
relation between A and B? This problem he attempts to solve by comparing
the laboratory to a factory and to an administrative agency. However, these
comparisons make no sense; The papers that move from B to A in the
laboratory can neither be seen as production reports (as in the case of a
factory) nor are they material to be processed according to particular rules (as
in the case of an administrative agency).
Although the comparisons yield no direct results, they do inspire the observer
to regard the laboratory as a unit with a particular function. The participants in
the laboratory are sympathetic to this functional perspective, and they inform
the observer that the function of the laboratory is the annual production of
about forty scientific papers.
The observer’s next move is to investigate how these articles are produced.
His attention is caught by the office desk of one of the doctors. On the left
side of the desk there are open books and periodicals. To the right there are
curves, diagrams and tables, which have been produced in the laboratory
bench. The observer remarks: “It is as if two types of literature are being
juxtaposed: one type is printed and published outside the laboratory; the other
type comprises documents produced within the laboratory.." (p.47, emphasis
in original). Juxtapositioning takes place, for instance, when an article is
drafted: A number of other articles are quoted, and particular statements from
these articles are discussed and challenged by means of the documents
produced within the laboratory. 
The observer can now conclude that the product of the laboratory is
constructed through juxtapositioning of external literatures with internally
produced documents. Thus the relation between A and B is, that section B
produces the documents that are used in section A. But the observer still
needs to understand exactly how the internal documents are produced. 
His next step is to move to the laboratory bench, where he makes a number of
observations of the work processes from the preparation of an experiment to
the drafting of the pieces of paper that end up on the doctor’s desk. He
watches laboratory technicians make a number of careful registrations before
an experiment. He watches how rats are given injections, how samples are
taken from these rats, how the samples are placed in tubes, mixed with
chemicals and refrigerated. Later he sees the samples being placed in a
machine that produces sheets of figures. These figures are used as input to a
computer that prints out a data sheet, which is finally transformed to a curve
28
by a technician. The paper with the curve is the document, which is brought
into section A.
The observer has now described the laboratory as a productive unit: He has
identified the product, and he has outlined the production process from rats
and chemicals in one end to finished articles in the other. 
From the above account, we can now analyse how the observer constructs a
functional explanation. The first step is to evoke the idea that his object of
explanation is functional; That is the idea that the laboratory serves a
particular goal, and that this goal explains the laboratory’s organisation and
practice. This is a fairly easy step for the observer. Firstly, because ideas of
functionality are widespread in our culture (this is how we understand
factories and administrative agencies). Secondly, because the participants
themselves think of the laboratory as functional; without further ado they
point out the scientific articles as the product of the laboratory’s functional
working. 
After the product has been pointed out, the next step is to move backwards
from the final product to the earlier construction processes. The explanation is
successful if an unbroken production chain can be established; Output from
the first production event should be input to the next and so on and so forth;
until the final product. 
It is clear that a functional explanation combines a number of data types:
work processes, locations in the laboratory, machines, documents etc. But just
as in the case of the naive description, there is no magic formula, which
prescribes that certain data types go together in a certain way. The data types
are merely combined by means of the notion that particular production events
presuppose each other in a particular order. The publication of an article
presupposes that internal and external literatures have been juxtaposed. The
juxtapositioning presupposes that the internal literature (e.g. the curve) has
been produced. The existence of the curve presupposes that sheets of figures
have been printed out from the computer, etc.
Every single production event is a compound. As an example, the observer’s
first event contains the doctor (a type of person), his desk (a type of furniture),
articles and data sheets (types of literature), juxtapositioning (a type of work
process) and his office (a type of physical space). An event is thus the
combination of all the types of data, the observer sees on one particular
occasion. In other words: proximity in time and space is what combines a
number of data types into an event. Thus the construction of an event does not
require any translation between data types: The event is constructed through
the observation.
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I argued above, that descriptions are effortless because there are almost no
limits as to where you can start and which data types you can enrol. This
lightness does pertain to the functional explanation. First, the observer is
forced to start with the final product. Second, he is forced to relate to the
participants’ idea of what the final product is. Third, the functional
explanation project generates a series of questions that he must answer: How
is the product assembled? Where did the parts come from? How were the
parts produced? To answer these questions he must seek out events and
produce some answers from these events. He is literally forced round the
house in order to piece his explanation together. 
In every single event, the observer excerpts those particular aspects that can
be interpreted as contributions to the function of the laboratory. In this way,
the events and data types, which are used, are made synonymous with their
contribution to the function. Obviously, this focus on functionality implies
that many other things are brought out of focus. If an event contributes to the
function it is noted. But if the event or parts of it do not contribute, it is passed
by in silence. So production events are the only kinds of events that are
represented through this method. The functionality of the laboratory is an
explanation, or a fact, that speaks on behalf of all the production events, that
the observer has meticulously found, arranged in order and extracted the
functional aspect of.
In the beginning of the text, the observer constructed the physical space by
arranging a number of data types as sources of this reality. In a similar
manner, he has now organised a number of data types as sources of the
functionality of the laboratory. The functionality is constructed as a reality
through making function re-present a number of data about the laboratory.
3. From function to network
The observer’s third transformation of data expands the perspective from the
specific neuroendocrinological laboratory to a comprehensive network of
laboratories. To undertake this expansion, the observer introduces a particular
theoretical concept, namely phenomenotechnique. This concept was
developed by Gaston Bachelard (1894-1962), a French philosopher of science
who was greatly inspired by the development of nuclear physics in the first
half of the 20th century (Castelão-Lawless, 1995).
Bachelard claims that modern science does not discover it’s objects (such as
the quark) but rather constructs them in laboratories through the use of
advanced technology. Consequently, it makes no sense to talk of the objects
of science independently of the technology through which they are realised at
a particular historical moment. The reality of science is not objective in itself
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but a phenomenotechnical reality consisting of particular technical and social
arrangements, which enable the construction of particular objects. 
Inspired by the concept of phenomenotechnique, the observer takes a closer
look at the technical equipment of the laboratory. Borrowing a concept from
Derrida, he describes the apparatuses as inscription devices, because each of
them is able to transform a substance into an inscription on a piece of paper: a
number, a curve, a mark or the like. The observer realises that every
inscription device has been specifically invented to assist in the construction
of laboratory objects. For example, the centrifuge developed by Svedberg in
1924, made it possible to create the notion of protein by allowing
undifferentiated substances to be discriminated by spinning (ibid, p.65). By
means of further investigation, the observer finds out, that the inscription
devices have appeared in the literature of other scientific fields at earlier
points in time. However, the debates over the inscription devices and the
objects they construct have been ended a long time ago. The equipment of the
neuroendocrinological laboratory can thus be regarded as the materialised
result of closed debates.
In this analysis the observer makes use of Bachelard's concept to link three
different types of data; (1) the objects of the laboratory or the phenomena
appearing in the discussions among the scientists, (2) the technical
apparatuses through which the phenomena are constructed, and (3) particular
theories in other scientific fields. 
The analysis is in agreement with the earlier functional explanation; with the
concept of phenomenotechnique the observer depicts scientific debates and
their materialisation in technical apparatuses as prerequisites for the
functionality of the laboratory. In this way the analysis of apparatuses and
their history supplements the functional explanation of the laboratory. 
However, the observer carries this analysis even further. He argues that
technical apparatuses in the form of inscription devices are not just input to
the laboratory. When laboratory work succeeds, articles are produced, and in
lucky instances particular scientific debates are closed. This results in the
creation of a scientific fact, which can be made the basis of new inscription
devices. Consequently, inscription devices are the prerequisites for as well as
the outcome of laboratory activity. Input as well as output. 
By this the observer creates a new image of the laboratory. Earlier he
described it as an isolated functional chain. But now the laboratory is viewed
as a junction in a network. So the Bachelard-inspired analysis starts by
supplementing the functional explanation (add prerequisites to the function),
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but ends up transgressing it by viewing the laboratory as something different
from a closed functional system.
The image now evoked is that of a comprehensive network of laboratories,
which over an extended period of time construct inscription capabilities,
distribute them in the form of inscription devices, and make these devices the
basis of new inscriptions. This network image is possible, because the
observer, drawing on Bachelard, establishes an essential similarity between
the laboratory input (technique-that-constructs-particular-objects) and output
(theories-of-particular-objects-which-can-be-materialised-in-technique). The
establishment of this similarity between input and output is the move that
enables the observer to use his earlier analysis of a single laboratory to depict
the entire network. 
The implicit argument is this: How do the other laboratories produce the input
that we receive? Answer: In the same way that this laboratory produces the
output, which is passed on to the other laboratories. 
So by using the phenomenotechnique to establish a similarity between input
and output, the observer establishes similarity between the construction work
in this laboratory and in all other laboratories. He can now depict the entire
world in the image of the laboratory, and he can make claims about many
places even though he has only been in one place. This final reorganisation
and combination of data is thus another widening of the scope of the account,
and a fairly remarkable one at that. 
A Constructionist View of Facts
In the beginning of this chapter, I asked the question: How do social scientists
manage to combine heterogeneous data into a coherent account? Through my
dissection of Latour & Woolgars text, I came across three different methods
by which the observer handles the combination problem. Each of these
combine data in a specific way thus creating three different images of what
the laboratory is - three different ontologies. 
The observer established a description by making one data type superior
(physical space) where upon a number of other data types were organised
accordingly. The functional explanation was created by assuming that the
laboratory is functional, then point out the product (articles), and finally trace
a chain of production events leading to the product. The network explanation
was produced through the engagement of a theoretical concept
(phenomenotechnique) that created an essential similarity between laboratory
input and output. This allowed for an image of the laboratory as a part of a
network rather that just an isolated functional system. 
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The observer’s combination work oscillates between moving the ontology and
moving the data. In the description he establishes the ontology by distributing
the subordinate data types. In the functional explanation he sets out with the
ontological assumption, that the laboratory is functional, and subsequently he
gathers the data that can substantiate this explanation. In the final part of the
text he collects information on the technical equipment of the laboratory. This
initially confirms an established ontology (the laboratory as a functional
system) but later it enables the move to a new network ontology.
So the case contains one example of ontology before data (function), one
example of data before ontology (network), and one example of a more or less
simultaneous establishment of the two (description). Consequently, the work
of the observer is neither simply inductive nor deductive. It is rather an
ontological-empirical tinkering involving continual expansions and
reorganisations of both ontology and data. This combination work associates
more and more data types corresponding with a successive broadening of the
account. 
The observer’s course of action is contrary to the standard recommendations
of deductionists such as Yin (1994). According to Yin a successful case study
depends on a specification of the ontological dimensions of the phenomenon
beforehand. If a case study in progress discovers new dimensions of the
phenomenon, the case at hand must be redefined as a pilot study, the original
design must be altered, and the case study must start over.
Latour & Woolgars text, which is considered to be a classic within science
studies, illustrates that ontological changes in the course of action are not
necessarily a problem. On the contrary it is by virtue of the observer’s
continual introduction of new ontologies and reorganisation of the data that
the scope of the text continues to increase. The ontological Puritanism and
self-inflicted restraints of Yin is not necessarily a more productive strategy
than Latour & Woolgar's ontological festival.
Transformative growth
There can be little doubt that the scope of Latour & Woolgars analysis
increases through the text. It moves from the physical layout of a single
laboratory to the image of a comprehensive network of laboratories. The
question, however, is how to conceptualise this kind of growth.
One metaphor for the growth of social science could be the voyages of
discovery in the 19th century. At this time the contours of the continents were
known, but within the continents a number of white spots still awaited a
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closer inspection. The purpose of these voyages was to specify the detail of
what was already known in broad outline. This metaphor clearly doesn’t
cover the work of the observer; His initial establishment of the physical space
is not followed by a stream of more detailed descriptions of space.
Another possible metaphor for social science could be the voyages of
discovery before the 19th century. These expeditions did not fill in white
spots; they discovered new worlds beside to the old one. This metaphor seems
more suitable for the work of the observer. He first describes the physical
space, then the function of the laboratory, and then the network relations. But
the metaphor of a supplementary expedition is also seriously flawed. The
different ontologies are in no way neatly juxtaposed, they rather seem to
overlap and extend over each other. The idea of laboratory function is not a
reality lying next to the physical space of the laboratory. The idea of function
incorporates the physical space, making the latter a means to the function.
Similarly, the observer doesn’t position the-laboratory-in-the-network as a
reality next to function. The function is incorporated in the image of the
network and the data establishing the function are reorganised, to be evidence
of the laboratory in the network. One example of this is the observation of the
juxtapositioning of literatures. This piece of data is depicted as a production
event in the functional explanation, but later it becomes evidence of the
laboratory’s engagements in a scientific network.
The development in Latour & Woolgars text is best characterised as
transformative growth. Earlier ontologies and data are used as means to
establish new ontologies and collect new data. Consequently, the observer
does not cumulate knowledge in any simple, linear way. Through tinkering he
reaches positions that can organise even more data types around even wider
ontological claims. The process entails a continual abandonment of ontologies
and continual reorganisation of data, in order to make them sources of new
realities. 
Ontologies as the inscription devices of social science
The concept of inscription device is undoubtedly a central point in Latour &
Woolgars analysis. The laboratory constructs its scientific objects by means
of inscription devices, and the distribution of these devices are constitutive of
the network of laboratories. 
There is a striking resemblance between the role of inscription devices in the
laboratory and the role ontologies in Latour & Woolgars text. 
One example is the ontological claim of the laboratory’s functionality. The
moment the observer accepts this claim, he is enabled to inscribe data in
specific way: 
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• To formulate the question of what the product is.
• To extract the functional aspect of particular events, thus making them
production events.
• To arrange the production events as a chain of production based on the
idea that the product is assembled by a number of parts. 
In this way, the ontology of functionality makes it possible to inscribe data
that constructs the phenomenon of functionality. When these data are
gathered and ordered into a chain of production, they are considered a direct
indication of the ‘underlying’ functionality of the laboratory. The observer
(and possibly the reader) is convinced that the laboratory is in fact functional. 
My argument, then, is that ‘functionality’ is a phenomenotechnical reality
constructed in Latour & Woolgars text in exactly the same way as the
biochemical substances are phenonemotechnical realities constructed in the
laboratory. 
A further parallel between inscription devices and ontologies is their ability to
be distributed in networks. Latour & Woolgars analysis is only possible
because they apply a number of ontologies from common sense of western
societies and social science literature. Among these ‘space’, ‘function’ and
‘phenomenotechnique’. However, Latour & Woolgar themselves also produce
new ontologies. The most significant one of these is the notion of the
network, which has later been seized, utilised and transformed by many other
social scientists (see Law & Hassard, 1999).
Latour & Woolgars image of natural science can thus be applied to social
science as well: The facts of social science are not discoveries but
constructions dependent on inscription devices in a network2. 
Some principles of a constructionist methodology
My reading of Latour & Woolgar is obviously not an attempt to make a
traditional academic critique. I have not searched for internal inconsistencies
in the text, and I have not attempted to deconstruct their analysis by relating it
to other studies. To the contrary, I have tried to positively account for the
relatively simple and mundane steps that are used to combine data into a
                                             
2 The present analysis of the combination work in Latour & Woolgars text is not a discovery either.
My analysis is a construction that has been established through the meticulously application of a
number of ontologies, such as the idea of a combination problem and the idea of different data types.
35
coherent and persuasive account. Against this backdrop, I will extract three
methodological principles, which I will use as guidelines for my own
construction of facts. 
Ontological pluralism. The analysis illustrates that a continual development
of the ontology within the text can be fruitful. Earlier ontologies should not be
regarded as mistakes, but rather as necessary ordering attempts that pave the
way for later and more comprehensive ordering efforts. Consequently, the
deductionist recommendation of adopting one particular ontology in the
design phase is rejected. 
Empirical pluralism. The analysis demonstrates that a study can expand its
scope and increase its strength by employing a plurality of data types.
Heterogeneity is an advantage, not a disadvantage. This observation leads to a
rejection of the widespread tendency that social scientific subdisciplines
attempt to purify and monopolise a small number of data types.
Social science as net-work. The individual researcher does not discover the
world anew and by his own strengths. His social scientific facts are
constructions enabled by the ontologies / inscription devices available. Social
science should thus be regarded as a comprehensive network, in which
combinations of ontologies and data are continually transformed.
The Combination Problem in the Methodological Literature
Having formulated my general view of fact construction in social science, I
will now broaden my search for combination methods that are applicable to
my data. An obvious place to look is of course the literature on methodology.
This literature explicitly attempts to define guidelines for collection, analysis
and interpretation of data. But rather surprisingly I have found, that the
combination problem tends to slip out of this literature (see Elgaard Jensen,
1999b). 
Deductionists recommend that the ontological dimensions of the phenomenon
be defined in the design phase. This means that the types of data, and the way
in which they should be fitted together is treated as a theoretical discussion,
which should be solved beforehand (e.g. Yin). And this means that the
deductionists have very little advice to offer a researcher who has already
collected a pile of heterogeneous data.
Inductionists, on the other hand, maintain that combination work must be
done along the way. But they have an unfortunate tendency to describe this
work as unique in every single case. In the words of Norman Denzin:
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 “Every action in the field provides new definitions, suggests new
strategies, and leads to continuous modifications of initial research designs.
Like other forms of interaction, sociological research reflects the emergent,
novel, and unpredictable features of ongoing activity [..] To summarize,
methodological triangulation [i.e. the combination of different types of
data, TEJ] involves a complex process of playing each method off against
the other so as to maximize the validity of field efforts” (Denzin, 1970,
p.310)
In this account, Denzin emphasises the particular aspects of the research
process that are impossible to investigate, and he omits those aspects that
could be analysed more closely. He is undoubtedly right, that research like
other forms of interaction has emergent features. But what he doesn’t mention
is that research - again like other forms of interaction - displays structural,
ordered, and patterned features, which can be analysed. And this analysis
might, when its object is scientific work, be passed on in the form of
combination tricks or inscription devices.  
Of course, the rigorous deductionists and inductionists, whom I have
mentioned here, do not exhaust the methodological literature. A number of
authors have attempted to outline practical, explicit and systematic methods
which can be applied in qualitative studies. These methods are neither a
matter of theoretical preconceptions, nor are they novel, unpredictable
features of the research activity. 
Miles & Huberman (1994) are probably the best known representatives of this
practical and explicit approach to data analysis. They present a number of
procedures, which will allow the researcher to order and combine data. I will
briefly present some of these methods, which I have used in my own
combination work. 
Displays. One of Miles & Huberman’s key recommendations for initial data
analysis is the use of matrix displays. The key purpose of this is to cross two
(or more) dimensions of data to see how they interact (ibid, p 239). Among
the numerous examples described in the book, Miles & Huberman presents a
matrix display of events in a school system related to the implementation of a
reading program (ibid, p.93-94). This table has consecutive time periods
along one dimension, and different levels of the schools system along the
other (from state level to individual schools) along the other. This and other
matrices systematically combine data in a way that closely parallels the work
done by Latour & Woolgar’s description. The ontology indicated by the
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headline of a column (‘time period X’) is supported by the data in the cells
below it. And the difference between this column and the neighbouring one is
supported by the different data in the two columns. 
Coding is another well-known data combination method. “Codes are tags or
labels for assigning units of meaning to the (..) information compiled during a
study. Codes are usually attached to ‘chunks’ of varying size - words, phrases,
sentences, or whole paragraphs..” (ibid., p.56). Miles & Huberman distinguish
between various types of codes. Descriptive codes merely attempt to label the
activity in a particular section of the data. With interpretative codes the
researcher tries to look ‘behind’ the events, for instance by attributing a
particular motives to the actors. Finally, a pattern code is an attempt to
indicate a particular recurring pattern or logic in the data. Irrespective of the
type of coding, the procedure seems to be yet another practical and systematic
way of managing the work of combining data with particular ontologies.
Furthermore, an important benefit of the method seems to be that it makes the
success and failure of the combination work visible. Through coding, it may
become clear that certain ontologies can be supported by many pieces of data,
whereas it may seem impossible to gather much support for certain other
ontologies. 
Memos. Miles & Huberman quote Glaser’s definition of a memo. “[A memo
is] a theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they
strike the analyst while coding (..) it can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few
pages (..) it exhausts the analyst’s momentary ideation based on data with
perhaps a little conceptual elaboration”3 The potential benefit of writing
memos is that it allows the researcher to toy with a number of ideas of how to
relate different ontologies and data. In this way, it may stimulate the
ontological pluralism as well as the move toward more comprehensive
orderings of the material. 
The Combination Work in my Study of the Team Project
I will now turn to my own work of ordering and combining the heterogeneous
pile of data, which resulted from my fieldwork. The following account will
include practicalities about this work as well as reflections on my use of
inscription devices, combination methods and forms of pluralism. 
                                             
3 Quoted from Glaser, B. (1978).
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During the entire period of fieldwork I wrote theoretical memos of the sort
recommended by in the Grounded Theory approach4. During the bothersome
work of typing my field notes, I often got ideas of how to order the material.
At these moments I wrote a memo on each idea or theoretical concept. Some
of my memos also contained links to other theoretical concepts and some
included empirical questions, which I might pursue on my next visits to the
local centre. 
One of my memos looked like this: 
Memo 4
May 5th, 1999
Different constructions of the local centre
The local centre is constructed in at least four different ways in the introductory
meeting for new teams: 
1. Functional in relation to the users’ needs.
Talk about the meaning of the centre to specific types of users.
2. As a place where a particular professionalism is exercised. 
Talk about what is professionally acceptable - references to methods, casework and
educational background. 
3. The centre as a point in a statistical distribution. 
The centre is compared to other centres or municipalities, or it is argued, that things
are possible elsewhere. Inscription devices: usually surveys or reports from consulting
firms. 
4. The centre as a political signal
The centre is taken to ‘emit’ particular signals, which the politicians are more or less
satisfied with. 
Figure 2. Example of a theoretical memo
I believe the continual writing of memos provided a good opportunity for
experimental writing about the material. It was, so to speak, a playground for
my empirical-ontological tinkering. It allowed me to get a clearer sense of
which combinations, I was able to make. But it also made me recognise that I
had a long way to go. There were vast amounts of material that I simply did
not know what to do with, and I had many theoretical ideas, which I could
only combine with very little data. 
                                             
4 See Glaser (1978) or Strauss (1987, chap. 5).
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An additional idea from the methodological literature, which tried I out, was
the process of coding. Using the N’vivo software, I worked through field
notes from a number of events. My codes I used were inspired by the analyses
of construction work in early actor-network theory (e.g. Callon 1986a, 1986b;
Latour 1987). From this I drew a number of theoretical concepts/codes such
as ‘problematisation’, ‘interessement’ and ‘enrolment’ (I will give a more
detailed account of these in chapter 3). By and large, the exercise of coding
turned out to be unproductive. It didn’t yield very many new perspectives on
the data, and it drained rather than raised my energies. In retrospect, I believe
the problem was that I was too unclear about which theoretical interests I
wanted to pursue in the material. And in such a ‘fluid’ situation, it is
necessary to continually move the data as well as the ontology. But the former
is much easier than the latter in the N’vivo software. For that reason the
software felt more like a stifling and bureaucratic obstacle than a helpful
organising tool. However, even though coding in itself didn’t produce much, I
think that this exercise also contributed to my continual work of figuring out,
what could and what couldn’t be constructed from my assemblage of data and
theoretical ideas. 
Further opportunities and obligations to order the material were created by the
reference group, which was set up in relation to my project. According to our
collaboration agreement (appendix 2) I was to write one report halfway
through my observation period, and shortly after I finished. 
In the first of these reports (Elgaard Jensen, 1999c), I chose to follow up on
the idea that reality is constructed and inscribed in various ways. More
specifically, I wanted to investigate how the four different professional groups
construct ‘the user’. I did this by gathering examples of what kind of
information or ‘dimensions’ the social workers within the professional groups
would use in their daily talk about the users. In the table below, I have listed
some examples from the report5. 
                                             
5 I will give a more detailed introduction to the professional groups in chapter five.
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Profes-
sional
group
Type of information about a user
(i.e. ontologies/inscription devices)
Examples
The services a client should receive. “cleaning”
“shopping”
“washing clothes”
Obstacles in the apartment “there are bugs again”
“a lousy vacuum cleaner”
“there is a carpet”
Home-
helpers
If the client is dangerous “he’s crazy - only men are allowed in
his apartment - he can only receive
help if he has taken his medication”
If the user is in the right office. “what is you social security number?”
“your case is still in X - you have to go
to the other end of the building”
The client’s usual conduct in
relation to the caseworkers
“she forgets the receipts”
“he makes bad excuses”
“he is very timid”
Case-
workers
How the user is ‘in the system’ “on supplementary benefits”
“on early retirement”
“the case hasn’t been followed up”
The physical location of the users 
(residents in supported housing)
“he is hospitalised with pneumonia”
“he wasn’t at home yesterday - I wrote
him a letter”
Evaluation of the condition of the
user
“she is intelligent but very fragile”
“he is self-destructive”
Home
advisors
The extent to which the user can
handle particular situations
“making a schedule for his day is a
disservice - it becomes a cross for him”
“the birthday went well”
“he is willing to go down to one visit a
week”
The psychiatric condition of the user “psychotic”
“paranoid delusions”
“doesn’t recognise his illness” 
Conflicts with others “complaints from the neighbours or
lawyers”
“he is perceived as threatening”
Support
persons
The quality of the contact with the
support person
“trust has been established”
“the client if fearful”
“the support person is allowed inside
the apartment”
“the client engages in talk about the
past and the future”
Figure 3. The different professional groups’ construction of the user
(excerpt from Elgaard Jensen, 1999c)
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In many ways, this way of ordering my data was satisfying. It gave me an
overview of the differences between the professional groups, which I didn’t
have before, and it was my most comprehensive and inclusive ordering of the
data for the time being. In addition, several of the social workers told me that
they recognised themselves in my description, and that they found it
interesting to read about the other professional groups. However, there were
also receptions of the report, which troubled me. In particular I was troubled
by a comment made by a manager in the central administration of the FLMA.
He said, that up to now I had described the different professionals’
perspectives, but now I should move on to describe the users’ perspective.
What made me uneasy about this was the manager’s assumption, that there
was a ‘true’ user-perspective out there, rather than a series of different
constructions of users6. To put it bluntly, I got the feeling that my
constructionist analysis had been highjacked by a realist. My second worry
was that my writing made it so easy for this manager to place himself outside
my description. He could describe himself as not a part of the game, as
someone who from a distance could point out that the users’ perspective had
been forgotten. I had no answer to this, since I had no analysis of the
inscription devices that he, the manager, was employing. I simply had to face
that I couldn’t argue against his reading of the report. But I also decided that
my next report would be more encompassing; I wanted to include
management in the story. 
In my second report (Elgaard Jensen, 2000b), I delineated two sets of actors
in the social administration. On the one hand the social work professionals
and on the other hand ‘the organisational people’. The latter group, I defined
as managers at various levels, central administrators and organisational
consultants.
In this report, I attempted to track the project through three consecutive time
periods. I took my point of departure in eight official goals of the team
project, which were presented by the organisational people to the
professionals at the introductory meeting. I then described how the goals were
negotiated, achieved, abandoned, deferred or changed over the course of the
three time periods. An excerpt of this analysis is presented below. 
                                             
6 Including the multiple, situated ways in which the users may inscribe themselves. 
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The
organisational people’s
definition of the team
project
The professionals’
response in period 1
The professionals’
response in period 2
The professionals’
response in period 3
Vision:
The user-centred
administration
[cannot be
contradicted]
do. do.
Organisation:
Teams as the key
building blocks in the
formal organisational
structure
[an established 
fact before time
period 1]
do. do.
Organisation: 
Subdivision of the team
based in differences in
the users’ needs.
(later addition: but
geographical grouping
is also acceptable)
(later addition: but the
professional groups are
allowed to criss-cross
the geographical
grouping)
[no comments] Participate in a
trial after
managerial
assurances about
necessary
resources, and the
maintenance of
professionalism.
Participate
reluctantly in the
trial - but only 5%
of the working
hours.
The role of the team
member: 
The team members
‘carry’ the team’s
competence
(later addition: but all
professional groups
maintain their core
area)
[no comments] emphasising
professional
differences
emphasising
professional
differences
Figure 4. The negotiation of team project goals (excerpt from Elgaard Jensen, 2000b)
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I think, this report was enlightening in the sense that it allowed me to combine
even more events, actors and observations into a coherent account. The report
also turned out to produce a predominantly negative commentary on the team
project. It seemed that a significant number of the managerial goals had not
been achieved. Certainly, the project had succeeded on the level of changing
the formal organisational structure (establishing teams on the organisational
chart), but the impact on daily work in the local centres seemed very small
indeed. I still believe that there is some point to this analysis, but I also grew
more and more dissatisfied with it. On the face of it, my analysis was critical
of management; it did not praise the managerial efforts, and it did not say that
the team project was a success. But on a more fundamental level, my analysis
colluded with a managerial perspective. It builds on the assumption that the
officially stated project goals constitute a proper definition of what the team
project is. This seems to be a rather limited and questionable ontological
assumption. Among other things it leaves out the different non-managerial
versions of what the project is. So I gradually arrived at the conclusion that I
had given the managers too much in the second report, whereas I gave too
much to the social work professionals in the first. 
There was one additional thing, which made me uneasy about the second
report. The description of the team project as a series of encounters between
managers and professionals tends to paint a very ‘humanistic’ portrait of the
team project. There is much focus on human verbal acts such as commenting
and agreeing, but the non-human actors are not very salient in the analysis. It
is almost as if the team project were merely an extended conversation
between managers and professionals. 
In chapter three and four, I will explore a series of theoretical resources,
which I can use to move beyond the conversational metaphor of the social.
The discussion begins with social learning theory, it then moves on to actor-
network theory, and it ends with recent work on performance. In chapter five
and six, I make the concept of performance the cornerstone of my final
ordering of the data. In these chapters, I attempt to give a detailed and
materialistic account of the ‘play’ between professionals and organisational
people. My final account is thus an outcome of a long process of empirical-
ontological tinkering. In this process, I have struggled in particular to expand
my account to accommodate the managerial as well as the non-managerial,
and the human as well as the non-human.
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Chapter Three
Learning Theory, 
Its Problems and Its Challengers
Learning is probably the most researched and discussed concept in
psychology (Gross, 1987) and in recent years there has been a wave of
interest in the so-called social learning theories in social psychology (eg. Lave
& Wenger 1991, Wenger 1998).  A standard textbook definition of learning
reads like this: “learning is a relatively relatively permanent change in
behavior or behavioral potential, that results from experience”. Relatively
permanent change was certainly one of the outcomes of the team project, but
the question is whether learning is the most adequate way to conceptualise
this change. In the following, I will argue that it is not.
I begin this chapter by exploring various learning theories and their problems.
I argue that learning theories all work by delineating systems1 of learning, and
that this underlying notion of system is problematic for a number of reasons.
The critical discussion of learning theories leads me to explore an alternative
metaphor for “relatively permanent change”, namely that of the network. I
present the use of this metaphor in actor-network theory, and I conclude by
indicating some of the recent criticisms and developments of the network
metaphor. 
Systems of Learning
I begin the discussion of learning theory with some of the earliest work on
learning, which also happens to be one of the first theories that is presented to
psychology students. I am of course talking about Pavlov and his salivating
dogs. 
The organism as an adaptive system
Psychology students are told that animals are born with instincts that cause
specific stimuli, such as the smell of food, to elicit specific responses, such as
salivation. This innate schema is useful in many situations. But in a changing
                                             
1 I use the standard definition of system as ”any set or group of elements or parts (..) organized for
definite purpose and in relation to an external environment” (Collins Dictionary of Sociology)
46
world too much pre-programming can also be inconvenient. This is where
learning, in the form of classical conditioning, enters the arena. 
Pavlov discovered that the salivation response can be linked to other stimuli
than food, for instance the sounding of a bell. The by now well-known trick is
to pair a conditional and an unconditional stimulus: sound the bell while
serving the food. And after a few trials the dog will start salivating when it
hears the bell, even though the food has not arrived yet. So the dog has
learned to adjust its response to a feature, which is specific to the local
environment: The fact that food and bell sounds come together in Pavlov’s
laboratory.
This is one of the marvellously simple and effective tricks that animals use to
improve the fit with the environment. The genetic makeup constitutes a pre-
programming, and on top of this, the animal adjusts its connections between
stimuli and responses according to the specific conditions of the environment. 
The analytical unit of Pavlov’s theory of learning is quite obviously the
organism. The organism is an adaptive system that receives input (stimuli)
and emits output (responses). The contribution of Pavlov was to infer the
learning processes inside the organism from close observation of input and
output. 
With this theory, the psychology textbooks can arrange all learning
systems/organisms on a progressive scale. At one end we find simple
organisms that are almost completely genetically predetermined. These
organisms have an extremely limited register of learning. Somewhere in the
middle we find pigeons, that have a fair amount of instinctual behaviour. But
a pigeon can also learn to play table tennis if it is trained by a proficient
learning theorist like B.F. Skinner. Finally, we have humans, positioned at the
far end of the spectrum where instinctual behaviour is limited, and where the
capacity for learning is greater than in any other animal. 
By now, it is clear to the psychology students, that the strategies of learning
and genetic adaptation are not equally good. Learning is a smart, flexible
strategy that humans excel at. Genetic adaptation is crude, rigid and rather
non-human. In later studies, the psychology student will find that a long list of
psychological buzzwords such as identity, competence, personality and
intelligence are closely linked to the human capacity for learning. So in the
discourse of behaviorism and psychology textbooks, learning is good.
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Systems within systems
There is, however, a further feature of behaviorism that deserves mentioning.
Learning is about maximising the gains for the organism. So Behaviorism
depicts the individual as an individualistic opportunist. The learning organism
is synonymous with economic man. 
Numerous authors before and after behaviorism have rejected the idea that the
world can be depicted as the war of all against all. There seems to be a very
widespread sentiment, that there is something more to the story; The world
cannot and should not be contained in the notion of selfish (albeit smart)
organisms. And so there have been many attempts to draw up a bigger picture
in which behaviorism could be engulfed2.  
A prominent example of this is the sociological theory of Talcott Parsons3.
Parsons set himself the task of explaining the social order, and he wanted to
do this without falling back on the assumption that every individual is simply
pursuing his own interests. Parsons’ solution to the problem of social order
was a grand hierarchical systems theory. 
The society is viewed as an encompassing system with a particular set of
functional prerequisites, or system needs. These needs give rise to a number
of social systems and institutions. The institutions in turn encompass a
number of positions furnished with particular roles and norms. Parsons
conceptualised the newborn individuals along the lines of psychodynamic
theories. The individual is born with a bundle of drives, needs, and instincts.
However, through the socialisation in the family and the education system,
the growing person learns the prevalent values, and comes to seek fulfilment
in societally acceptable ways. Parsons thus views the individual as a role
player in a basically fair and meritocratic system. The individual adapts to the
norms of society and he is rewarded by social acceptance and encouragement.  
The stories of behaviourism (and cognitivism) fit nicely into the Parsonian
framework. The learning theories explain the technicalities of how organisms
are conditioned to the environment. The Parsonian theory - in principle -
explains what the individual has to learn: the socially acceptable norms and
roles. Furthermore, Parsons explains why roles must be learned: because they
fulfil system needs and thus in the last instance contribute to the maintenance
of the social order. 
                                             
2 In this account, I am leaping over later versions of behaviourism as well as cognitivism. These
traditions are similar to early learning theory in that they take the individual organism to be the
learning system. Furthermore, these theories also define ’games’ in which humans are the most
advanced.  
3 The following account of Parsons’ theory is based on Layder (1994)
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So here we have a learning theory that engulfs the learning system of the
individual organism in the larger the social system. Learning thus becomes a
matter of socialisation, of ordering the individual parts within the societal
whole. 
Parsons’ functionalist theory has been criticised on a number of counts. First
of all it has been pointed out, that Parsons’ theory paints a far too harmonic
and conflict-free picture of society; Conflicts between classes, races or
genders are conspicuously absent. In continuation of this, functionalism has
been accused of an over-socialised conception of social action. Human action
is merely seen, as adaptation to societal roles. No play, creativity, cynicism,
obstruction, indifference or fooling around. Man is rendered a cultural dope.
One way to sum up the criticism is to say that Parsons’ organismic metaphor
of society was questioned. Parsons takes individuals, institutions and the rest
to be parts of an ordered whole. The opponents say, that these entities are
much less ordered and much more in conflict than Parsons' systemic theory
suggests.   
The broad critique of functionalism also had an impact on learning theory. In
fact, the critique hit very hard. In the first decades of learning theory,
adaptability was regarded as the brilliant quality that distinguished humans
from lesser creatures. But following the critique of functionalism, adaptability
was seen as the very mechanism by which humans could be made obedient,
docile followers of the existing social structure4. Thus Parsons might have
rescued learning from a discourse of economic man, but only to enrol learning
in a profoundly conservative and normative discourse of assimilation to
societally given norms and roles. So something had to be done, if learning
was to be rescued from the functionalist embrace. This is what the next series
of learning theories are about.
Systems of social learning
On the American academic scene, Ethnomethodology and (a revived)
Symbolic Interactionism were the most important successors to the Parsonian
dominance in the 50’s. The conceptualisation of social action in these theories
takes its point of departure in human face-to-face interactions. Emphasis is
placed on the emerging, negotiated and situated character of human actions.
Accordingly creativity, mutual recognition, and co-ordination of actions are
generated through interactional work. So the productive creativity, as well as
the credit for maintaining some measure of social order, is reclaimed from the
social system and given back to relatively small groups of interacting humans.
                                             
4 This critique was raised in various forms by a number of social psychologists, eg. Dreier (1979),
Holzkamp (1979), Mørch (1985), and Brückner (1979). 
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In terms of learning, these theories also break new ground. In behaviourism
and functionalism the adapting system is the individual organism. But
Symbolic Interactionism constructs a new adapting and generative system: the
interacting group of humans. This novel entity is the basis of the social
learning theory5 that has been developed for the past two decades. 
“Situated Learning” by Lave & Wenger (1991) is generally considered the
seminal book in social learning theory. Lave & Wenger discuss the
apprenticeship-style learning, in what they call communities of practice. Five
empirical examples are presented: A group of tailors in Nigeria,
quartermasters on a US navy vessel, a unit of Alcoholic Anonymous,
Butchers in an American  supermarket and Midwifes on the Mexican Yucatan
peninsular. On one hand the concept of community of practice draws on the
Marxist idea of productive, human practice (Lave, 1997). A community of
practice is defined by doing and producing something together. On the other
hand, there is a link to Symbolic Interactionism’s concept of social worlds.
Communities of practice imply some sort of continuous communication,
negotiation of meaning, and shared discursive repertoires (Wenger, 1998).
Thinking in terms of community of practice, the individual is no longer
depicted as an isolated receiver of pre-structured knowledge. The individual
in a community of practice is a participant. She performs tasks that are useful
contributions to the whole, and she takes part in the negotiation of meaning.
Lave & Wenger try to capture newcomers’ specific mode of engagement with
the term: legitimate peripheral participation. This term indicates that the
newcomer is initially given relatively easy tasks, where errors have relatively
minor consequences (peripherality). But these tasks are nevertheless useful
contributions to the community (participation), and therefore the person is
granted acceptance as a participant (legitimacy). In the process of doing
relatively simple tasks, the newcomer is placed in a position where she can
observe, hear about and get a feel for more mature practices. So legitimate
peripheral participation entails access to learning resources that are relevant to
the person’s future participation. Her position should not merely be viewed in
terms of the simple tasks, which she carries out at the moment. The present
position is a part of a learning trajectory that leads to more and more
involvement in the community. Consequently, the position is also constitutive
of her identity as a member of the community of practice. 
With this account of learning in practice, social learning theory can draw up a
number of sharp contrasts to cognitivism and functionalism. According to
social learning theory, the process of learning is not disembodied
                                             
5 Lave (1988), Lave & Wenger (1991), Wenger (1998).
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appropriation but legitimate peripheral participation. The content of learning
is not ’abstract’ propositions but expanded participation in lived communities
of practice. The learner is not an information processing individual brain, but
an embodied, positioned participant. The purpose or telos of learning is not
socialisation and inculcation of ready-made knowledges, but engagement in
the production of the world.
So briefly put, social learning theory reworks the concept of the learner, the
knowledge, the process of learning and the telos of learning. Learning is once
more rendered a good endeavour. 
After System: Blurred Boundaries of Content, Agent, and
Location
Up to this point I have constructed a developmental story of learning theories.
I have introduced the early conceptions of learning as individual adaptation. I
have described the structural-functionalistic embrace of this notion, relegating
individual learning to a supportive process in the sustenance of more
encompassing systems. Finally, I have outlined the latest version of the
learning system, the community of practice, which is advanced by social
learning theory in an attempt to restore learning as a worthy and indeed
admirable human endeavour
This story may be read as a search for the proper size of the learning system.
The unit of behaviorism was too small; there is more to the story than the
individual organism. The unit of structural functionalism was too big. It
created a whole out of parts that were really not parts, but entities in some
measure of conflict. Finally, social learning theory seems to have got it right.
It outlines a learning system beyond individualism and at a safe distance from
a consensual view of society. 
However, as I will argue in the following, there are reasons to believe that the
learning system of the community of practice isn’t right either. In fact, I will
argue that the very idea of systems of learning is problematic and that the hunt
for the properly sized learning system will never achieve its goal. The reason
is that the boundaries of learning systems are leaking. And that is the case for
any size of learning system. In the following I will examine some of these
boundaries: the boundaries of content, agent, and location. 
The boundary of the content of learning
In the history of learning theories, the content of learning seems to be
continually expanding.
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Behaviourism refused to deal with anything but observable behaviour.
Cognitivism added cognitive schemas related to internal reasoning and verbal
accounting. Structural functionalism added norms, values and roles. Social
learning theory added participation in communities of practice, which entails
a complicated web of relations between the community and the individual.
Learning is thus made a ubiquitous and integral aspect of practice
(Lave&Wenger, p.30-1). But the expansion of the content does not stop here:
In the mid-90’s social learning theorists considered the community of practice
to be the locus within which learning should be studied. Today, these authors
also focus on individuals’ multiple memberships and trajectories across
different communities (Dreier 1999), and they start to think about
constellations of a number of communities of practice (Wenger). 
The broadening of scope makes it increasingly hard to pinpoint the system of
learning. I believe there are two sources of this hardship. First, the
participating humans are not adequately defined as ‘parts’ of the present
community. They are also and simultaneously parts of something else.
Second, the community of practice is not adequately defined as ‘a whole’,
because it exists in a constellation of other communities of practice.  
I suggest there is a pattern here, a pattern which social learning theories share
with the earlier versions of learning theory. When a theory of learning makes
its necessary first move - delineating a learning system - two problems will
eventually follow. The parts will ‘refuse’ to be parts; Social learning theory
finds that so-called participants are engaged elsewhere; Critics of Parsons
point out, that the so-called functional parts of a social system are in inner
conflict. The second problem for any system theory is that the whole ‘refuses’
be a whole; the organisms of early learning theory are not adequate wholes,
because learners are related to communities; The communities of social
learning theory are not adequate wholes, because communities are related to
constellations of communities and so on. 
The point is this: When attention is paid to the content of learning systems, it
seems that learning theories are continuously sliding between system sizes
rather than approximating ‘the right one’. It also seems that neither the parts,
nor the putative wholes will remain in their theoretically assigned places. The
boundaries of learning systems are invariably overflown by inside parts
flowing out and by outside ‘entities’ constructing other wholes than the one
stipulated by a given learning system. 
The boundary of the agent of learning
Most if not all learning theories will at some stage make a reference to the
individual human learner. Structural functionalism and social learning theory
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do not say that the social system or the community of practice should replace
the notion of the human subject as learner. What they do say however, is that
individual human learning should be conceptualised in relation to these
systems.  So somehow these theories maintain, that there is a who of learning.
The well-worn category of the human subject might then constitute the
boundary needed for a learning system.
The problem of the who of learning is subtly addressed by cognitive
anthropologist Ed Hutchins in his well-known analysis of distributed
cognition (Hutchins, 1996). In this book he tells the tale of an imaginary
observation of a community of ants on a beach: 
“Let us assume that we arrive just after a storm, when the beach is tabula
rasa for the ants. Generations of ants comb the beach. They leave behind
them short-lived chemical trails, and where they go they inadvertently
move grains of sand as they pass. Over months, paths to likely food
sources develop as they are visited again and again by ants following first
the short-lived chemical trails of their fellows and later the longer-lived
roads produced by a history of heavy ant traffic. After months of watching,
we decide to follow a particular ant on an outing. We may be impressed by
how cleverly it visits every high-likelihood food location. This ant seems to
work so much more efficiently than did its ancestors of weeks ago. Is this a
smart ant? Is it perhaps smarter than its ancestors? No, it is just the same
dumb sort of ant, reacting to its environment in the same way its ancestors
did. But the environment is not the same. It is a cultural environment.
Generations of ants have left their marks on the beach, and now a dumb
ant has been made to appear smart through its simple interaction with the
residua of the history of its ancestor’s actions.”
This story effectively troubles the notion of the individual organism as
learner. The increase in “smartness” is mutually constituted between the ant-
work and the rearrangement of the environment. The learning, and the credit,
cannot be attributed to the individual ants, or the group of ants. Learning is
relational between ants and beach, past and present.
The point of learning as relational is often repeated in social learning theory.
However, drawing on Marx these authors also tend to view the cultural
environment as congealed human labour. In this way, everything is in the last
instance attributed to human work6. 
                                             
6 A similar the-human-takes-it-all strategy is employed by Wenger, who makes symbolic interaction
the criterion for participation (and thus learning) in a community of practice (Wenger, 1998) 
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But this attribution is no less valid, than reducing the beach to congealed ant-
labour. In the case of the ants, we have no problems thinking in terms of the
development of an ecological process. It would also be reasonable to regard
the development of the so-called social praxis as ecology comprising humans
as well as non-humans. This of course means that ‘the relatively permanent
change of behaviour’ that learning theories define as learning, cannot be
referred back to a specific who, or to a well-bounded learner. 
The boundary of locations of learning
With a troubled notion of the learner, one could perhaps imagine that learning
could be pinpointed at specific locations. After all who wouldn’t agree that a
limited number of square meters on the beach is the location of the Hutchins
example?
A somewhat similar turn to location seems to underlie Wenger’s book on
“communities of practice. Wenger acknowledges that the claim processors in
his empirical case have all sorts of material, emotional, and symbolic relations
to “others” outside the community of practice. But he insists that all this is
negotiated and given meaning in relation to the community at hand. In this
way, the symbolic interactions of a community of practice constitute a
privileged symbolic location, a social world7 in which the community can be
clearly bounded from its surroundings.
Wenger (and other symbolic interactionists) introduce a strong asymmetry
between symbolic interactions and everything else. The latter is rendered the
object of the former. Symbolic interactionists do not claim that meanings are
the only things that matter, but that all human action is intertwined with
interpretation and meaning (Blumer, 1969, p.2). I find no reason to doubt that
a study of practice on these premises is feasible. As Latour remarks:
“Everything may be made to be the measure of everything else” (1988,
p.158), and so human meaning-making processes can be set up as the
measurement point in studies of the social world. It can be done, and it has
been done8. But the price paid by this theoretical perspective is that very little
space, analytical space, is left for non-humans. In the case of Wenger this
means, that the ability to negotiate, relate and accumulate knowledge is only
granted to the human actors. The world described by Wenger is thus primarily
a social world. 
Hutchins’ analysis of distributed cognition provides a significant counter-
example to the notion of social world. In his study of navigation on a US
                                             
7 The concept of social world is widely used by symbolic interactionists. See Star & Griesemer
(1989) and Strauss (1978).
8 Numerous examples are presented in Spradley (1979)
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Navy ship he analyses the navigation practice from three different
perspectives. One story is about the trajectories of the members of the
navigation team, the quartermasters. The story is about their different
positions in the collective task, the movement toward greater responsibility
and complexity, and the continual access to learning resources. This story is
very much in line with social learning theory, and it is indeed adopted as a
crucial case story in Lave&Wenger (1991). 
But Hutchins tells a second story about navigation. This story tracks a
sequence of computations from the taking of a bearing through a series of
intermediary steps to the final drawing of an additional pencil mark on the sea
chart. In the intermediary steps, different human and non-human ‘media’ are
juxtaposed. The computation is generated when one stage in one media is
propagated to another state in another media. A few examples will clarify
this: In the alidade used by the bearingtaker, two compass scales are
superimposed on to the image of what ever is seen in the telescopic sight. So
in the alidade, the image of a particular object in the surroundings of the ship
(e.g. a lighthouse) is propagated to a particular point on a compass scale. In
the next step, the bearingtaker reads the compass scale and shouts the reading
to another quartermaster. In this way a particular visual reading is propagated
to a particular verbal announcement. And on it goes. Information constantly
changes form and media all the way to the final pencil mark on the sea chart. 
Hutchins argues that a computational cycle of navigation is effected through a
series of such propagations of stages across media. The computation or
cognition of the navigation team is then a feature of the whole assemblage of
people and artefacts rather than simply an ability of the humans involved. 
If we relate this story to Wenger's notion of a located (symbolic) community
it is clear that Hutchins moves beyond the notion of symbolic interaction as a
distinctly human phenomenon. Cognitive performances such as computation
and remembering are carried out by people and artefacts alike. The putative
boundary of human symbolic interaction is obviously flooded. 
But in Hutchins’ second story, the geographical boundary of the team is still
intact. If we grant that cognition might include some local artefacts, then we
can still maintain that the team consists of a finite number of parts, and that it
is located in a specific place. We can still designate it a cognitive system, as
Hutchins indeed does. 
This however, changes with Hutchins third story about navigation, a story
about navigational artefacts (ibid, pp. 49-116). Navigation is about directing
the movement of a craft from one point to another. But this can be done with
very different sets of tools. Hutchins has done extensive research on
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Micronesian navigation, and he uses this tradition as a point of comparison
for his analysis of western navigation. One crucial feature of western
navigation is technologies for measurement and digital computation. An
example of this is the chip log, a device used to measure the speed of a ship.
The chip log consists of panel of wood (the chip) tied to a line. The chip is
thrown over the side of the ship into the water, where it remains stationary
while the ship sails away. The line to the chip is allowed to pay out for a
given period of time. Initially, this time was the duration of a spoken prayer,
later time was measured by a sandglass. Since speed is distance pr. time unit,
the amount of line is directly proportional to speed. The amount of line is
easily measured by counting the number of knots9 on the line, each knot
indicating a fixed interval of length. The chip log, is thus a tool for
measurement that generates digital output (a number of knots). 
As might well be imagined, this digital output generates opportunities for
further computations, such as predicting the distance travelled during a longer
time interval. Another interesting feature of the chip log is that its precision is
dependent on the precision of time measurement. So there are important
interdependencies between the tools of navigational. 
I could go into further details with Hutchins analysis of navigational tools.
But there is no need to. The point I wish to emphasise is clearly brought out in
Hutchins concluding remarks: “The tools of navigation share with one another
a rich network of mutual computational and representational dependencies.
Each plays a role in the computational environment of the others, providing
the raw materials of computation or consuming the products of it. In the
ecology of tools, based on the flow of computational products, each tool
creates the environment for others.” (ibid, p.113-4, emphasis added). What I
suggest is important here is Hutchins’ change of metaphors. In his first stories
he talked about learning and cognitive systems. In this story he talks about
ecologies and networks. The story of artefacts is about functional
interdependencies, but it is not a story about a geographically bounded
functional organisation. Like the earlier stories, the story of artefacts is about
multiple elements, but in this case the number of elements are not finite. So
here we have another case of overflow. In Hutchins’ second story, the notion
of social worlds was flooded with non-human participants, now in this third
story, the notion of boundedness in time and space is flooded or replaced by
notions of continually developing ecologies or networks. 
                                             
9 This is the origin of the term ‘knot’ as a measure of a ship’s speed in nautical miles per hour (ibid,
p.105).
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The crisis of learning systems
In the previous discussion, I have introduced the most common learning
systems outlined by learning theories: the organism, the organism in the social
system, and the social group. I have argued that there are problems with all of
these systems. The boundaries of these systems are leaking and, to put it
colloquially, the parts refuse to be parts and the wholes refuse to be wholes. I
have described a number of these overflows. In the case of the content of
learning it seems that the parts of learning systems continuously appear also
to be parts of something else. In addition, the ‘whole’ of the learning systems
appear be partially defined by external elements rather than exclusively by
their so-called constitutive parts. Learning theories often use the agent of
learning as a boundary of a learning system. But, as I have argued, the
evolving relations between agents and environments make it hard (or
reductionistic) to attribute the change merely to the organism. Finally, it
seems untenable to employ a particular (symbolic or geographical) location as
the boundary of a learning system. The concept of a social world as a place
for only-human meaning-making is contradicted and flooded by non-human
entities in Hutchins analysis of navigation as distributed cognition. And the
idea of learning bounded by a geographical space is contradicted by Hutchins’
depiction of an unbounded network of artefacts evolving over time. 
So in conclusion, there seems to be a number of intractable problems with
learning theories due to their dependence on the notion of system. And it
seems about time to search for new guiding metaphors in the study of
practice. In the following, I will explore the use of the network metaphor in
actor-network theory. 
Actor-Network Theory
The notion of network is pivotal to actor-network theory, a particular
sociological tradition, which has gained momentum over the past two
decades. A late (in fact the latest) version of this theory will be the centre of
attention in following chapters. For that reason, I will presently make a
relatively thorough presentation of the early theory. I will of course also
clarify, how and why actor-network theory is a viable alternative to theories
based on some notion of system. 
The primary precursors of actor-network theory are the so-called laboratory
studies, which were developed in the 1970's by a new generation of scholars
in the field of science studies10. At that time, natural science had for a long
time been regarded as an awe-inspiring institutionalisation of rationality. But
                                             
10 My account of laboratory studies is primarily based on Knorr-Cetina (1994) and Olesen (1996).
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the groundbreaking work of Kuhn (1962) had promoted the idea that the
rationality of science is in fact constituted in specific historical and practical
circumstances. Social science should therefore not consider the facts of
natural science to be ‘untouchable’. Newcomers to the field of science
studies, notably Michael Lynch, Bruno Latour11, and Karin Knorr-Cetina, set
out to investigate the day-to-day practicalities of scientific knowledge
production. They conducted anthropological-style fieldwork in prestigious
research laboratories, and through this, they were able to offer detailed
accounts of the construction of scientific facts. They described how scientific
knowledge is accomplished through messy interactional work, and how
practically everything is negotiated in this process: What is an object and
what is an artefact of the experiment? Who is a good scientist? What is a
proper method? What counts a replication12? They found it surprisingly easy
to show that successful scientific practice depends on numerous mundane and
nonmethodological elements, which were completely absent from the
philosophers’ accounts of science (Knorr-Cetina, p.144). Latour & Woolgars
text (discussed in chapter 2) is case in point. They describe the scientific work
in a neuroendocrinological laboratory as a series of translations and
negotiations involving people, papers, rats, computers, chemicals, inscription
devices, articles and numerous other elements. But laboratory studies didn’t
just add new practical elements to the picture of science; they also changed
the picture by their whole-hearted commitment to constructionism. The claim
that forcefully emerged from laboratory studies was that scientific facts are
neither given, nor discovered. ‘Facts’ are outcomes of negotiation processes
comprising all the before mentioned elements. Thus the fact of a particle or a
chemical substance is not residing in some pre-formed unit ‘out there’. The
fact is a product of interactional work and the generation of a network of
relations between matter, inscription devices, people, articles etc. Only when
matter, machines, people, etc. have been ordered, persuaded, manipulated,
disciplined to play their roles in the network of a new fact, will the fact
emerge as a self-evident and incontrovertible. It is easy to misunderstand
constructionism on this point. The claim is not, that objects, such as electrons
did not exist before science lay its hands on them. The point is that objects are
constructed when they are identified, investigated, differentiated from other
objects, given a name etc. Through this, objects become real in the sense, that
they can reckoned with, inserted into and encountered in previously
constructed networks (Knorr-Cetina, p.161). The crucial move made by
                                             
11 The text by Latour & Woolgar (1979) discussed in chapter 2 is considered one of the classics of
laboratory studies. 
12 This question has been explored by the so-called SSK tradition (Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge), see Collins (1985).
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laboratory studies was thus to abandon abstract philosophical questions about
the existence of reality and turn to empirical, sociological questions of how,
in local practice, things are constructed as real. 
The constructionist studies of science and technology were continued during
the eighties but also taken in new directions13. One of these was the actor-
network theory (ANT) developed by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John
Law14. These authors combined constructionist studies with ideas derived
from Saussurean semiotics. The fundamental claim taken from semiotics is
that all entities are relational; the form and attributes of an entity are
established in relation to other entities. Semiotics has used this notion to study
linguistic units in their relations to other units in the language. ANT however
extended the notion of relationality considerably by including any imaginable
kind of objects: people, machines, materials, scientific facts, animals,
institutions, society. In this way, ANT attempted to develop a semiology of
objects, rather than merely a semiology of meanings. 
The notion of actor-network encapsulates ANT’s ontological position. The
claim is that the world is not populated with entities that possess certain
essences in and of themselves. The world is a texture of relations - a network -
which occasionally produces the effect of stabilised entities. The actors in the
actor-network are not (necessarily) human agents, but actors in the semiotic
sense: an actor is anything that is ascribed agency or admitted to be the source
of agency in a situation. So any kind of ‘entity’ (machines, materials, persons,
institutions, animals, particles, etc.) can figure as an actant in ANT’s analyses.
With this highly abstract and perhaps strange sounding vocabulary, ANT set
out to investigate how actors become connected and disconnected, shaped and
deformed, assembled and dissolved through the development of actor-
networks. The sociology of translation is another name, by which this
‘program’ is known.  
In the following I will use a study by Michel Callon (1986b) to exemplify this
program of investigation. Callon’s case will serve to illustrate the analytical
opportunities that follows from thinking in terms of a networks and (semiotic)
actors, and how this is different from thinking in terms of systems. 
                                             
13 Among these the so-called Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), which was concerned with
the importance of  human and social factors in the construction of scientific knowledge (e.g. Collins
1985).
14 Some of the important works within the ANT tradition are: Callon & Latour (1981), Callon & Law
(1982), Callon (1986a;1986b), Latour (1987).
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Callon’s study is about scallops in St. Brieuc bay in northern France. Scallops
have been highly appreciated by French consumers, but unfortunately the
stock of scallops has decreased year after year due to predator fish and
exploitative fishing. Fishermen and marine biologists alike have begun to
worry about the dwindling stocks. In 1972, when Callon’s story takes its
beginning, scallops could only be fished at two locations in France: at the
coast of Normandy and in St. Brieuc bay. 
In 1972, a conference was held to discuss ways to increase the stock of
scallops in St. Brieuc bay. At this conference, three marine biologists told of
their observations on a recent trip to Japan, where a different species of
scallops is cultivated. The technique is as follows: In the larvae-stage the
scallops attach themselves to so-called collectors, that float in the ocean. The
collectors are surrounded by a net protecting the larvae against starfish and
other predators. When the scallops have reached a suitable size, they are
‘sown’ on the ocean floor and after another 2-3 years the full-grown scallops
can be ‘harvested’.
At the time of the conference, there were no direct relations between the
marine biologists, the fishermen in St. Brieuc, and the scallops. Furthermore,
neither biologists nor fishermen had any knowledge about the mechanisms
behind the development of scallops. Two years later scientific knowledge
about the development of scallops had been produced, a social group had
been established (the fishermen in St. Brieuc bay), and specialist groups had
been organised around the development of the cultivation method. 
Callon analyses this course of events by following the three marine biologists,
who brought home the Japanese idea of cultivation. He identifies four crucial
moments in the biologists’ attempt to establish a project around the method of
cultivation. At each of these moments, certain actors are identified and their
possible interactions are limited.
First moment:  identities and an obligatory passage point.
After the conference, the three marine biologists wrote a proposal that
outlined a particular project as well as the identity of a number of actors.
According to the proposal, the fishermen want to fish as many scallops as
quickly as possible in order to make profits, but they are also concerned about
their long term interests, and therefore they will be interested in a project of
restocking the Bay. The scientific colleagues of the three marine biologists are
considered to be interested in the advancing of knowledge, and therefore they
would be interested in a project, in which scallops are studied in the sea rather
than in experimental tanks. Finally, the biologists assume that scallops anchor
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themselves during their larvae stage, and for this reason they “will ‘accept’ a
shelter that will enable them to proliferate and survive” (ibid. p.205). After
listing the actors and their interests, the proposal link them in a particular
way. All three actors (in italics above) are related to the project of the three
biologists, and to the key question, which they pose for this project: Do the
French species of scallops attach themselves in the larvae stage? This
question is set up as an obligatory passage point, something that all the actors
will want to relate to in order to achieve their goals (fishing in the long term,
proliferation, and knowledge). But the passage point as well as the identities
of the actors are only what Callon calls a problematisation; a conjecture made
by the three biologists. A conjecture, which may later be confirmed,
challenged or transformed. 
An important feature of Callon’s analysis is that the analytical vocabulary of
identity and interest is used in a way that makes no a priori distinctions
between natural and social actors. Scallops, colleagues and fishermen act in
certain ways, and they might be made interested in the project for certain
reasons. 
Second moment: locking allies into place by means of devices of
‘interessement’.
After the initial proposal, the three biologists begin to lock their allies into
place. Again Callon invents an analytical term, which is impartial to the actors
involved. Callon takes the list of interests (outlined above) to be one point in a
broader process of interessement. Interessement is the process in which other
actors define the inclination of an actor. When an actor, A, tries to establish a
link to an actor B, then A must simultaneously cut or weaken the ties between
B and any other actors that define B differently. So interessement from the
perspective of A includes any process or device that can be used to come
between B and any other actor that defines B.
Callon first applies the concept of interessement to the scallops. The
biologists produce a towline with a number of collectors protected by nets.
Callon calls this an archetypal interessement device. Before, larvae were eaten
by fish, or taken away by currents. But the device introduced by the
biologists, come between the larvae and other actors such as fish and currents.
Through this, scallops are interessed in a new way; a way that leads them
toward the obligatory passage point set up by the biologists.
The biologists also work to redefine the inclinations of representatives of the
fishermen by introducing devices such as curves showing the decline of
scallops, and stories about the ‘spectacular success’ of the Japanese method.
And the scientific colleagues were interessed by means of an exhaustive
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literature review concluding that nothing is know about the French species of
scallops. 
Third moment: Enrolment - defining and co-ordinating roles. 
In the next part of the story, Callon describes a long series of negotiations that
transform the initial interessement to actual participation or enrolment.
Enrolment is another term, which is sufficiently impartial and broad to
accommodate any kind of actor. With this term, Callon denotes a multitude of
devices by which actors are made to play their roles. Physical violence is
asserted to sever the link between predator fish and the scallops. Various
materials on the collectors are used to seduce the scallops to attach
themselves. The professional colleagues are persuaded by the three
biologists’ talk, but their enrolment is also secured through the explicit
recognition of their colleagues’ earlier work on the scallops’ capacity to
anchor. Finally, the fishermen simply appear to consent to their role as
amused spectators, without any particular effort on behalf of the biologists. 
Fourth moment: mobilisation of allies - and dissent
At this stage, the biologists have only interessed and enrolled a few
individuals: some representatives of the fishermen, some colleagues at a
conference, and a limited number of larvae on a collector. The next big
question is whether the masses, that is the fishermen, the scientific
community, and all the scallops in the bay, will follow their representatives.
Using another war metaphor Callon calls this process mobilisation. This
process is about securing the link between spokesmen and the entities on
whose behalf they speak. 
To begin with the scallops: The biologists take the larvae anchored to the
collectors to indicate that all larvae go through a stage of anchorage.
Epistemologists call this induction, but Callon likens it to an election. A few
individuals (scallops) come forward to vote (anchor). The biologists count the
votes, and transform them into a curve on a piece of paper. Later the paper is
transported to a conference (the second conference in this story), and
presented to the scientific colleagues. 
In the case of the fishermen, the process is similar. From this community a
few individuals emerge to vote for a representative. The votes are tallied, and
someone is elected to speak in the name of the community. The representative
negotiates with the three biologists, and the result of this conversation is also
carried to the conference. So at the conference the biologists can tell their
colleagues what the scallops will do, and what the fishermen want. These
silent masses have been given a voice, and the three biologists have managed
to become the head of several populations. 
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However, this constellation of actors and spokespersons is not guaranteed. It
can be challenged at any moment. And this is in fact how Callon’s story ends.
“In the two years following the first [..] anchorages, the scallops hatched from
the larvae ‘interested’ by the collectors, after being regrouped at the bottom of
the bay in an area protected by a concrete belt, are shamelessly fished, one
Christmas Eve, by a horde of fishermen who could no longer resist the
temptation of a miraculous catch. Brutally, and without a word, they
disavowed their spokesmen and their long term plans.” (ibid, p.220).
With this account of Callon’s analysis, I am now in a position make a number
of points about ANT. 
First, I wish to repeat the important point, that ANT makes no a priori
distinctions between actors. This means that no assumptions are made about
the difference between social and natural actors beforehand.  Consequently,
ANT avoids a number of the initial moves made by learning theories;  ANT
does not take a predefined organism as the unit of analysis; ANT does not
stipulate that social actors are the only actors in the so-called social order;
ANT does not define action as entirely social, and neither does it exclude the
possibility that non-social entities participate in the action. All of the moves
sketched here grant humans a particular and privileged status in the analysis a
priori, and ANT vehemently rejects this. 
Second, the analysis by Callon illustrates that it is entirely possible to make a
comprehensive analysis without recourse to the systems (of learning)
employed by so many other theories. ANT does this by developing neutral
and abstract vocabularies, which can accommodate a broad spectrum of
actors. This does not imply that ANT believes itself to be neutral. Quite
contrarily, ANT considers itself to be building networks, which are no
different from the ones it studies15. But ANT does claim that it is able to
analyse natural and social actors without privileging one or the other. 
Third, it is important to emphasise exactly what is negotiated in Callon’s case
study. The outcomes of the negotiations are facts about nature (scallops do
anchor in the larvae stage) and facts about society (the fishermen at St. Brieuc
Bay is a group that want to restock the bay). The point here is that nature as
well as society is an outcome of the negotiation. If problematisation,
interessement, enrolment, and mobilisation had for some reason been done
differently, then different facts of nature and society would have been
constructed. The possibilities are endless: A different material on the collector
might have interessed the larvae more efficiently. A different spokesman for
the fishermen might have made demands, or caused the fishermen to split up
                                             
15 Cf. chapter 2.
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into two factions. The entity of ‘the three marine biologists’ might have split
up, over some issue. So the outcomes, natural and social, is the empirical
concern of ANT. And it is precisely, because these outcomes are uncertain,
that learning theories misconstrue their object when they assume that certain
social units or actors can be defined beforehand, or that certain non-social
actors can safely be disregarded! 
Fourth, the metaphor of the network challenges familiar notions of location.
ANT focuses on the tangible, functional relations between entities; Scallops
anchor to a collector. Biologists count the number of anchored scallops. The
count is transformed to a curve on a piece of paper. The paper is transported
to a conference in another city, and presented to the colleagues. In this mode
of analysis the geographical proximity between entities is granted no
explanatory role in itself. A fish swimming close by the collector or a car
driving right behind the biologists in their way to the conference would be left
out of the analysis. The only things that matter are the functional relations
between entities. In the words of Latour, the network metaphor breaks the
“tyranny of distance” and it “claims that modern societies cannot be described
without recognising them as having a fibrous, thread-like, wiry, stringy, ropy,
capillary character that is never captured by the notions of levels, layers,
territories, spheres, categories, structure, systems” (Latour, 1996a, p 49-50)16.
The point here is cognate to my earlier comments on Hutchins. The functional
relations between navigational tools cannot be described as long as the notion
of system is maintained. Therefore Hutchins is pressed to change his guiding
metaphor from cognitive system to a network of artefacts.
Fifth, the metaphor of the network challenges traditional ideas about ‘micro’
and ‘macro’ actors. Social science has endlessly reproduced a certain
ontological scale: individual, family, group, institution, and nation state.
Parsons’ grand systems theory is case in point. Ontological scales generally
come with a notion of social order. The larger units determine the smaller
units, or in some theories, the other way around (Latour, 1996a). The network
metaphor replaces the idea that certain ontological levels are given in the
order of things, and that some of these putative levels should be granted
explanatory priority a priori. In Callon’s analysis, the same vocabulary of
actors and relations is used to describe a loosely connected network (the phase
of interessement) and an intensely connected one (the phase of mobilisation).
The three biologists are followed from an initial situation, in which they are
just another actor, to a situation in which links have been forged that allow
them to speak as powerful macro-actors on behalf of numerous others. And
                                             
16 Latour (1990) argues that geographical space should be seen as a specific case of net-work.
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finally, Callon follows the biologists to a situation in which they start to loose
their status and power, due to the actions of the fishermen. Thus, ANT offers
a vocabulary for describing macro-actors and macro-effects as constructions
rather than givens17. 
Criticisms of Actor-Network Theory - Multiplicity and
Performance
ANT has evoked a broad scope of commentaries and criticisms. Some authors
have flatly rejected the possibility of treating humans and non-humans
symmetrically  (Collins & Yearley). I take this to be largely a matter of
ontological standpoint, and will not explore this particular debate further.
Instead I will turn to a number of sympathetic albeit hard criticisms of ANT.  
Susan Leigh Star (1991), a feminist and a symbolic interactionist, recognises
that ANT has made an important contribution to the study of sociotechnical
networks, by attending to the heterogeneity of their elements. But she also
raises concern that ANT seems to view the network from the standpoint of the
manager, the innovator or the victor. Callon following the three biologists, not
a particular fisherman, nor a particular scallop is case in point. Star is thus
accusing ANT of managerialism. She suggests that additional stories and
perspective should be voiced. The study of formalisms could be an important
methodological handle in this respect (see Star & Bowker, 1999); Networks
stabilise themselves by constructing certain standards (obligatory passage
points) which actors fit into with greater or lesser ease. The actors, who do not
fit easily, must do a lot of work - silent work - in order to fit in. This
ubiquitous silent work is epitomised in Stars account of her visit to
McDonalds. Star is allergic to onions, but onions are a standard part of all the
menus, a part that cannot be omitted, unless you are willing to wait for more
than half an hour. So Star accepts the standard menu, takes a plastic fork, and
scrapes off the onions herself. This is exactly the kind of silent work that is
important to keep the network stable and the standards functioning. But it is
also a kind of work that is almost impossible to notice from a managerial
perspective.
Singleton & Michael (1993) make a similar call for attention to the
multiplicity of networks. Singleton has studied the British cervical screening
program. This program might be depicted managerialistically with traditional
ANT terms. In that case, the individual General Practitioner would be seen in
the role as small pawn in the big game of the health planners. However,
Singletons fieldwork reveals that the participation of the GPs is fraught with
                                             
17 For a more detailed discussion of the micro-macro problem see Callon & Latour (1981). 
65
ambivalence. On the one hand, they persuade women to undertake the smear
test, but on the other hand they know that the level of cancer in the cervix has
not declined during the 35 years, the program has been in existence. On the
one hand they tell the women that the test is simple and free of pain, on the
other hand, they know that the test in certain conditions is both complicated
and painful. And the list goes on.
A ‘classical’ ANT-perspective would regard these ambivalences as serious
problems that might potentially undermine the network. But Singleton &
Michael argue that the opposite is the case. It is precisely because the GPs are
able to move between so many different and conflicting positions that the
program can move on. The coherence and stability of the program, which
appears from the managerial perspective of the health planners, is dependent
on the growth of supportive networks out of their sight. An important one of
these is the clinical practice and the relations to patients built by the GPs. So
contrary to the ‘classical’ actor-network theory, Singleton & Michael claim
that ambivalence is, or at least can be, functional. 
Commenting on the criticism above, John Law (1997) has suggested that the
primary difference between classical ANT and later ANT-related work has to
do with coherence and centredness. In Callon’s study the three biologists
become manager-like by drawing things together; they establish links to
numerous allies, and translate them into the single point of a paper, which can
be presented to their colleagues at a conference. Clearly, Callon assumes that
a coherent, centred reality is (temporarily) made by the biologists, and that
this coherent construction is described by himself. 
In the study by Singleton things are not drawn together. There is no centre,
from which everything is organised. And neither is there a higher court, which
reduces the ambivalent positions of the GPs to a singular mode of
functioning. The project lives, and lives well, with its incoherences and its
decentredness. 
Law argues, that if the idea of centredness and coherence is removed or
moderated, then a different world-view will emerge. It is still a world of
heterogeneous networks and actants, but it is also a world where different
entities are linking and clashing in multiple locations. A texture, a patchwork.
In this world, ontologies are ambivalent, temporary and only partially
coherent. And there is endless work to patch things together. Law and other
‘post-ANT’ authors have used the term performance to characterise the
patterns of local, heterogeneous ordering. In the next chapter, I will explore
this recent turn to performance in science and technology studies. 
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Chapter Four
The Performative Turn
in Science and Technology Studies
Jean Lave, a key proponent of social learning theory, once remarked, that the
field of STS doesn’t say anything about learning. ”Nothing. Zilch”1.
Obviously, she meant this as a critique. 
But given the problems with learning systems, the lack of references to
learning in STS might be considered a virtue. The field of STS might indeed
provide resources for studying practice, without getting entangled with
various versions of systems thinking. 
In this chapter I will explore a series of partially linked theoretical
deliberations and studies of practice in STS. I have chosen to focus on four
works by John Law and Annemarie Mol. All of these are part of what has
been called the performative turn in science and technology studies2. 
Much traditional sociology imagines the world populated with particular
objects that exist in and of themselves; A manager, an aircraft, a disease do of
course have a history of development or construction, and they might turn
into something else in the future. But in the time slot called the present,
objects are entities, gestalts, configurations with particular essential qualities.
The performative turn reverses these ontological premises in a move that
bears resemblance of an earlier revolution in social science. In the 1960’s
pragmatists reversed the Parsonian idea of the social order by making it the
object of their analysis, rather than it’s premise3. In a similar vein, the
performative turn studies the object order as a precarious accomplishment,
rather than a given. Thus to the performative turn, an object is not a singular
entity, but rather a texture of partially coherent and partially co-ordinated
performances. What an object is, is thus decentred in a multitude of practices.
Objects do not exist in and off themselves but only through multiple situated
practices. This ontological claim is directly opposed to Kantian notions of
                                             
1 Personal communication, March 2000.
2 A number of other authors have done related work on performance. Some of these are Donna
Haraway, Marilyn Strathern, Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, Vololona Rabeharisoa, Vicky Singleton,
Tiago Moriera, Anni Dugdale, Ingunn Moser, Hans Harber and Alice Stollmeyer.
3 See e.g. Suchman (1987)
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‘das Ding an sich’ versus ‘das Ding für Uns’. In the Kantian version the
relations that make up an object ‘out there’ are somehow closed in on
themselves and completely separable from the relations that ‘we’ may forge
with them. The performative turn implies that the putative object ‘out there’ is
never closed in on itself. It is always constituted and re-constituted, that is
performed, in relations to multiple others. These others may be a
contemplative ‘Uns’, a more directly interfering ‘Uns’, or any other sort of
material, textual or symbolic relations. So the claim is, that an object does not
exist behind fixed boundaries that separate its internal essence from the rest of
the world. An object is a relational entity.   
A recent and very clear example of this mode of analysis is Annemarie Mol’s
study of anaemia (Mol, 1999). She outlines three different performances of
anaemia: a clinical, a statistical and a pathophysiological. 
In the clinic the patient may complain about tiredness, and the doctor will
examine his eyelids to see if they look pale. If this is the case, the client might
be said to have anaemia. In this clinical performance of anaemia, the most
important ’props’ are the visible and verbally accountable symptoms.
In a hospital laboratory anaemia is performed through an analysis of the
haemoglobin-level in a blood sample. If the level is more than two standard
deviations below the average in a norm group, then the patient is said to have
anaemia. 
In a pathophysiological context (e.g. surgery) an assessment is made of the
haemoglobin level necessary to transport sufficient amounts of oxygen to the
organs or the patient. If the haemoglobin level drops below the set level, the
patient is said to have anaemia. 
Mol now makes the interesting observation that the three performances of
anaemia are not always concordant. A number of patients deviate from the
statistical norm, but show no sign of tiredness. There are also cases in which
the haemoglobin level drops to such an extent that sufficient oxygen is not
transported to the organs, but the patient is nevertheless above the statistical
cut-off point. So the idea that anaemia is a single thing, or that a single thing
is underlying all the ”instances” of anaemia will have to go. 
So the object of anaemia is somehow more than one. But Mol also argues,
that it is less than many. The different performances of anaemia are
connected, or better: partially connected. 
One example of this is that the clinical performance is included in the
statistical performance. The statistical performance is based on norm groups
69
that are constructed from a large number of blood samples from healthy
individuals. But the evaluation of ’healthy’ is not statistical. It is clinical. 
In other cases, the different performances co-exist in sequence. Such is the
case, when a clinical evaluation is followed by a laboratory test. In yet other
cases, one performance substitutes another; in a third world aid programme
fast and inexpensive clinical assessments will replace slow and expensive
laboratory tests.
With this analysis, Mol argues that the object of anaemia is multiple rather
than singular in character. It is more than one because it is performed in
different ways, but is less than many because the performances are connected
is a variety of intricate ways. Moreover the claim is that there is no-thing
behind or underlying the performances. Anaemia is the various performances. 
As Mol’s analysis indicates, the performative turn thrives on at least two
empirical questions: How are objects multiple? And how, or to what extent do
objects cohere in spite of their multiplicity? 
In what follows, I will review four exemplar studies within or rather co-
constitutive of the performative turn in STS. In each of these I will try to
explicate what kinds of multiplicities and what kinds of coherences are
suggested. 
Organizing Modernity
Organizing Modernity (Law 1994) is a complex book that works on at least
three interconnected projects. First it outlines some of the theoretical space
that the performative turn might be said to inhabit. Second it presents an
ethnographic study of Thatcher-era management and organisation in a British
research laboratory. Third the book develops a novel theoretical concept,
modes of ordering, which is a particular way of talking about performances. 
The theoretical outline of a modest sociology
The problem of ‘the social order’ is no doubt the oldest and the most common
way for sociology to define it’s key concern. Law opens the book by refuting
this problem term by term. First he argues that there is no ‘order’. Order is
never complete, it is always temporary and precarious. It can always be
overthrown. Moreover, he argues4 that the modernist dream of a perfect order
should really be seen as a nightmare. The worst crimes in history have been
committed in attempts to impose a perfect order by systematically weeding
                                             
4 Following Zygmunt Bauman
70
out ‘the impure’ or ‘the other’. In this argument, Law draws on Foucault,
Weber, Marx, Elias, Bauman and others who have described modernity as a
period in which the methods of order have been thoroughly reorganised and
intensified. 
Second, when ‘order’ is never attained, then it follows that the singular ‘the’
must go as well. ‘The’ social order is replaced by a plurality of orderings. 
Third the idea of ordering as social is challenged by Law. He argues that
“what we call the ‘social’ is materially heterogeneous: talk, bodies, texts,
machines, architectures, all of these and many more are implicated in and
perform the ‘social’” (Law, p.2). Consequently, the object of study becomes
processes of socio-technical ordering. 
With this ontological commitment to heterogeneous orderings, the next
question is how to study these beasts. Law calls for sociological modesty. We
ourselves are participating in projects of ordering, through our talk, writing,
etc. We too are part of the modern project, and we too want to create order.
There is no escape from that, so the best we can do is to try not to create
violence in our own ordering, and not to pretend that our ordering is perfect or
to conceal the blindnesses that went into producing it. 
To do this – or not to do this – Law enlists a number of modest sociologies:
the sociology of scientific knowledge, actor-network theory, symbolic
interactionism and post-structuralism. All of these concern themselves with
social processes, and all of these have avoided the idea of one all-
encompassing social order. From these theoretical traditions Law draws four
principles. 
1. Symmetry
David Bloor (1976) originally formulated the principle of symmetry. The
principle states that both ‘true’ and ‘false’ knowledge deserve a sociological
explanation and that the explanation of both should be in the same terms.
Thus the principle outlaws the standard practice of the earlier Mertonian
sociology of scientific knowledge, in which true scientific knowledge was
explained by referring to nature, while false scientific knowledge was
explained by referring to social factors (e.g. incompetence or fraud). 
Actor-network-theorists have extended the principle of symmetry to the
relation between humans and non-humans (e.g. Callon 1986b). In these
analyses humans as well as non-humans enter the analyses in the form of
‘actants’ which are associated in networks. In these networks “essential
qualities” such as agency are generated through the association and
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disassociation of actants. What is subjective and what is objective is thus a
network effect, rather than a quality given in the order of things.
Furthermore, actor-network-theory has extended the symmetry principle to
the so-called micro-macro divide (Callon & Latour 1981). This putative
difference between micro and macro phenomena is also seen as a network
effect. At certain times, networks are transformed in ways that render certain
actors ‘macro-like’ by allowing them to speak on behalf of a number of other
actors. The appearance of micro and macro or bigger and smaller should thus
be analysed as an outcome of net-work rather than pre-established levels of
reality. 
All of these versions of symmetry are important because they stress that
analysis should not start by privileging certain classes of phenomena, or by
saying that certain things do not need to be explained. 
2. Non-reduction
Reductionism is the idea that a small class of phenomena drives everything
else. This mode of thought is of course standard practice of the vast majority
of social science. Law argues that reductionism divides the world into two
kinds: the drivers and the driven. In that way, the analysis starts off on an
asymmetrical footing. It tends to build orders, and it tends to exclude and
deny all the things that don’t fit into the grand explanatory schemes. 
Structuralism is one of the few alternatives to reductionism. In this mode of
thought, anything is seen as the product of multiple relations to others. But,
unfortunately structuralism also makes it very hard to think about processes.
According to Law, structuralism tends to paint synchronistic images, which
are somehow out of time. 
As an alternative, Law suggests the following path for a modest sociology: 
“It will not distinguish before it starts, between those that drive and those
that are driven. But, and this is where it is relational, but not structuralist, it
will allow that effects, a relative distinction between drivers and the driven,
may emerge and be sustained. Note that this is a conditional and uncertain
process, not something that necessarily happens, not something that is
achieved for ever” (ibid, p.13).
3. Recursive process
The third component in Law’s modest sociology is the idea of the social as a
recursive process. When the idea of an order is left behind, the focus moves to
orderings. One way to put this is that the social is conceptualised as a verb
rather than as a noun. As a good example of this, Law refers to symbolic
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interactionism (e.g. Blumer 1969). In this tradition social relations and the self
are regarded as continual outcomes of interaction. So an entity like the self is
regarded as a process, something that is done, not as something that simply is.
But even if sociology attends to processes, one cannot help asking what drives
these processes? Law is quite clear on this point. There is nothing outside or
behind, that drives the process. Social processes are recursive, that is, self-
generating. Quoting Giddens (1984), Law states, that the social is a medium
as well as an outcome. “So the image that we have to discard is that of a
social oil refinery. Society is not a lot of social products moving round in
structural pipes and containers that were put in place beforehand. Instead, the
social world is this remarkable emergent phenomenon: in its processes it
shapes its own flows. Movement and the organisation of movement are not
different.” (Ibid, p.15)
In short, this means that modest sociology can tell stories about generative
relationships and patterns that seem to reproduce themselves. But not about
causes and not about structures. In this way, modest sociology consciously
gives up most of sociology’s explanatory resources. According to Law, this
radical move is necessary “if we are to avoid reproducing the games of
classical modernism, and put the experience of hideous purity behind us”
(ibid. p.16)5.
4. Reflexivity
Law suggests that reflexivity is about acting upon yourself, as you would unto
others. This means that we also have to see ourselves and our own accounts as
local and recursive effects. There is no room for pretending that our vision is
pure or that our orderings are irreversible. So on one hand we are caught up in
the modern project of wanting to make pools of order, and on the other hand
this project is as impossible for us as it is for everyone else. 
But if monitoring, legislation and control are impossible, then the question
remains. What should we do as social scientists? Should we cleave to the
modern project, and keep making ‘legislation’ albeit of a more provisional
and modest kind? Or should we turn ourselves into interpreters, who aim to
systematically deconstruct our own positions? 
                                             
5 A similar argument in a different context is made by Enzensberger (1999) in his essay
“Tilbagetogets helte” [The heroes of retreat]. Enzensberger calls for a new vision of political heroism
and leadership. The art of the possible should not be about triumphs and conquering, but about
leaving untenable positions. The true political hero is he who leads his people back from the front
where they face destruction. In a similar vein Law argues that we should withdraw from the
untenable positions of modernity before we cause more damage.
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On this hard question, Law says that he “provisionally, very provisionally, [..]
tend[s] toward the camp of the modest legislators rather than the interpreters”
(ibid. p.17). So Law will attempt to do sociology: to lay down principles, and
to say how things are. 
Modes of ordering
The empirical basis of Organizing Modernity is an extended ethnographic
study of Daresbury SERC laboratory, a British research institution. From this
material, Law develops a ‘thick’ empirical description of four so-called modes
of ordering. A mode of ordering can briefly be defined as way in which
agents and materials constitute themselves and social organisation. Or to
quote Law’s formulation: “I think of them as fairly regular patterns that may
be usefully imputed for certain purposes to the recursive networks of the
social”. In what follows, I will briefly present the four modes of ordering,
discussed in the book: 
Enterprise gives rise to the kind of agents sometimes referred to as the
cowboys of the organisation. It is a way of doing things that puts a premium
on qualities such as about opportunism, pragmatism and achievement. The
ideal agent is an entrepreneur who is sensitive to the shifting opportunities
and demands. And this might well include bending or breaking the rules set
up by bureaucrats. Enterprise is about seizing the day and making the most of
it. This mode of ordering performs structure and agency in a particular way:
Structure or bits of structure are regarded as resources that the agent must use.
A passive agent is an irresponsible agent. Flowing with the stream or
following the given structures is not acceptable. 
Administration is the bureaucratic mode of ordering. This is about
routinisation, formalisation and the making of consistency. It is about defining
roles, procedures, rules and hierarchies. The ideal agent is systematic,
planning and meticulous. The aim is the creation of the perfectly well-
regulated organisation. Responsibility is about being dutiful and following
rules. This however, does not necessarily preclude creativity or proactivity. It
can take considerable amounts of both to extend rules and consistency to
novel situations. But, at any rate the ‘dragons’ that are slain by Administration
are comparatively smaller and less visible, than the dragons in the stories of
Enterprise. 
Vision. The keywords in this mode of ordering are charisma, grace and
transcendence. The ideal visionary agent tries to separate himself from the
profane. Vision is about privileged access to ultimate truths. “Power is drawn
from the other side, a sacred place that is sacred because it is set apart” (ibid.
p.79). So agency is generated through the juxtaposing of existing structure
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with a yet to be realised structure. In some versions, visionary agents are
believed to be born that way. Others talk of guidance and rites of passage (e.g.
Traweek 1988). And yet others6 have pointed out that we all have visions, but
that very few of us are able to harness the resources of organisations to follow
through on them. 
Vocation. This mode of ordering is about embodied skills and expertise. It
talks about practical experience, tacit knowledge and apprenticeship-like
forms of learning. One example of this is Kuhn’s (1962) puzzle-solving
scientist within a normal paradigm. He is creative and self-starting, but
simultaneously adhering to conservative standards of good science, which he
has assimilated by working alongside older experts. Thus, vocation is about
the disciplined body, domains of skill, and professional demarcations. It is
about belonging to a community of practitioners and about the social basis of
skills7.
Performance
To sum up, Organizing Modernity outlines some theoretical space for a
performative turn. Performances are viewed as recursive heterogeneous
processes that create certain effects. These effects do not amount to orders,
but may be studied as precarious outcomes of ordering. No causes or final
instances are to be found outside the heterogeneous social processes. 
The modes of ordering is one particular attempt and one specific theoretical
tool for imputing patterns to the social. I will say more about this tool at the
end of this chapter, when I have reviewed a number of other tools. 
Regions, Networks, Fluids and Fire
In the article Regions, Networks and Fluids Mol & Law explore one more
way of imputing patterns to the social. Their topic is topologies of the social. 
In the original sense of the word, topology is a branch of pure mathematics
that deals with spatial types. It articulates spaces that go beyond the
traditional X, Y and Z axes. It explores the nature of objects and the possible
mathematical operations in these alternative spaces. 
Mol & Law seize the notion of ’topology’ and apply it to social science. Their
argument is this: 
                                             
6 Law refers to Susan Leigh Star
7 Lave & Wenger’s theory of social learning in communities of practice is another obvious example
of “vocation” (Lave & Wenger 1991).
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” ’The social’ doesn’t exist as a single spatial type. Rather it performs
several kinds of space in which different ’operations’ take place” (ibid. p.643). 
In this quotation, it should be noted that Mol & Law do not say that the social
exists in different kinds of space. Rather they say that the social performs
spaces. So the topologies are not somehow outside the social. The oil refinery
image that Law discarded in Organizing Modernity is not re-introduced. 
Moreover, we might note that the quotation rehearses the leitmotif of
orderings. The social performs a plurality of spaces rather than just one. 
In the following I will present three different kinds of space discussed by Mol
& Law. They do this through an empirical investigation of anaemia in the
Netherlands and in Africa. What is anaemia? Where is anaemia? And what
kinds of space does it perform? 
Regions
A standard textbook defines anaemia as the absence of “..enough RBC Hb
(red blood cell haemoglobin) in the blood. Normally there is more than 10g
haemoglobin in each decilitre of blood” (ibid. p.644).
Epidemiologists have studied the geographical distribution of this condition.
In the Netherlands studies suggest that between 1.4 and 2.0% of the
population is anaemic. Whatever the precise figure, all the studies indicate
that the prevalence of anaemia in the Netherlands is low. On the contrary,
anaemia is considered one of the commonest causes of ill health in Africa. In
this case, studies suggest percentages of anaemia ranging from 9.4 to 50% of
the population (ibid. p. 644-6).
Mol & Law observes that the facts being created by epidemiologists are
regional facts. They are creating a regional topology. Regions are generated
when a boundary is drawn around something, and when the differences inside
are suppressed. The Dutch figures are low - give and take some variation.
And the African figures are high - give and take some variation. “So it’s
possible to build a version of the social in which space is exclusive. Neat
divisions, no overlap. Here or there, each place is located on one side of a
boundary. It is thus that an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ are created. What is
similar is close. What is different, is elsewhere” (ibid. p.647).
Networks
So a space of regions is one possibility, but there are others. Mol & Law note
that regional maps depend on numbers, which depend on measurements. And
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these in turn depend on machines that function and on properly trained
people. So the creation of a regional map requires a network of haemoglobin
measurement. 
Actor-network theory8 has made this point repeatedly: The regional spaces
that can be drawn depend on a different kind of space, the space of networks.
Mol & Law defines a network as “a series of elements with well defined
relations between them”9. The elements can be anything: A needle, a
machine, a normal distribution, a skilled nurse taking a blood sample. And the
relations can also be of any imaginable sort. The defining characteristic of a
network is simply that it hangs together in some functional way. This means
that ‘proximity’ in a network is not related to physical distance. Instead,
proximity has to do with location in the network of relations. “Places with a
similar set of elements and similar relations between them are close to one
another, and those with different elements or relations are far apart” (ibid. p.
649). So clinics on different continents, that use similar machines, materials,
and work procedures are far apart in regional space but quite close in network
space. 
Fluids
The rather heroic stories about world spanning and world generating networks
are often followed by stories about disastrous network failures10. Machines
break down, calibrations go wrong, materials run out, samples get lost, or
people don’t follow procedures.
Mol & Law argue that there are two ways to study these failures. One
approach is “stay with the network” and study how it struggles to maintain its
coherence vis-à-vis other networks11. The second approach - which they
themselves choose to explore - is to look for other spaces beyond the network.
So Mol & Law want to look for (spatial) conditions of possibility for network
space, just as actor-network theory in the 1980’s looked for (spatial)
conditions of possibility for regional space. 
Mol & Law continue their story by attending to clinical diagnoses. Clinical
diagnoses are based on symptoms and signs, so this work moves on regardless
of the failing network of haemoglobin measurement. Clinical methods might
                                             
8 See Latour (1990).
9 Some actor-network theorists e.g. Bruno Latour talk about less as well as more stabilised sets of
relations under the rubric of network. His definition of network would thus be broader than the one
used by Mol & Law. See Latour (1996b).
10 E.g. Callon (1986a, 1986b), Latour (1987). Both describe large scale and rather sudden project
failures.
11 Singleton & Michael (1993) is an example of this approach. Mol & Law is sympathetic to this
analysis.
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be considered yet (or just) another network. Perhaps one composed of skilled
human bodies, gestures and signs. But interestingly the elements of clinical
diagnosis are not invariant. In the Netherlands complaints of dizziness,
tiredness and shortness of breath are taken to be indicative of anaemia. But in
Africa these symptoms are so usual in daily life, that patients are unlikely to
report them. In Africa an observation of pale eyelids is more likely to enter
the clinical method. Whereas this element is not used in the Netherlands
because pale eyelids only occur in severe cases of anaemia. And severe cases
are very rare in the Netherlands.
Mol & Law make two points about this. First, they observe that the elements
of the clinical method do not hang together through invariant relations. So
unlike a network, the elements and the relations are not well defined; there are
no forced lines of movement or obligatory passagepoints. Second, they point
out, that there are no clearly demarcated African and Dutch versions of
medical care. And neither is there a Dutch anaemia that can be separated from
an African anaemia. So, unlike regional space, the differences in the clinical
method are not related to clearly drawn boundaries. 
The characteristics of the clinical method seem to be “variation without
boundaries and transformation without discontinuity” (ibid. p.658). The
topology performed by the clinical method is given the name fluid space. 
Several points can be made about this fluid space. 
As already mentioned Mol & Law argue that fluid space has no clear
boundaries. Difference is a matter of gradients. When a doctor moves from
the Netherlands to Africa, she gradually and continually exchanges elements
in her clinical methods. 
Second, fluid space is a space of mixtures. Fluids cannot be randomly mixed.
They should rather be seen as composed of various more or less viscous
combinations. Sometimes elements can be separated: epidemiologists are able
to separate diagnosis from treatment. And sometimes separation is
impossible: doctors in clinics prefigure their diagnoses in the relation to the
possible treatments. (Precisely because iron tablets are cheap and widely
available, anaemia is an ‘excellent’ diagnosis.)
The third characteristic of fluid space/fluid objects is robustness. Because
elements and relations do not have to be well defined, and because elements
and relations can change gradually, fluids tend to be very robust. “Like
guerrilla armies, fluids melt back into the night. They circumvent. They
infiltrate” (ibid. p.662). In addition, fluids are able to ‘absorb’ all sorts of
elements created within the logic of other topologies. 
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.. And Fire Space 
In a recent article Law & Mol  (2000) have added a fourth kind of space to
their list: Fire space. They introduce this idea through a quotation from
Bachelard. In this quotation he talks about the reverie of a person who stares
at the flames in a fire: 
“... the reverie is entirely different from the dream by the very fact that it is
always more or less centred upon one object. The dream proceeds on its
way in a linear fashion, forgetting its original path as it hastens along. The
reverie works in a star pattern. It returns to its center to shoot out new
beams” 
(Bachelard, quoted in Law & Mol, p. 5)
Drawing on this quote, Law & Mol imagine three characteristics of fire space. 
First, they imagine that the continuity of shape in fire space is effected by
discontinuity (!). It is the abrupt and discontinuous movements – the shooting
out and the return – that makes for the constancy of shape. 
Second, Law & Mol think of fire space as a flickering relation between
presence and absence. The shape constancy of that which is present depends
on that which is absent.
Third, they imagine fire space, or at least one version of it, to be characterised
by the ‘star pattern’, which is described by Bachelard. That, which is present,
is a single centre, and this centre is linked to multiple absent Others. 
Law & Mol sum up the characteristics of fire space in the following way: “To
say that there is a fire topology is to say that there are stable shapes created
in patterns of conjoined alterity” (ibid, p.5). 
To further exemplify the notion of fire space, Law & Mol discuss the
empirical example of a formalism which was used by aircraft designers in the
1950’s12:
M
G =     
W/S
                                             
12 The formalism below and the account following it is simplified for the present purpose. For a fuller
account see Law & Mol (2000) and Law (2001, chapter 5).
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The formalism links a number of terms, which refer to characteristics of an
aircraft wing. ‘G’ is the so-called gust response, or turbulence. ‘M’ is
velocity. ‘W’ is the weight of the aircraft. ‘S’ is the wing area. 
The formalism expresses, that turbulence increases if the velocity is high, if
the weight is low, or if the wing is large. This is significant to aircraft
designers, because large amounts of turbulence will make the pilots feel
nausea or they will even get injured from bumping up and down. And in
extreme cases the aircraft itself will break up. 
So what does this have to do with fire space? Law & Mol point out the
formalism takes us beyond itself. The fact that G cannot exceed a certain level
depends on experiments in which pilots have flown aircraft at high speeds and
have experienced all the adverse effects of turbulence: blurred vision, nausea,
vomiting, black outs. This means the present formalism, figures on a piece of
paper, depends on absent others such as vomiting pilots. These others cannot
be made present; there is no place for vomit in the offices of aircraft
designers. And there are several other absent others; Law & Mol explain, that
the formalism also comes with certain decisions about minimum speed. This
is linked to the necessity to escape from Russian anti-aircraft missiles. So the
Russians and fear of the Russians is also present-absent in the formalism. The
formalism depends on it, but it cannot be made present.
So the conjoined alterities of a fire object such as a formalism or a reverie,
implies a distinct form. Like a fluid object it depends on movement to retain
its shape. But where fluid objects depend of gradual change, the movement of
fire objects is an abrupt flickering between absence and presence. This means,
almost paradoxically, that the flickering movement makes the present part of
the fire object immobile. The formalism doesn’t evolve or flow, and the
reverie doesn’t hasten along as a dream. And this stability is afforded because
the flickerings to absent others always return to the present. 
Performance
With this discussion of regions, networks, fluids, and fire the question of
space is drawn into the analysis of performance. The argument is that social
objects such as clinical methods or an illness help to perform certain types of
space. In line with the modest sociology, the article does not deal with space
by ‘identifying’ causes or structures. The contribution is rather to develop
conceptual tools for asking interesting empirical questions about the spatial
patterns or the effects of ‘the social’. 
The first line of questions that can be raised with the concept of the article is
about spatial difference. What kinds of space are being performed? Does it
resemble regions, networks, fluids, fire or something else? 
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The second line of questions is about spatial relations. How is a certain type
of space dependent on other kinds of space? How do objects generated within
one type of space fare in other spaces? 13 What are the tensions, inclusions or
exclusions between various types of space?
The Body Multiple
Annemarie Mol’s book The Body Multiple is (like Organizing Modernity) a
philosophical treatise as well as an ethnographic study.
The topic of the book is neither spaces nor modes of ordering but a particular
object. The object is atheroschlerosis, or to be precise: the enactment14 of
atheroschlerosis in hospital practice. One might imagine this to be a rather
simple and banal affair. After all, atheroschlerosis is a very commonplace
disease. But Mol uncovers a surprising variety of ways in which
atheroschlerosis is ‘done’ as well as a number of ways in which the different
enactments are made to hang together. Thus atheroschlerosis is seen as a
multiple object; something that is more than one (non-singular) but less than
many (non-fragmented).
With this program of investigation, Mol follows a number of lines that I have
already mentioned. She focuses on multiplicity rather than singularity -
orderings rather than order. In line with the extended principle of symmetry
she takes the different ‘doings’ of atheroschlerosis to be heterogeneous: they
are events co-created by humans and non-humans. The social is presumed to
be a recursive process: the object of atheroschlerosis is not granted any
essential qualities, it is an effect. Finally, reductionism is carefully avoided
through the idea of atheroschlerosis as a multiple object: no elements are
singled out and promoted to ‘causes’ or ‘structures’ underlying everything
else. The object is the texture of performances. 
Below, I will take a closer look at some of the differences and coherences that
Mol describes in her study of atheroschlerosis. Again, the purpose is to
harvest resources for thinking about performance.
Different atheroschleroses
In the department of pathology atheroschlerosis might be enacted in the
following way. An amputated leg is taken from a freezer. An artery is
identified and a slice of it is cut out. The sample is prepared and dyed. The
                                             
13 The second kind of question is asked in relation to Alcoholic Liver Disease in the article “This is
Not an Object” (Law & Singleton 2000).
14 Mol chooses to replace the term performance by the term enactment. I will discuss this move in the
conclusion of this chapter.
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sample is placed under a microscope, and the focus is directed toward an
abnormal thickness of the inner coating of the artery. This is what
atheroschlerosis is in pathology. 
In the outpatient clinic atheroschlerosis might be enacted in this way: A
patient comes in and complains about pains following walking. A doctor ask
him questions about how long he can walk, and if the pain goes away after a
break. The doctor asks the patient to take his trousers off, and the doctor feels
the pulsations in the leg arteries. The doctor notices if one foot is colder than
the other, and he conducts a measurement of the blood pressure in the leg, and
he compares it to the blood pressure on the patients arm. Pains upon walking.
Weak pulsations. Cold skin. Comparatively low blood pressure. All these are
part of what atheroschlerosis is in the clinic. 
From these examples and many more Mol argue that atheroschlerosis is
multiple. As soon as you start attending to the practicalities of enactment, the
varieties of atheroschlerosis multiply. The hospital (and the clinic, and the
pathology department) turn out to be full of contrasts that can be made the
object of further investigations. 
Co-ordinating and distributing atheroschlerosis
So how is all this variability handled in hospital practice? Is it a problem, an
obstacle, or even a disaster? It doesn’t appear so. Mol discusses a number of
ways in which differences are co-ordinated. 
One way is to add up different versions. If two types of measurement differ,
then you might nevertheless project a common underlying reality, if you can
manage to make one of measurements win. A patient is complaining about
severe pain but the blood pressure measurements are normal. In this case you
might assume that there is ‘in fact’ atheroschlerosis, but that the pressure
measurement has gone wrong for some reason. Perhaps because veins, that
are severely clogged up, are hard to compress properly. And this is necessary
to measure the blood pressure. 
Another way of adding up is not to bother with the idea of a specific
underlying object. Instead the measurements can simply be taken to be
indications for action. If one or two or three measurements point in the wrong
direction, then something should be done. 
Yet another way of handling differences is to calibrate different
measurements. Figures resulting from a newly developed measure of
atheroschlerosis (e.g. ultrasound measurements of blood flow) might be
translated to the scales and figures produced by an older and more standard
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method of measurement (e.g. X-ray pictures of radioactive dye in the
bloodstream). 
So differences are not necessarily a problem - they can be added up or
calibrated. And furthermore differences that seem to be ‘in different worlds’
such as accounts of pain on walking and tissues from an amputated leg might
simply be distributed to different ‘worlds’ such as the outpatient clinic and the
pathology lab. This does not fragment atheroschlerosis; it simply places two
versions at different places on a trajectory. This practical way of handling
difference – distribution – is quite unlike the scientific controversies so often
described in the sociology of science15. Research laboratories work hard on
replication: the perfect reproduction of experiments made elsewhere. And
scientists continually try to persuade others that their laboratory possesses the
true version of the object. In the hospital, there are no attempts to replicate the
enactment at different sites. The clinic doesn’t try to imitate the pathology
department or vice versa. Consequently, there is no basis for conflicts over
who has got the ‘true’ atheroschlerosis. 
Inclusion
In Mol’s account of the hospital, differences get calibrated, added up or
distributed, rather than drawn together, fought over and homogenised. Mol
takes this analysis further and argues that a study of enactments alters
traditional ideas of ontological scales. In a textbook, reality might be depicted
as a number of concentric circles. “A cell is a part of tissue, tissues compose
an organ, organs make a body, bodies form a population and populations are
part of the ecosystem” (ibid. p.89). However, if practicalities of enactment are
attended to, the idea of larger and larger wholes containing everything else
dissolves. 
As always, Mol argues through specific examples. One example is this: At the
end of an operation, when the last sutures are being made, the surgeon might
say: “Will someone call his wife?". In this move the surgeon shifts from
enacting the patient-as-clogged-arteries into the patient as a social being. Mol
stresses that this is not a matter of summing up the blood vessels to produce a
whole human being. And it is not simply a matter of zooming out either. What
the surgeon does is to switch his attention to a different object. So in an
account of performances the arteries are not situated inside but alongside the
social being (ibid. p.91-3). 
Mol goes on to discuss a more complicated example concerning individuals
and populations. In certain contexts and at certain times individuals are taken
                                             
15 E.g. the sociology of scientific knowledge, see Collins (1985).
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to be inside populations. Every time a diagnosis of atheroschlerosis is made in
a Dutch hospital information is passed on to a centre for the study of
epidemiology. At this centre, figures are added up and facts of the following
kind are constructed: “In the Netherlands in 1992 170 men out of every
100,000 inhabitants and 70 women out of every 100,000 inhabitants were
admitted to a hospital for peripheral arterial disease”16. In this case the
population is made up of individuals in a very straightforward way. The
population is nothing but a sum total of the individual cases. So the
individuals are in the population. But Mol argues that the reverse is also true:
The population is inside the individual. When individuals are examined the
criteria on which they are judged are often derived from population studies.
What is a normal level of cholesterol in the blood depends on the average
level for men or women in a given population. So somehow the population is
included, when an individual is enacted. In certain cases these mutual
inclusions might even lead to circularity. Mol has interviewed a professor in
epidemiology, who pointed out that mortality statistics might influence the
cause of death written on death certificates. When a physician is called out to
a patient, that has suddenly died, he must fill out a cause in the death
certificate. Epidemiology has produced the well-recognised ‘fact’, that men
are more prone to heart attacks than women. For that reason, the physician is
likely to expect a heart attack in the case a man and look for other causes in
the case of a woman. Consequently, the fact of heart attack being a
predominantly male disease is reinforced. 
Performance / enactment
Mol's concept of the multiple object constitutes an attempt to rework the
ontology of traditional social science. Objects are no longer attributed
essential qualities, they are seen as network effects. Objects are no longer
attributed singularity; they are seen as multiple enactments. Objects are no
longer attributed a fixed spatial relation in a world of objects, they are
included in and including other objects. In short, one might say that the object
‘as we knew it’ is dissolved into a process ontology of enactments,
distributions and inclusions. This leads to a host of new empirical questions
about how ‘an’ object is enacted differently, how tensions and differences are
co-ordinated, and how the object hangs together. 
Aircraft stories
The final book in this selective review of studies of performance is John
Law’s Aircraft stories (2001). The book is a study of a British attempt to
                                             
16 Mol quotes a report from the Dutch Heart Foundation, ibid p.96
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build a particular military aircraft - the TSR2, a tactical strike and
reconnaissance warplane. The project was initiated in the 1950’s and it was
cancelled in 1965 by a newly elected Labour government.
John Law explores various specificities of this project. A sales brochure, the
construction of a wing, the decision to cancel. These analyses take up a
number of leitmotivs already presented in this chapter. Law shows how
objects are performed in multiple ways, and how their appearance of
singularity is a precarious achievement. What I find particularly interesting is
the way in which Law includes talk in the realm of performances. In the
following I will go into more details about this particular aspect of the book. 
The performativity of talk
From the beginning of the book Law stresses that talk is performative. When
something is said or written, it somehow helps to produce, what it talks about.
This claim is of course another version of the reflexivity argument; we
ourselves are engaged ordering when we try to study ordering. Talking or
writing do not constitute detached spaces of non-engagement with the world.
Law develops this point further through a discussion of the speech act theory
by the philosopher J.L Austin. Austin is well known for making the
distinction between performatives and constatives. 
A performative is a statement, which is also an act. If you say ‘I do’ under the
right circumstances such as a properly conducted wedding ceremony, then
you produce the effect of getting married. 
A constative, on the other hand, is different from an act. Law illustrates this
by the example of hearing on the news, that ‘the government has fallen’. If
you repeat this statement, e.g. by sharing the news with a friend on a later
occasion, your statement ostensibly doesn’t make any contribution to the
‘fact’ it talks about. Common sensically we would say that is simply a report.
Law goes on to introduce two more statements that challenge the sharp
dichotomy between performatives and constatives. The statement ‘I love you’
might in Austin’s terms be described as a constative. It reports a fact. But the
statement is also a performative. Said under the right circumstances it might
be the beginning of a love affair or a re-affirmation. However, the
performative effect of ‘I love you’ might be uncertain: “if it were said in the
‘wrong way’ or the ‘wrong circumstances, it might be the end of a love affair
or a friendship’ (ibid. p.157). So the statement ‘I love you’ is constative that
aspires to be a performative – and whether this is achieved depends on
specific conditions. 
Specific conditions are also evoked by the next statement discussed by Law:
‘The government will fall tomorrow’. This is a statement, which we can
attribute to the thousands of demonstrators on the Wenceslas Square in
Prague on the night of the Velvet Revolution. By saying this statement, by
assembling, and by clinking their keys, the demonstrators did in fact perform
the departure of the government the following day. So this is another
statement which is both constative and performative. In fact, Law points out,
that this statement is constative precisely because it is performative. A self-
fulfilling prophecy as we say in psychology. 
Law lists the various statements in the following table: 
One wa
statemen
we migh
statemen
case we 
But all o
you con
you can
constativ
wedding
conditio
statemen
helps to 
argue th
fallen, t
parliame
the achi
Action
(perfor
Report
(consta‘I do’ ‘I love you’ ‘The government will
fall tomorrow’
‘The government
has fallen’
mative)
? ? ?
? ? ?85
(Ibid. p.158)
y to sum up Law’s arguments is to say that in rare moments a
t might achieve an effect with a fair amount of certainty. In this case
t describe a statement as a performative. Also in rare moments a
t might talk about a fact with a fair amount of detachedness. In this
might describe the statement as a constative. 
f this is a matter of degree, not of qualitative difference. The more
trol the action the more you can call yourself performative. The more
 distance yourself from the action the more you can call yourself
e. However, no one can obtain full control. Even the ‘I do’ of a
 ceremony doesn’t do it without the co-operation of a lot of other
ns. And conversely, no one can obtain full detachment either. A
t always overlaps or interferes with others, and it always somehow
bring about certain intended or unintended conditions. If you want to
at I am not a part of the action, when I repeat that the government has
hen you are simultaneously performing a boundary around, say,
ntary games, rather than around, say, democracy and public life. So
evement of a constative effect is dependent on the arrangement of
tive)
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specificities. And one could even argue that precisely because I speak in
constative ways about the government, I am playing my role as not a part of
the action - a role that is crucial to the performance of representative
democracy. 
Consequently, no statements are purely constative or purely performative. All
statements are in the slippery space between performative and constative. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced the turn to performance in STS by reviewing
a number of studies. I am quite prepared to apologise to the reader, who has
found this ‘tour’ a bit too kaleidoscopic. The prime reason for the many-
sidedness of the present chapter is this: The performative turn is not simply a
claim about a particular object out there and neither is it simply about a
particular method used in here. It is rather something in between. For the sake
of clarification, however, I will try to press the notion of performance in the
object-direction and the method-direction respectively, and try to approximate
a definition. 
As an ‘object’ performances can be said to be particular patterns that can be
imputed to the social. We have come across a number of these putative
patterns. A type of mini-discourses called modes of ordering for instance:
enterprise, administration, vision and vocation. A variety of spaces or
topologies for instance: regions, networks, fluids and fire. Objects which are
somehow more than one but less than many, so-called multiple objects, for
instance a disease or an aircraft. None of the authors I have come across,
attempt to limit the study of performance to objects, spaces or mini-
discourses. Much less do they attempt to prioritise these options or make one
engulf the others. In fact, in seems to be a matter of analytical discretion as to
which type of performance will play the principle part in the analysis. This
can be elucidated through an example taken from Mol (2001). She explains
that the laboratory practice of angiography creates something akin to a ‘road
map’ of atheroschlerosis. In this case we might chose to focus on (1)
laboratory practice - a vocational mode of ordering. (2) The ’road map’ - a
type of space. Or (3) atheroschlerosis - a multiple object. This makes it clear
that the spaces, objects and modes of ordering can be considered
supplementary rather than competing tools for imputing patterns to the social.
And this in turn opens the possibility of using several of them together. A
possibility that I will utilise in the following chapters.
So far I have simply mentioned a number of examples of ‘patterns imputed to
the social’. It is however possible to list certain characteristics of these
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patterns. First, performances are recursive processes. They are continually
emergent outcomes of interaction. Second, performances are materially
heterogeneous. They are about talk, bodies, texts, machines, architectures,
materials etc. Third performances are somehow bounded. They do not exist in
and off themselves. They exist in multiple relations to other performances:
conflict, inter-dependence, mutual inclusion, tension, interference etc. So if
we press the notion of performance in the object-direction, we might say that
performances are unbounded, materially heterogeneous, recursive processes
or patterns that can be imputed to the social. 
If we choose to look at the performative turn as a method or an analytical
sensitivity, something else comes into view. First, the claim is that the social
can/should be investigated by attending to specificities of doing. The focus is
on the details of materially heterogeneous events. Furthermore, there is an
attention to differences: how are objects, spaces and orderings done
differently? And following this there is an attention to the partial and specific
forms of relatedness between the different performances: distributions,
inclusions, tensions, dependencies and the rest. So as a method, the
performative turn can be defined as a sensitivity to specificities of materially
heterogeneous events with special reference to differences and relations
between performances. 
In addition, the performative turn comes with a certain reflexive attitude.
Texts are taken to be performative, so writings about performance - as well as
any other writing - participates in the orderings of the world. This calls for
modesty, in that no claims are made to tell the whole story and no efforts are
made to hide the author, or to pull what Donna Haraway has dubbed the god-
eye-trick of seeing everything from nowhere. 
As a final effort to clarify the performative turn, I will position it in relation to
a number of other theoretical traditions. 
Very broadly, the performative turn is a way to refuse the choice between the
modern and the post-modern. The modern is about order and purity. The post
modern is a celebration of fragments and disorder. The performative turn is a
series of claims and sensitivities that try to reach a fractional space in
between. Something that is beyond the mono-dimensionality of modernity
and beyond the free-floating multi-dimensionality of the post-modern. In this
sense it has much in common with the parts of the ANT-tradition that claim to
be non-modern. (See Latour, 1993)
 This ‘in between’ position is also salient in relation to the speech act theory
of J.L. Austin. The dichotomy between constatives and performatives is
questioned by Law, who argues that most if not all statements are to be found
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in a slippery space in between, aspiring to either performative or constative
effects. Thus the question of constative vs. performative is turned into an
empirical question, and thus potentially an object for a sociology of
performances.
The term performance is easily confused with a number authors and traditions
that use it to designate the ‘front’ of something underlying, hidden from view.
For instance in linguistics it is common practice to distinguish between
underlying competence versus overt performance. And the sociologist Erving
Goffman is well-known for his studies of the ‘performance’ as the
presentation of self in public as opposed to the ‘back stage’ behaviour
exhibited when a person believes he is in private (Goffman, 1959). The
performative turn has no truck with any of this. The performative turn does
not come with the notion that performances are presentations of some
underlying reality. An assumption of this kind would amount to the
asymmetrical move of dividing phenomena into drivers and the driven. In
addition, the idea of performance as a front would a priori make the presence
of other humans the single most decisive factor that configures performance.
However, Mol points out that certain other aspects of Goffman’s theatrical
metaphor are quite useful. For instance the idea, that a performance can have
a script and that there can be improvisation. And the idea, that performances
are staged and employ certain ‘props’.
Garfinkel’s notion of accomplishment (Garfinkel, 1967) is also somewhat
akin to the notion of performance. Obviously, the performative turn shares the
critique of the systemic abstractions of structural-functionalism and it
endorses the claim that social reality is created, as it where, everywhere and
on the ground. But the performative turn broadens the scope of actors to
include non-human actors, and in that sense it is rather different from
ethnomethodology. An even more important difference is the notion of social
order. Garfinkel makes a contrast between the order generated through social
accomplishments versus the disorder in awkward situations such as breaching
experiments. The performative turn doubts the image of a by and large
ordered society with cracks of disorder, or even the image of isles of order in
a sea of disorder. In fact, the performative turn doubts the very opposition
between order and disorder. In the performative turn, this dichotomous notion
is replaced by the notion of multiple incomplete and interfering orderings.
Consequently, performances are not equivalent to accomplishments defined
as successes on some putative scale of order. Performances are multiple,
emerging and partially interdependent orderings some of which collude, and
some of which disarray each other.
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Finally, I should mention that Annemarie Mol has proposed to replace the
term performance by the term enactment (Mol, 2001, ch.2). She argues that
performance carries a number of confusing connotations, such as the ones
mentioned above; many readers come to think of underlying competence or
performance as a successful achievement of order. Mol suggests that the term
enactment carries fewer loads. I have no doubt that this word exchange is a
productive disentanglement move in the fields of sociology, medical
anthropology and philosophy, which Mol is engaged in. But in the field of
organisational theory, which is engaged by the present text, the term
enactment is very closely connected to the work of Karl Weick (1993). In his
work enactment is linked to human sense-making, which is yet another
inappropriate connotation of enactment. (Performance is broader and more
heterogeneous than sense-making). So the dream of a relatively ‘unspoiled’
concept is scattered once again. For this reason I will stick with the term
performance, hoping that the reader will bear the above-mentioned provisos
in mind.
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Chapter Five
Orderings and Spaces
in Social Administration
In this chapter I will begin the work of combining the concepts of the
performative turn with the empirical material gathered from the team project. 
The empirical material will be introduced in the form of four cases. These
cases trace a chronological story about initial discussions in the team project,
the increased focus on the issue of how to subdivide the team, the decision
about a particular kind of subdivision, and the subsequent fate of this
arrangement. 
Along with the chronological story I make a running commentary in which I
impute patterns or performances to the material. I have chosen not to restrict
the commentary to one particular conceptualisation of competence. But most
of the performances, which I point out, are akin to John Law’s modes of
ordering. To some degree, I take this description of performances to be an
interesting piece of ethnography in itself because it suggests how things and
people get ordered in this social administration. However, the primary
significance of the description of performances is that it allows me to raise the
next question: What is the relation between these performances? 
In each of the four empirical cases I attempt to characterise the pattern of
relations, and at the end of this chapter I will suggest that the relational
patterns in each of the four cases represents a particular spatial type.
The first case, that I analyse, is a brief discussion about the opening hours in
the local centres. In the course of this discussion several opposing
performances are articulated, but the performances remain relatively unrelated
and unaffected by each other. This relational pattern might be seen as a case
of regional space.
In the second case, the question of how to subdivide the team into smaller
groups is discussed in a large meeting. This issue is staged in a way that
brings out different performances and relate them in such a way that retreat is
impossible. A conflict has been articulated. This relational pattern might be
seen as a case of fire space.
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In the third case, a working group continues the work on how to subdivide the
team. In this event, certain performances form an alliance and this alliance
becomes sufficiently dominating to produce a ‘solution’ to the problem. The
solution is the construction of a new set of regional boundaries. This
relational pattern might be seen as a case of network space.
In the fourth and final case, the different performances that were connected in
the product of the working group start to get displaced. The new set of
regional boundaries does not hold or contain the work of the local centre.
Instead the performance of the new regional boundaries get mixed up with or
incorporated in the performances that they were supposed to replace. This
relational pattern might be seen as a case of fluid space.
So chronological story along with the commentary trace how different
performances get related and how these relational patterns can be
characterised. The overall conclusion would be something like this: The
‘development’ of the adult team is not a matter of replacing the old with the
new, but rather a matter of a finding ways to handle the tension between the
simultaneous performance of the old and the new. Or to put it in another way:
the metaphor that doesn’t work is the idea of a homogenous region of the new
pushing back a homogenous region of the old. The metaphor that does work is
the idea of performances that are in tension, form alliances, get implicated,
resonate, and try to exclude each other. 
With these overall lines of argument laid out, I will present some background
information about the team project, the local centre and the social workers.
Some Background Information
From the perspective of central staff members in the FLMA (Family and
Labour Market Administration), the team project has moved through three
phases. First, there was a long phase of discussion, planning and decision that
led up to the project. Second, there was a phase of changing the formal
organisational structure, including the hiring of new team managers. In the
case of the adult teams, this phase also entailed the locating of supports
persons and home advisors in the local centres. These professional groups
were elsewhere before. Finally, there was a third phase, which was about
making the teams work. The first seven months of this is what I will
investigate in detail here. A number of the team’s activities in this phase were
laid down by a standard program, which had been decided by the board: 
• Introductory meeting at the central offices of the FLMA (case 1). 
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• Team training session with a consulting firm (case 2). 
• Team Profile: All team members are asked to fill in a questionnaire
designed to measure the ‘developmental stage’ of the team(case 4)
• Two more days of team training (case 4)
• Second Team Profile measurement (case 4) 
• Last team training session (case 4)
In addition to these scheduled activities there were a number of meetings in
the local centre in relation to the team project (see case 3 and 4). 
The adult team consisted of four different professional groups. The table
below displays some basic information about these groups and their clients. 
In this text, I use the term social worker as a cover term for the four different
professional groups below. To the Danish reader this might be slightly
confusing because the subgroup of the caseworkers, who have a three year
education in social work (Danish: socialrådgivere), are often translated to
‘social workers’ in English. What is a cover term here is thus used as a more
specific term in some other contexts.
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Caseworkers Home-helpers Home advisors Support persons
Staff total: 20
3 caseworkers specialised in
early retirement
10 specialised caseworkers
specialised in supplementary
benefits
7 office assistants
total: 13
1 ’co-ordinating 
home-helper’ (a middle
manager)
3 with a health assistant
education. 
total: 9
1 ’co-ordinating
home advisor’ (a
middle manager)
total: 3
Clients 3039 clients divided into 40%
on supplementary benefits and
60% on early retirement.
All of these clients meet the
criterion of requiring a special
effort before they will be able
to re-enter the labour market.
138 clients, most of
these of these
alcoholics, mentally ill,
mentally handicapped or
in other ways
‘marginalised’.
About 60 clients. 
All mentally ill. 
about 20 clients
All mentally ill. 
Services Administration of early
retirement, supplementary
benefits, and a variety of other
benefits. 
’Activation’, i.e. the furthering
of clients’ participation in
education, work-projects,
rehabilitation, etc.  
Cleaning, shopping,
laundry, dressing,
mobilising, personal
hygiene, administration
of medicine.
Supported
housing, and
supporting visits
to mentally ill
clients living in
their own home.
Contact and
support to
severely mentally
ill people, who
are unable or
unwilling to
receive any other
services. 
Loca-
tions 
of work
Two reception areas and eight
small offices in the local
centre.
The clients’ homes. 
One office and a
meeting room in the
local centre.
Supported
housing and the
clients’ homes. 
One office and a
meeting room in
the local centre.
The clients’
homes.
One office
located outside
the local centre. 
Misc. The home
advisors were
made a part of
the local centres
in connection
with the team
project.
Half of the
clients are
located outside
the geographical
area of the local
centre. 
The support
persons were
made a part of
the local centres
in connection
with the team
project.
Figure 5. The professional groups of the adult team
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Case 1.  A discussion about Opening Hours
“When a region is defined the differences inside it are suppressed. (..) 
So it’s possible to build a version of the social in which space 
is exclusive. Neat divisions, no overlap, here and there, 
each place is located at one side of a boundary” 
Mol & Law (1994, p.646-7)
I will begin this search for different performances and the relational pattern
between them at one of the introductory meetings in the team project. The
meeting took place in conference room, which is a part of the central offices
of the Family and Labour Market Administration. The purpose of the meeting
was to introduce the team project to a group of about 40 social workers, who
were to constitute a team in one of the local centres. Like a number of teams
before them, these social workers had been summoned to the headquarters to
receive information on the aims of the new team structure, and to be given the
opportunity to ask questions to a member of the board. 
Below, I will reconstruct a small discussion that took place at this meeting.
The speaking participants were a leading staff member from the central
administration, a caseworker from a local centre and the manager of that local
centre. Apart from these three there were, as I said before, about 40 social
workers listening to the discussion. 
1 Central staff member: We have made our own little phone survey. We found
that the city of Copenhagen has the worst opening
hours in Denmark, compared to the other
municipalities.
2 Caseworker: The worst opening hours in Denmark - is that in a
comparison to other municipalities or with respect to
the users’ needs?
3 Central staff member: The politicians and the citizens regard it as a bad
political signal that we are closed from 1 PM.
4 Caseworker: If we are going to have longer opening hours, the time
for reflection and follow-up will suffer. 
5 Manager: There is a study that shows that the largest cities have
the shortest opening hours
6 Caseworker: Of course! When there is inadequate staffing, you have
to limit the opening hours to make room for the 
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administrative work1.
7 Manager: But we have the same number of clients regardless of
the opening hours
8 Caseworker: When I said that this has to do with inadequate staffing,
I sensed that the colleagues were nodding. This is how
the colleagues feel!
9 Central staff member: This is also related to phone service. If we get better at
giving people full information and connect them to the
right person, we would save a lot of time for the clients
and ourselves.
In the above exchange, social work is performed in a number of different
ways: 
Firstly, the local centre is performed as a point in a statistical distribution (1;
5). This is done in the talk of manager and the central staff member. But there
is more than merely talk; the statistical performance draws on particular props
such as data and surveys and it crucially involves the acts of comparing and
ranking the municipalities. This is not simply an exercise of facts, it also
performs a particular kind of morality; the claim is that being at the bottom of
a ranking is blameworthy. To have the shortest opening hours is equivalent to
having the ‘worst’ opening hours. 
As a critical reply to the statistical performance, the caseworker speaks of the
centre as functional with respect to the users’ needs (2). This user-functional
performance often ‘loads’ itself with stories of how individual clients derive
problems and successes from the services provided by the local centre. This
performance of social work is primarily carried out by social workers, who
have daily contacts with clients and therefore know a lot of stories about
them. But occasionally others also perform social work in this way; in the
introductory chapter, I mentioned that managers tell the story of clients
running the gauntlet between offices. 
A third type of performance is to speak of the social work as implementation
of the wills of politicians and citizens (3). In this respect short opening hours
are referred to as a “bad political signal”. This political performance entails
references to political statements, positions, and evaluations of the present
political trends in the political leadership of the Family and Labour Market
                                             
1 Generally, the work of a caseworker has two parts: While the client is present, the communication is
primarily verbal; needs are established, agreements are made, procedures are explained, etc. When
the client has left, the caseworker does the administrative work; writing in the case file, drafting up
letters, starting benefits by means of the computer system.
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Administration. This type of performance is almost exclusively done by
members of the board and the central staff members, who are close to the
politicians.
A fourth performance is to speak of the social work as the exercise of
professionalism (4; 6). This performance is mostly carried out by persons who
service clients every day and who are trained in social work. References are
made to professional discretion - the right and ability to make judgements
regarding the nature of social problems and the appropriate course of action.
The strength of this performance is also achieved by making links or
references to the community of professionals: the colleagues. 
The four different performances are mobilised and get related to each other in
the discussion about opening hours. This discussion can be seen as a struggle
over the construction or deconstruction of an organisational fact. “The
badness of the opening hours” is launched by the central staff member as
statistical fact. The caseworker makes a deconstructive move by emphasising
user-functionality as an equally valid criterion. At this moment “Bad opening
hours” is no longer an irresistible fact but merely one of two viewpoints.
Responding to this, the central staff member enrols the conceptions of the
politicians and the voters on his side of the argument. In this way he adds to
the construction of  “bad opening hours” as an irresistible fact. But then, the
caseworker claims that an expansion of the opening hours would conflict with
the time for reflection and administrative work, and he furthermore enrols his
physically present professional colleagues as support for this performance.
This move appears to discourage the central staff member from further
attempts to establish ‘the fact’; he retreats to the issue of how time can be
used more efficiently within the present opening hours. 
Clearly, there are two bands of performances in this discussion. The political
and the statistical performance of the social work combine in the efforts of the
central staff member, whereas the professional and the user-functional
performances work together in the arguments of the caseworker. The two
parties enrol more and more allies on either side, but it is also interesting to
notice that they carefully stay away from the ‘home ground’ of the other. The
central staff member doesn’t say anything related to the professional
performance of the work, and he makes no claim about what is useful for the
users. Symmetrically, the caseworker makes no claims about what the
politicians or the citizens want. And he makes no comments on the statistical
survey of opening hours. At one point the manager offers a middle ground of
commonsensical logic, with the statement:  “But we have the same number of
clients regardless of the opening hours” (7). If the caseworker enters this
ground, he would immediately have to explain why the opening hours should
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have any effect on the amount of work related to a fixed number of clients.
However, the caseworker refuses to get into this. He never reveals if he
understands or agrees with the manager’s ‘logic’. Instead, he mobilises his
colleagues behind the claim that this has to do with inadequate staffing (8) 2.
It is tempting to say that nothing really happens in this discussion; no one
moves and the conversation drifts to another topic. But this would overlook
the fact that this event performs a certain distribution of resources and
positions from where to make knowledge claims. Who can make knowledge
claims about what in which ways? This question and its usual answers are
rehearsed. The event is thus a part of an on-going labour of division3 between
actors in the social administration4. So the event is not simply ‘about’ social
work, it is in fact co-constitutive of what social work in this administration is.
It does indeed perform social work. It performs social work as certain areas of
expertise, which are largely unaffected by each other. In this state of affairs
there is no room for the manager’s commonsensical logic or other things
common such as a consensual evaluation of the opening hours. These entities,
which cannot be located within a particular area, are either left unsupported or
actively deconstructed. This then is one of the patterns of performances in the
social administration; A world of mutually exclusive areas of expertise with
nothing in between. 
                                             
2 The theme of refusing to get entangled has been thoroughly discussed by Callon & Rabeharisoa
(2000). The terms entanglement/disentanglement, which I use in the following is borrowed from this
article.  
3 This term is borrowed from Robert Cooper. 
4 In addition, it should be noted that there is always a price to pay. The construction of one world
implies the destruction of others. The performance of different areas of expertise precludes a
consensual evaluation of the opening hours.
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Case 2.  A Team Training Session
“To say that there is a fire topology is to say that there are 
stable shapes created in patterns of conjoined alterity”
Law & Mol (2000, p.5)
As a part of the ‘implementation’ of the team project, the board of the
Administration hired a private consulting firm to be in charge of four days of
team training for each team. In what follows I will analyse the pattern of
performances in the first of these team-training sessions. 
The general discussion in this session was the question of how to subdivide
the team. From the very beginning of the project, central staff members had
pointed out that 46 social worker cannot collaborate on a daily basis, so
somehow the team had to be divided into a number of smaller groups. No one
seemed to disagree with that, but the question was how to do it. 
In the team training session, the social workers were expected to participate in
a decision about this problem. In the course of this a number of different
performances, which I will describe in detail, were brought out. The plurality
of performances is similar to case 1, but I suggest that case 2 is different in at
least one important respect. In case 2 the issue of grouping is staged in such a
way that the different performances cannot continue unaffected by each other.
The performances seem to get entangled. 
The Making of a Day to be Seized
On a normal working day, the four professional groups work
independently in the local centre and in the field5. The only exceptions to
this rule are a few particularly hard cases in which cross-professional co-
ordination takes place on an ad hoc basis. 
For the team training, the professionals were summoned to an education
centre in a different part of the city. It goes without saying that all
appointments with clients were cancelled on this day, and that numerous
non-human actants were left behind in the local centre. 
                                             
5 Caseworkers work almost exclusively in the local centre. The home-helpers, home advisors and
support persons spend most of their working time in the field. 
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At the education centre, the professionals were placed in a conference
room with tables and chairs placed in a horseshoe formation6. Individuals
were thus placed on one long line (with two bends), and every individual
was facing (almost) every other individual. However, the professional
groups were also visible in the choreography, because almost everybody
seated themselves next to their closest colleagues. So give and take a few
exceptions, the horseshoe consisted of a line of caseworkers followed by a
line of home-helpers, followed by a line of home advisors etc. 
What I have described so far, could be thought of as number of more or less
partial detachments. Detachment from clients, detachment from the
materialities of the local centre, and detachment from the professional
colleagues7. These detachments serve to create an empty space: In the
calendars, in purpose of the day (no agenda has been given), and on the floor
in middle of the horseshoe. This space performs an opportunity to do
something but also a demand to do so. All these appointments cannot be
cancelled for nothing. All these wage hours cannot be wasted. All these
people cannot be seated in this way without talking about something
important. So the scene is set for making something of the void. A day to be
seized has been made. The attention is drawn to the chief consultant who is
about to make his introduction. 
The chief consultant starts by stating his name, and briefly going over his
previous work experience. We learn that he has held the position of
administrative director in another municipality for 7 years, and that he has
worked in the consulting firm for 13 years. The assistant consultant makes
a presentation in a similar format, mentioning her law degree, her
background in the national central administration, and her 10 years of
seniority in the consulting firm. 
A third consultant introduces himself. He is an internal consultant from
the central administration of the Family and Labour Market
Administration. He explains his role as the supervisor and facilitator of the
team, and he mentions his long experience with various social work
projects. 
                                             
6 To be precise: The tables were arranged as three sides of a square. In Danish this arrangement is
typically referred to as a horseshoe. I will use this term in the following. 
7 The creation and use of off-site arrangements is a very common practice in organisational
development.
101
The short presentations do a number of things in terms of defining roles and
assuring the social workers that the people standing before them are
competent and experienced. In this way, the presentations add to the
opportunity-charging of the empty space; the agenda is still not revealed, but
the social workers are told that an impressive amount of experience will be at
their disposal in the following hours. 
Entering the Empty Space
The chief consultant’s next move is to tell that he has a standard plan for
the day. This is the plan that has been used with most of the other teams in
the Administration. The plan has two elements: First, getting to know each
other better, and second the issue of grouping. He asks the audience
whether they want the standard plan, or something else. The social workers
seem somewhat surprised. They start to talk a bit with their neighbours,
and after a short while, two or three people say they go for the standard
plan. The chief consultant takes this to be general consensus. 
In the above event, the consultant places something in the void: A decision
between two alternatives. By doing so, he performs the group as a decision-
making body, and soon a few of the social workers support this performance
by entering the empty space and stating their opinion. The consultant then
takes these few people to be representative of the rest. In this way, the few
people who spoke up get enrolled as representatives for their silent
colleagues. 
The next move by the consultant is even more surprising. Smiling, he
declares that he will invite everybody to a cocktail-party. Cocktail parties
are about meeting new people, he explains. So he will ask everybody to get
up from the chair and go to the empty floor in the middle of the
horseshoe. In there, everybody should seek out someone they haven’t
talked to before, introduce themselves, and strike up a conversation. The
social workers respond to this suggestion as a fun and somewhat crazy
thing to do. They all go into the horseshoe and quickly there is a loud
buzzing of voices from the ‘cocktail-party crowd’. 
In a very literal sense, the cocktail party exercise places the team in the
empty, opportunity-charged space. The team members themselves are now in
the centre. And they are engaging in an exercise that performs team members
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as people with a specific conduct. First, the conduct is about having fun. (I
will return to this). Second, it is about civility. The civility entailed in playing
cocktail-party means that the team member is supposed to express interest in
others, and to tell the group something about herself. In this mode of
interaction, there are no intermediaries such as outspoken colleagues or
middle managers between the individual social worker and people from other
professional groups. She is expected to speak for herself. In this way, the
exercise adds to the work of detaching the individual from the professional
group.
Judging from the tone of voices everybody regards the exercise as fun.
However, fun can be hard to resist. Not having fun in the midst of group of
people having fun may be very awkward, and you may have to explain why
you are ‘such a bore’. Furthermore, particular materialities of the cocktail
exercise work to make it difficult to escape participation. Let us imagine that
one of the social workers did not want to participate. That person would be
extremely visible if she remained in her seat on the outside of the tables,
while everybody else was inside. Or image that someone changed her mind
after entering the floor. If she wanted to escape from the crowd of people
presenting themselves and expecting to be responded, she would either have
to climb over the tables surrounding the group on three sides, or she would
have to walk past the smiling chief consultant standing by ‘the teachers desk’
on the fourth side. In effect, she would be trapped in the zone of fun and
civility. So what is performed here could perhaps be termed the obligatory fun
of teamwork.  
After ‘the cocktail party’ and a short smoking break, the social workers
gather in the horseshoe again. The chief consultant introduces the next
exercise. Pair with you neighbour and interview each other about your
backgrounds for 10 minutes. Afterwards, everybody will be asked to
present his or her neighbour to the rest of us. Again there is buzzing of
voices, and everybody works busily on the task. When time is up the round
of neighbour presentations starts. The social workers represent each other
in a format that somehow resembles the earlier presentations given by the
consultants. The first name and the present job in the local centre are
stated. Most people also mention the educational background, and earlier
jobs in the social administration or elsewhere. A few people tell of their
neighbour’s positive or negative expectations to the team collaboration. 
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The round of presentations contributes to a number of performances
mentioned above. First, individualised civility. In this exercise every social
worker is expected to account for herself to her neighbour, and she is
expected to display interest. And again, there is little room for escape; if
someone chose not to participate, the void in the continuous round of the
presentations would be highly visible. Second, there is the charging of the
empty space. The long list of presentations seem to convey the message that
the social workers bring an impressive amount of education, and experience
to the disposal of the meeting. Third, detachment. The presentation of
individuals works against an ontology of professional groups.
However, the presentation exercise also performs something new. Every
single person is now called to speak in public in front of everybody else. So
the individual is performed as a contributor to the empty space. 
After another short break, the chief consultant introduces the plan for the
rest of the day. There will be group discussions about the issue of grouping.
And there will presentations of the group discussions, and further
discussions in a plenary session. But before going into groups he will ask the
audience to formulate some principles for grouping. “What should we take
into account when we discuss the grouping of the team?” He places himself
next to a flip-over and picks up a pen. A number of different social workers
speak:  
- cross-professionalism
- no reduction in service
- good lines of communication
- interest, motivation, commitment
- sufficient professionalism
- opportunities for job rotation
- consideration of target groups
- respect for the expertise of individuals
The chief consultant takes everything down. There is no discussion about the
principles. Afterwards, the second consultant divides the team into 6 groups
that mix the different professions. She walks the inside of the horseshoe
counting numbers 1 through 6, assigning a number to each social worker.
Then she goes to the blackboard and writes list of rooms. She asks the ones
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to go in room X, the twos in room Y, etc. The social workers start moving to
the group rooms.
With the list of principles, things get complicated. What is being evoked with
all these different ‘principles’?8 Are they in conflict, or can they be
reconciled? For the moment I will not get into these questions. Instead, I will
focus on how the team is performed by the work of the consultants. By asking
the team to formulate principles for the ensuing group work, the team is once
more performed as a decision-making body. Organisational theorists9 often
make a distinction between two kinds of decision-making. One is about
ratification and approval of ideas that have emerged in the lower echelons of
the organisation. The other is about pro-active strategic planning. Obviously,
the stating of principles is related to the latter kind. So the collective team is
performed as a planning actor, and the groups are assigned an executive
role10.
Finally, the creation of groups that mix the professions can be seen as yet
another contribution to the work of detaching individuals from professional
groups. 
In my account of the team training so far, I have described a series of events
that perform the social workers’ participation in a decision about grouping.
The performances work to detach the social workers from clients, local centre
materialities, and professional groups. They further work to create an empty
space of opportunity and demand for action. In this void, the social workers
are performed11 as individuals engaging in civility, obligatory fun and capable
of speaking in public. Finally, the collective team is performed as a decision-
making body and a planning actor formulating principles for the work in
smaller groups. Taken together these performances seem to suggest that the
                                             
8 The principles might be read as parts of the performances of social work, which I sketched in case
1: (A) Social work as professionalism (good lines of communication / interests, motivation,
commitment / sufficient professionalism / opportunities of job rotation / respect for the expertise of
individuals), (B) Social work as user-functional (no reduction in service), (C) Social work as the
expression of political will , i.e. the officially stated goals of the team project (cross-professionalism /
consideration of target groups).
9 E.g. Mintzberg (1994).
10 Making the employees participate in key decisions is another very commonly used procedure in
organisational development. 
11 The passive form ”the social workers are performed as..” is a deliberate choice. If I had written
“the social workers perform civility” it comes close to a simplistic attribution of the actions to the
individuals. I consider the performances to be orderings, which are stretched over bodies, places,
materials etc. The most precise phrase would probably be “the social workers are performed as and
perform themselves as civil individuals”. But this is rather awkward, so for the sake of simplicity I
will use the passive form in the following. However, this does not mean that I consider the social
workers to be passive. 
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present assembly of capable individuals should seize this unique opportunity
to come together as a team and make a strategic decision.
Preparing a Decision
When the social workers left the conference room, I followed one of the
six groups into a smaller meeting room. Seven people gathered in this
room: The team manager, two home-helpers and four caseworkers.
In their discussion, they almost immediately outlined two alternative ways
of grouping the team: 
(1) Geographical grouping – dividing the area of the local centre into
regions, and allocating social workers from each professional group to
the regions. This would amount to a number of smaller ‘copies’ of the
adult team.
(2) Target group division – dividing the clients into different targets groups
(mentally ill, substance abuser, etc.) and allocate the social workers
accordingly. This would amount to a number of specialised teams.
The participants quickly went into details with the first one. This was
initiated by the manager, who said, “Let’s play with the idea of geographical
grouping”. But it was quickly followed up by the others who suggested a
number of advantages and practical solutions related to this particular
division of the team. The combined effort produced the following ideas
and arguments in relation to the geographical division:
The benefits of geographical division are many: Every region gets a good
coverage of expertise. The division mixes the professional groups and thus
enables cross-professional collaboration. The division creates a variety in
the daily work of the individual social worker. Moreover, if three regions
are chosen, each region could have one of the three support persons and
one of the three caseworkers specialised in early retirement. With three
groups there would be about 15 social workers in each. This is considered a
manageable size, and sufficiently large to stand up to events of illness and
holidays. Finally, the geographical division will make the distribution of
new clients very easy. You simply ask them where they live. The division of
the existing stock of clients will require data on the distribution of clients
on street names. But these data should be fairly easy to obtain.
The group also identified a number of potential problems related to the
geographical division. First of all, there might be some serious demarcation
disputes if some professional groups have to broaden their scope of work.
In particular this is the case for the home advisors, and for a subgroup of
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the home-helpers who have a health assistant education. If these
professional groups were to take part in traditional home help, such as
cleaning, the present group believes that it would raise an outcry. 
Second, one of the home-helpers in the group remarked that his
professional group needs a meeting every morning to co-ordinate the work
of the day. Most of the agenda on the morning meetings would be totally
irrelevant to others. Thus, there is a problem of relevance, or lack thereof, in
cross-professional meetings. Third, the group discussed the impossible
problem of getting suitable rooms and offices for three groups. However the
topic was quickly abandoned because the manager remarked that this
problem would be the same regardless of the type of division. 
The above discussion provides an opportunity to continue the analysis of how
the social workers are performed in relation to the decision about grouping. I
will begin by pointing out that the professional groups are now being
performed. The different types of divisions are seen as different ways to
allocate the professional groups, and there is discussion about the needs of the
home-helpers, the likely outcry of home advisors etc. The professional groups
are performed as interest groups, groups that will inherently appreciate or
protest certain courses of action. This makes way for a particular role to play
for the social workers in the present group. It may appear that they speak as
representatives for their own professional groups. But this doesn’t fit the fact
that they also talk about the reactions of other professional groups. I’ll suggest
that the performance is closer to that of a modest witness12. The social
workers don’t make demands; they simply tell how their colleagues or other
professional groups will respond. In that sense, the talk about the responses of
others and the talk about practicalities, such as the ease of client distribution,
are two of a kind. It is all about facts. The social workers are thus performed
as people who know the business, who can predict what will happen, and who
know what is possible. All this knowledge they contribute to the
enlightenment of the manager’s choice between two types of grouping. A
recommendation is worked out, and the pros and cons are neatly listed.
Approaching the ideal of a civil servant, the social workers supply the
objective facts related to a decision to be made by somebody else. So along
                                             
12 The term is borrowed from Haraway (1997). She uses this term, somewhat ironically, to refer to the
enlightenment figure of the scientist as a non-interfering witness and a neutral spokesperson of the
workings of nature.  
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with the performance of civil servant comes the articulation13 of an informed
decision.
Facts and Interests in Public
Back in the conference room, the chief consultant prompts a round of
presentations from the groups. It turns out that the first three groups have
articulated a similar decision between geographical and target group
division. And they all recommend the geographical division. During the
presentation, one of the caseworkers comments that the support persons
and the home advisors will be against the geographical division. This
immediately provokes a response from one of the home advisors, a person
who is the co-ordinator (or middle manager) of the home advisors. He
explains that a geographical division of his professional group is impossible
because the workload related to the supported housing facilities in different
regions varies significantly from week to week. For this reason all the home
advisors meet twice a week at the moment to distribute the advisors across
the regions.
In this exchange the caseworker performs the home advisors as an interest
group. She states that they will be against the geographical division without
giving any further reasons. The home advisor however performs their
resistance as a matter of facts. He presents a set of practical reasons that
makes a geographical division of their work impossible. Through this
argument I suggest that the home advisor performs himself as one of the ‘civil
servants’ that should inform the manager’s decision. Simultaneously, he tries
to escape being performed as an interest group, which would effectively
detach him from the world of facts and decisions that is constructed by the
manager and the civil servants. 
The turn has now come to the fourth group. The co-ordinating home
advisor, who is in this group, proposes a completely different division of
the team. The professional groups should work by themselves, but each
group should elect a co-ordinator who can work closely with the other co-
ordinators and with the team manager. Furthermore there should be a
team meeting every month. 
                                             
13 Latour (1999) expands the traditional linguistic meaning of articulation to include any process in
which something is represented through a connection to something else (e.g. gestures, papers,
settings, instruments, sites, trials). (p.142). I use the term articulation in this expanded sense.
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The chief consultant asks if group 4 believes this division is user-oriented
or service-oriented. (The former would be in accordance with the official
goals of the team project, whereas the latter is the jargon term for the
former structure). The home advisor answers that he takes their proposal
to be user-oriented. The consultant goes on to ask how co-ordination with
respect to the users will take place. The home advisor answers that there
will be co-ordination “in the house”. Finally, the consultant asks if there
are any drawbacks to their proposal. The home advisor replies: “possibly”.
The consultant remarks: “But you didn’t come up with any!” The home
advisor doesn’t answer.
The home advisor has now presented a proposal, in which the professional
groups are clearly the core element. But this is challenged by the consultant.
First, he first tries to construct a contradiction between the proposal and the
official goal of the team project. The home advisor denies such a
contradiction. The consultant then presses the home advisor to state some
drawbacks of the proposal. The home advisor fails or refuses to do that. This
exchange might be seen as a type of test constructed by the consultant. If the
home advisor wants to be taken seriously as a ‘civil servant’, he must be able
to state pros and the cons in his proposal, so that the decision can be handed
over to someone else, i.e. the manager. If, however, the home advisor fails to
state the cons, he is not performing his civil servant role properly; he is
simply trying to make the decision himself by stating his own opinion, as any
interest group would do. 
The meeting continues with presentations by the fifth and the sixth group.
They recommend a geographical division for reasons similar to the first
three groups. 
As the meeting draws to an end, the chief consultant asks the team
manager to make a decision about what to do next. She proposes a date for
a team meeting at the local centre, and she says that she will make the final
decision shortly after this meeting. One of the caseworkers suggests that
each of the professional groups write a proposal to the manager. The chief
consultant supports this idea by saying: “yes, the team should have the
opportunity to influence the team managers thinking”. 
The co-ordinating home advisor says that they have a need to tell the rest
of the team about their organisation, its background, and why it is
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functioning very well14.  The caseworker suggests that he just write about
that in his proposal to the manager. “I don’t have to spend my time on
that. This is not the time for mutual education”. However, another
caseworker supports the idea, and the manager determines an additional
meeting time where each professional group gets half an hour to make a
presentation of their work to the others. With these agreements the
meeting ends.
In this part, the process of making a decision is performed in two different
ways. The manager, the consultant and one of the caseworkers suggest that
the manager makes the decision, and that the professional groups give her
(written) advice. In this version, the manager is the decision-maker and the
social workers are cast in the role of civil servants offering advice or
suggestions. 
The home advisor, on the other hand, asks for another team meeting where he
can present information about his professional group to the entire team. He
performs the team as the decision-maker. He is thus returning to the
performance of the team, which was done by the consultants at the beginning
of the day, but which was somehow pushed aside during the efforts to
articulate the options and inform the manager. 
Performances in Case 2
In the first team training session, I suggest that there are three different
performances of decision making. I will call these agora, informed
management, and expert-dialogue. 
Agora. Initially, ‘a team of individuals’ is performed as the decision-making
subject. This performance entails the positioning of furniture, bodies and a
meeting space in ways that produces co-presence and co-visibility of a large
number of individuals: an agora. It entails individuals who are legitimate
members of this forum, individuals who are capable of speaking, individuals
who are civil to each other, individuals who are obliged to participate, and
individuals who are momentarily disentangled from other obligations.
Furthermore, this performance entails acts such as deciding how to proceed
and stating principles for ‘subcommittees’. 
Informed management. When the team breaks up into groups, a distinctly
different version of decision-making is performed. Now a manager supported
                                             
14 Home advisors and support persons are newcomers to local centres. Their new physical and
organisational placement has taken place in connection with the team project. 
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by ‘civil servants’ is performed as the decision making subject. This entails
the articulation of options and the gathering of advantages and disadvantages
to these options. This articulation work does not require co-presence, it can be
distributed over time; the preparation of the manager’s decision can proceed
even though only a few team members are present, and subsequent
information can be given to the manager in the form a written proposals. This
performance of managerial decision-making is one that portrays itself as
rational and concerned with the facts. ‘Others’, that is people who do not
contribute ‘facts’ or proper ‘factual’ accounts of their opinions, are depicted
as interest groups that should be kept at some distance from the decision. 
Expert-dialogue. The third version of decision-making emerges in the talk of
the home advisor. This performs decision making as a process in which
established areas of expertise are brought into dialogue. The argument is
something like this: It would be irresponsible to build a house without
consulting expertise on fire regulations, electricity and piling. And likewise,
you should never make a team decision without serious consideration of the
knowledge of the home advisors and the other established professional
groups. The notion of areas of expertise implies that representatives of
different areas can be elected to speak behalf of these knowledge domains. So
decision-making can proceed without the co-presence of the entire team. But,
contrary to the managerial version, this version does not accept that ‘facts’
can simply be handed over to a manager, verbally or in writing. The expert
representative must participate all the way, and he should ideally retain a right
to veto.
So here we have three different performances of decision-making including
different subjects, artefacts, acts, and moral ideas about due process. The
question is now, what can be said about their relations. In the first case
discussed in this chapter (about opening hours) a number of different
performances were enrolled in a clash, but then they backed off. The present
case, I suggest, is less like boxing and more like wrestling; a number of
different actor get entangled in such a way that letting go is difficult. 
The issue of dividing the team is introduced as a matter of great importance.
As I described, heavy investments of time and expertise are made to create an
empty space charged with opportunities along with an agora-like performance
of the individual social workers as participants and stakeholders in the
decision in prospect. At this point, the balance of forces between doing
nothing and doing something is already heavily tilted towards the latter. In the
next part of the session, the social workers work in groups and decision-
making is now performed according to a seemingly well-rehearsed repertoire
of informed management (at least in the group, which I followed). This
111
performance creates visible tension with at least one home advisor who at
different times strives to become accepted as a ‘rational civil servant’,
proposes decision-making as an expert-dialogue, and asks for another agora-
session. The combined effect of this is that options have been articulated, and
that a number of partially conflicting performances of decision-making have
been evoked. None of these ‘programs’ can easily back off from the issue,
because that would leave the scene to the others. The manager’s clear
statement, that she will be ready to make her decision shortly after a second
meeting, drives the proponents of expert-dialogue to seek influence before it
is too late. And this in turn drives proponents of the agora-performance to call
for more team meetings, so that everything doesn’t happen behind closed
doors. The performances have thus been articulated and related to each other
in such a way that it is hard not to continue struggling with the issue of
dividing the team. The issue has been turned into a hot conflict!
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Case 3.  The Working Group
“A network is a series of elements with 
well defined relations between them.” 
Mol & Law (1994, p.649)
In case 2 I traced how different options and different versions of due process
were articulated and juxtaposed in a way that produced a hot conflict. In the
following, I will describe how this oppositional pattern was changed into one
that produced a solution to the issue of how to subdivide the team. 
At the end of the first team training session, it was agreed that each
professional group should submit a written proposal about grouping to the
manager. These proposals were to be discussed at a meeting for the entire
team at the local centre. 
If the team training session is taken as the point of comparison, then it is
unsurprising that the written proposal from the home advisors and the support
persons was a target group division. This type of division would entail one
group specialising in mentally ill clients, and thus all the home advisors and
all the support persons would go into this group. The paper from the
caseworkers was more of a surprise. On the day of the team training most of
them spoke in favour of a geographical division, but their written proposal
consisted of a short list of advantages and longer list of problems for each of
the two types of division.
Finally, the paper from the home-helpers didn’t relate to the grouping at all.
Instead it stated a number of unsolved problems with respect to weekend
shifts. Furthermore it listed a number of wishes for more resources, time and
facilities. 
Respectively, the messages from the three groups seemed to be: 
“We can only accept a grouping that allows our professional group to remain
united” 
“There will be serious problems, no matter what we do” 
“Other things than grouping are on the agenda”
Faced with these rather uneven performances - that certainly did not add up
do the performance of a decision - the manager made two moves. First she
declared that she would not accept that all the home advisors and all the
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support persons go into one group. “The professional groups must be mixed!”
That, she said, is what is “dinned into my ears” at the meetings with the
consulting firm, and that is what the official project goals demand. 
Second, she appointed a small working group to continue the preparation of
the grouping. The working group consisted of seven people: The team
manager, a former middle manager15, the co-ordinating16 home advisor, the
co-ordinating home-helper, a senior caseworker, a senior support person and a
housing advisor17.
Drawing on the analysis of case 2 it is fairly easy to explain why such a
working group is a workable way to proceed. Apparently, it satisfies all three
versions of due process. It informs the manager, it stages a dialogue between
representatives of the established areas of expertise, and finally it promises to
return to the agora to have its results agreed to.
In the following I will look closely into three working group meetings that
were held shortly after each other, in fact on a Monday, Tuesday and
Thursday in the same week. To me the effect of these meetings was
astonishing. Within this short period, the group moved from the uneven
performances, sketched above, to the construction of an elaborate solution to
the problem of how to divide the team. I will investigate this rapid process by
once again paying close attention to the different performances and how they
get related.
Waiting for the Figures
I arrive at the local centre Monday morning at 8:30 AM. The middle
manager, the support person and the caseworker are already there. They
are sitting in conference room designed for about 40 people. Three tables
have been shoved together in the end closest to the entrance, thus making
a working table for the group. They are waiting for the team manager.
I take the opportunity to ask what happened at a particular meeting last
week, a meeting that I had missed. The (former) middle manager tells me
                                             
15 Middle managers had their charge taken away as a part of the team project. As a part of the
agreement with the trade unions none of the middle managers were fired and their pay remained the
same. But they were told to keep a low profile in the team process, and their specific tasks in the new
structure were largely undefined. 
16 Social workers in positions designated ’co-ordinating’ are in effect middle managers in charge of
one particular professional group. Two groups - the caseworkers and the support persons - have no
co-ordinator.  
17 The housing advisor is a type of professional, which I have not mentioned before. There is only one
housing advisor in the team, and he is usually considered a one-man-professional-group because he
works rather independently of the others. 
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they all were very frustrated that the grouping has to take place right now.
“We discovered that geographical grouping will result in work every
weekend for the home advisors, and target grouping will result in work
every weekend for the home-helpers”. Furthermore, the middle manager
tells me, the team manager had arrived in the middle of this discussion. She
had declared that they must work across professional demarcations. “That
paralysed us completely”. 
The middle manager’s story performs a kind of paralysis that resonates with
the written proposal from the caseworkers. No matter which type of grouping
is chosen there will be intractable problems. The suggestion seems to be that
no action is possible, unless there are changes in external conditions, such as
the workload, the allocated staff resources, or the goals of the team project.
However, the performance of paralysis is changed in the very next moment.
The team manager arrives. She starts by asking the middle manager to
distribute a summary she (the middle manager) has made of the pages
concerning the adult teams in the official project plan of the team project.
This done, the manager explains to the others that she has talked with the
middle manager about how to proceed. 
The middle manager continues by telling that she has contacted the central
offices to get some figures. The figures on the supplementary benefit cases
have arrived, and the ones on early retirement will be here today. “I have
got a list of street names from the home-helpers, and I have added the
number of supplementary benefit cases in each street”. She passes out
another set of photocopies. The paper lists all the street names in the
region of the local centre and next to each street the number of
supplementary benefit cases is added in the middle managers handwriting
(figure A below). The caseworker remarks: “this is kind of fun – we have
never done this before”. The middle manager replies: “yeah, it is fun isn’t it
– and the early retirement cases are probably heaped up in the same way”.
In the above sequence the performance of paralysis seems wiped away by a
sudden burst of activity. Prompted by the manager, the middle manager
presents an array of materials (as we shall see later, these are all materials for
constructing a geographical division): A summary of the project plan, a list of
street names and figures on the distribution of cases. Through this, the group
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is performed as a centre of calculation18, a location in which diverse materials
are drawn together. The long project plan from the Board is translated into a
two-page summary. The region of the local centre is rendered manageable by
the home-helpers’ one page alphabetical list of street names. And for the first
time, some information on the physical distribution of clients is available
through the juxtapositioning of street names and client addresses.
In the earlier performance of ‘paralysis’, the working group seemed
dependent on the mobility of external conditions, and immobile in itself.
Now, the group itself seems to be the locus of mobility, in that it actively
draws information from its comparatively passive surroundings.
In the next part of the meeting, the group talks about the number of cases
in the adult team. There are about 1025 on supplementary benefits and
perhaps around 1400 on early retirement. Since the team was formed as in
organisational unit three months ago, it has received 200 new cases. When
the teams in the local centre were demarcated, the caseworkers were
relieved of a number of cases. But all of those cases were ‘easy’, whereas
the cases received now are very hard. The caseworker tells the group about
a particular case that the service team tried to pass on to the adult team. It
was a young, foreign woman who got divorced and had some existential
problems. But nothing ‘mental’ and nothing related to substance abuse.
The caseworker declares that the woman in question obviously didn’t
belong to the adult team. The rest of the working group agrees. They go on
to talk about some very bothersome calculations of heating benefits. This
tedious task is with the adult team at the moment, but all team managers
(and the official project plan) clearly acknowledge that it has to move to
the service team. It just hasn’t been done yet.
In the above snippet the demarcation in relation to other teams is performed. I
will call this performance labour of division. The team is performed as a unit
that the manager and the social workers cheer for together. The relation to the
other teams is performed as a battle over getting rid of hard cases and
annoying tasks. This battle takes a number of different forms. It can be large
battles such as the whole business of heating benefits, or it can be smaller but
potentially strategic “case-shoving” battles such as the case of the divorced
woman. 
                                             
18 Cf. Latour (1987, chap. 6).
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It is interesting to compare the ‘labour of division’ performance with the
performances of ‘paralysis’ and ‘centre of calculation’. The ‘centre of
calculation’ comes across as a potent and energetic of movement toward the
division of the team, whereas the ‘paralysis’ obviously has the emotional tone
of giving up, frustration, and lack of movement toward the decision. The
labour of division falls somewhere in between these. On the one hand there is
talk about waiting for others (external to the team), who has to take over some
of the workload. On the other hand there is talk about actively rejecting cases
and making demands to the other teams. In the next section, the performances
start to get related. 
The manager says something like this: There is a problem in relation to
grouping. It is a obstacle that we work with more clients, than we should.
What we must do is to pretend that we have as few clients as we actually
should have. Of course this is a problem because the reality is different.
But then we must make a list of what should be moved to the Service
Team and elsewhere. I will discuss the problem with the other team
managers, and ask how we are supposed to live up to the intentions of
being a team that delivers treatment. We must try to pretend that the
necessary conditions are there, and we must make demands on the Service
Team when they try to make us take over.
In this statement the manager engages in a performance that Law (1994) has
termed vision. Law describes this as form of authority in which power and
ordering is derived from access to a reality and a vision that transcends the
mundane. In this case the extra-mundane reality is the secluded group of team
managers who may divide the labour in such a way that the promise of
sufficient resources is redeemed. The manager offers to share a bit of her
access by taking a ‘list’ of problems with her. Evoking the intermediary19 of
the list is a way to enrol the social workers in the performance of vision. Their
specific role is to ‘pretend’ while the manager negotiates with the other
managers. This enrolment is clearly at odds with the pessimistic versions of
the labour of division. The manager urges the social workers to stop the
pessimistic talk about the caseload, which tends to slide them into paralysis.
Instead they should put the problems on a list, give them to the manager and
let it go. In that sense the manager’s performance of vision entails a
detachment of the social workers from their immediate problems. The clearly
                                             
19 The term intermediaries is used in ANT to designate any kind of entity that circulates between the
actors in a network (e.g. Callon, 1998, p.256-257). 
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stated purpose of this detachment is of course to create an opportunity for the
social workers to engage in the grouping decision. So the vision colludes with
the performance of ‘centre of calculation’ and it works to defer the
performances of ‘labour of division’ (in the passive version) and ‘paralysis’.
The tension between performances becomes even more pronounced a little
later in the meeting:
The meeting, that I missed last week, was apparently also missed by the
caseworker. She asks the team manager what she actually said at this
meeting that made people so paralysed. 
(Dialogue reconstructed from field notes20:) 
Manager: I was provoked by the co-ordinating home-helper who
constantly went into details. We must clear away the obstacles for
thinking. If we could make some groups, it would be fantastic. Each
of them could plan their work according to the target group. But that
presupposes that we get rid of those damn administrative tasks. I
really mean that. I don’t see why that should provoke people. 
Caseworker: The problem is not evening work, it is the professional
demarcations. “I don’t want to vacuum if two home-helpers are ill”.
Support person: And it is even worse in the case of care. I don’t know
anything about lifting techniques – there are professional
demarcations.
Caseworker: And we also have our professional pride. I will not accept that
a home-helper advises the clients about rehabilitation or flex-jobs.
Manager: You are pushing it to extremes. Everybody will retain his or her
core area, but there must be some flexibility. The group must jointly
manage the work outside the core areas.
Caseworker: yeah, we talked about that – and it would be fine with us to
visit clients with the home advisors or the home-helpers. We’d like to
get away from our desks.
                                             
20 The dialogues in this chapter are all reconstructed from my field notes. Statements in quotation
marks are English translations of formulations that I noted word by word. The other statements are
reconstructions based on key words, which I jotted down every time someone said something. The
accuracy of these statements are thus at the level of  “..or words to that effect”. On the whole, I do not
claim that the empirical snippets are accurate on the word to work level. But I do claim that they
constitute a plausible reconstruction of the discussions and actions in the adult team, which is
sufficiently ‘thick’ to analyse the broad patterns of performance.
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Manager: “That’s the secret of it. It must be possible to make some
exciting social work in this team”.
(The manager continues talking about the idea of making intervention
plans in all the new cases)
Manager: ... doesn’t that sound exciting?
Caseworker: At the moment, we are struggling with three interviews a day.
“When you are done with that, you are beat”. But we are trying to
make some intervention plans.
In this part it becomes clear that the manager’s attempt at clearing away ‘the
obstacles for thinking’ does not stop the social workers from performing
labour of division. (This time division between the professional groups within
the team). The two performances seem to oscillate; Every time the problems
crop up and paralysis seems imminent, vision is evoked. And every time the
vision is about to dominate the picture, someone calls attention to practical
problems. So in contrast to the team training session, it seems hard for the
manager to keep the grouping decision on the agenda. It seems to be pushed
aside all the time. 
Figuring it out
At the first working group meeting three people were absent21. At the second
meeting - the one I will analyse in this section - all the members attended. So
the total list of participants was this: Manager, middle manager, support
person, caseworker, home-helper, home advisor and housing advisor. At the
first part of the meeting, the performances oscillate the way I have described
above. 
The manager talks about the need to try to move on. Some of the social
workers talk about the staff that has left another team. The home-helper
says that the geographical grouping should take their ‘road time’ into
consideration, because it comes out as non-productive time in the
computer system. Responding to this the manager tells her that ‘the
practicalities’ will have to go in order to make it possible to think. The
home-helper answers: In that case, I think the staff will leave. The manager
says that the task of the working group would be made impossible if
everybody argued in that way. 
                                             
21 The co-ordinating home-helper, the co-ordinating home advisor and the housing advisor.  
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And so it continues. More worries are brought up, and the manager repeats
her idea about making a list and taking it to the management team. But then
something happens. 
The manager says that the figures from yesterday (the first meeting) might
suggest a division. She is referring the to the middle manager’s paper
combining street names and number of clients on supplementary benefits
(fig. A). 
The caseworker asks, "Are you asking if someone has a map in their head?" 
By this question, she queries if someone knows the local geography well
enough to imagine a set of regions that would divide the clients evenly.
Obviously, an extremely difficult task because the paper in question is an
alphabetical listing of more than one hundred street names (fig. A)
The middle manager replies to this by handing out photocopies of a list of
street names (fig. B) and a corollary map (fig. C). She explains that she has
received this material from the health visitors in one of the other teams in
the local centre. What makes this material interesting is that it divides the
area of the local centre into three regions, and gives an alphabetical listing
of the streets in each region. So now the group has the number of
supplementary benefit clients linked to street names (A) and street names
linked to regions (B+C).
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The manager asks if the figures (A) can be transferred to the regions (B).
The home-helper says, “I can divide mine into regions. That’ll take 20
minutes” 
She leaves the conference room, and goes to her office to figure out the
regional distribution of the 140 home help clients. 
The middle manager, the housing advisor, caseworker and the support
person start moving figures from A to B. They work in pairs; one person
stating the number of clients in a street (reading from A). The other person
is writing the number next to a street name in B. The manager sits between
the two pairs and watches them work. The work seems easy and they all
work energetically. “This is actually very enjoyable”, the caseworker
exclaims.
The home-helpers’ list
A-street  35
B-street   2
C-street   7
D-street  14
.
.
.
.
Figures added by
the middle
manager
Figure A
The health visitors’ list
Region I  Region II  Region III
B-street
C-street
E-street
.
A-street
G-street
J-street
.
.
D-street
F-street
H-street
.
.
Figure B
The health visitors’ map
I
II
III
Figure C
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In this snippet the oscillation seems to have stopped and the scene is
dominated by the performance of calculation.  The sudden focusing is related
to the entrance of lists and maps. With these, the manager and the middle
manager are able to define a puzzle22 that can be solved by the team: The
transfer of figures to regions. The group members accept this challenge, and
for quite a while they work intensively on the task. But why is this task so
interesting and fun for the social workers? Imagine that you have been
working in the local centre for several years. You have seen hundreds and
hundreds of clients. You know that certain estates are ‘heavy’, but besides
from that you have no clear picture of the distribution of clients. Now imagine
that the pieces to this puzzle are suddenly in front of you and that you can
figure the distribution out in just 20 minutes. And more over you will be the
first to know. No one has figured this out before. In an almost literal sense,
this task is attractive. 
The thrill of discovery, the thrill of an elegant series of calculations, the thrill
of creating a potent new form of visibility. All these desires are part and
parcel of the performance of a centre of calculation. This performance is
made possible by drawing together inscriptions from a number of networks23:
The printout from the database in the central offices, the map and the regional
listing of street names from the health visitors. But this is only the surface of
it. The inscriptions can be traced to an ever-expanding series of networks.
One example is that the database of client addresses draws on the huge
network of administrators, procedures and artefacts that have kept track of
every single client over the years24. So the thrill and potency of puzzle-solving
is derived from the long networks it draws together. And the social workers
seem to enjoy playing their parts in this performance of a centre of
calculation. 
Well, not all the social workers. The very attentive reader might have noticed
that the home advisor has slipped out of the story. 
                                             
22 The metaphor of puzzle-solving is borrowed from Kuhn’s depiction of science as creative craft
work that attempts to solve the problems, which are posed by a particular paradigm. The definition of
a puzzle enables disciplined work within a fixed ontological frame. For a similar use of Kuhn’s
metaphor see Law & Moser (1999). For a discussion of framing see Callon (1998).
23 The theme of creating centres of calculation by drawing together literary inscriptions has been
thoroughly discussed by Bruno Latour (1987; 1990).
24 The network that links clients and addresses has a very long history in social work. Thus, in the
beginning of the 1900’s, the last three addresses of a client was used as a the vehicle for settling the
distribution of costs between municipalities. (Christensen,  1998)
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While the home-helper leaves, and the others work with the numbers, the
home advisor sits passively on his chair. He looks puzzled and a bit
worried. He addresses me: “We are building a chimney, but we don’t
know where the house is going to be”. 
I play my self-assigned role of interested listener but reluctant contributor. 
The home advisor goes on to address the manager: “I don’t quite
understand what they are doing”. 
The manager gives a very straightforward explanation of how the numbers
are transferred.
Home advisor: I fear that we are building a chimney – I find it hard not to
look at the practical matters.
Manager: it is hard, but we will return to the practicalities – we all have
something that restricts us – we must get that out of the way.
Home advisor: as long as we don’t have to start before the foundations
have been built. If you will promise me that!
Manager: don’t worry, this is not practical yet.
The home advisor goes on to explain that today two of the clients had to
go to a civil court, and for that reason the schedule of all the home
advisors had to be reshuffled. He is afraid that such practical
solutions will not be possible with geographical grouping.
The manager explains that the large team must divide into groups, and
these groups must find their target groups and figure out how to
work. But before they can do that, some of the administrative
burdens will have to go. 
The home advisor asks if he can still meet with his professional group and
if they can still cover for each other regardless of the geographical
grouping. 
The manager approves this, but adds that the home advisors shouldn’t
meet quite as often as today. 
The first thing I would like to point out is that the calculation performance
and the above conversation take place simultaneously. The home advisor is
talking to the manager while the others are calculating. This entails an entirely
new relation between performances. In earlier parts of the meeting worries
and visions oscillated and, as it were, interrupted each other. In the snippet
above the calculation moves forward regardless of the worries voiced by the
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home advisor. This detachment and parallel ordering of performances
resonates with the manager’s earlier suggestion about writing a list of
problems to the other managers. That was also a way of separating problems
from ‘progress’. 
We might imagine the outcome of an oscillating vision-worries process to be
mutual exhaustion or perhaps some kind of compromise. But what kind of
object would be produced by parallel performances? I suggest that something
strange will be found if we pay close attention to the talk about grouping. The
manager says that each geographical group must find its target group (that is
each geographical group should discover a particularly important social
problem within its region and focus on that). So now geography and target
groups are no longer performed as alternative options. Instead the one seems
to be implicated in the other. A quick look around the organisational structure
suggests that this has happened before. The adult team (a target group) is part
of the local centre in region X (a geographical group), which is a part of the
Family and Labour Market Administration (a target group), which is a part of
the city of Copenhagen (a geographical group). So one could imagine a
history of exhausting debates between alternatives, break-ups into parallel
performances, and differences reappearing as implications rather than
alternatives. But of course all this is just speculation. 
Let me go back to the working group meeting and point out another case of
implication. The manager accepts that the home advisors continue their
meetings and work-planning across the geographical boundaries. They just
shouldn’t do it ‘quite as often’. By this, the manager performs the professional
and the geographical groups as mutually included. Home advisors can be
performed as something ‘in’ a geographical group, and geographical groups
can be performed as something ‘in’ the group of home advisors.
“Done!” The middle manager announces that all the figures have been
transferred to the regions and added up. The numbers of clients in the
regions are 319 – 431 – 255. 
The group looks at these figures for a while and decides that they are too
uneven. At this point a new puzzle is created. If the borders between two
regions are moved on the map (C), then corollary movement of clients can
be figured out by reading the street names on the map and finding the
client number related in these streets on figure B. So now the working
group engages in moving borders, calculating the adjusted client number
and evaluating if the resulting regions are sufficiently even. This time the
home advisor contributes with suggestions, and he keeps an eye on the
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even distribution of supported housing25 as the borders are redrawn. Even
the observer - who normally takes pains to avoid involvement in ‘political
games’ - thinks of this moment as purely technical and finds himself
making suggestions to the solution of this exciting puzzle.
And the puzzle does more or less work out. 319 – 381 – 305 seems to be a
reasonably even distribution of the clients on supplementary benefits26.
The home advisor and the support person also report a fairly even
distribution of their clients. Furthermore the home-helper has returned and
the distribution of her clients on the three regions turns out to be 56-43-39.
Also reasonably even27. Everybody seems to be in a good mood. The
manager ends the meeting by saying “Thank you so much for today!”
At the end of this meeting everybody takes part in the enjoyable performance
of a centre of calculation. Within less than two hours this peculiar calculation
performance has significantly changed its relation to other performances: First
it appeared in a mosaic with other performances, second it formed an alliance
with vision, third it existed in parallel with worries, and finally it dominated
the scene.
Accounting for the Figures
At the beginning of the third meeting the middle manager hands out fresh
copies of the map stapled together with three spreadsheets displaying street
names, professional groups, and number of clients for each geographical
group. She has received the figures with respect to clients on early
retirement (2034 cases), and these have been added to the supplementary
benefit cases that are also managed by the caseworkers. 
The middle manager accounts for a number of provisos in relation to the
figures. “There are 289 cases that have to be moved to the handicap team”.
“There are 57 cases that are not completed, or something like that. At any
rate they are not registered with an address in our area in the national
register”. “There are 94 who are dead or in other municipalities”.
She concludes by saying that it looks “incredibly good”. The geographical
division that was based on the supplementary benefit cases also turned out
to produce a reasonably even distribution of all the other types of cases. 
                                             
25 The home advisors are responsible for the supported housing.
26 Maximum deviation from the mean is ≤ 5%, TEJ
27 Maximum deviation from the mean is ≤ 7%, TEJ
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In this part the middle manager performs the geographical division as an
order, something that looks incredibly good. This entails boundary work: the
identification of cases that actually don’t count and really shouldn’t be here.
Rather monstrous categories are created for these others: ‘Not completed or
something like that’, ‘Dead or in other municipalities’. So the division is not a
stable self-reliant construction. It demands work. And there is more work to
be done and more others to be created: 
The caseworker comments that the differences in the home-helpers’
figures are rather big (56-43-39). 
The home-helper agrees.
The middle manager says that that is probably only important in relation to
distribution of staff between the groups. We shouldn’t have to move
the borders.
The home-helper replies: But they (her colleagues) don’t want to cross the
border, they want to stay in the southern area. 
(Because of unfinished labour of division with another team, the home-
helpers have only been working in the southern half of the area for
the past four months). 
The manager: That is not for them to decide!
The home-helper: They cannot comprehend that they are all together and
that each of them is in a geographical group. I am knocking it into
their heads. They still have to take weekend shifts, and to work across
the borders. The next thing they trotted out was that they would have
to part with clients - that is a major problem!
The rest of the group agrees that parting with clients is a problem and the
manager assures that it will only happen gradually and with proper
notice.
In this snippet the home-helpers are performed as other to the geographical
division. First, their client distribution isn’t quite as neat as for the other
professional groups. But this will not lead to a change of the regions. So in
other words, regions should move the home-helpers, not the other way
around. Second the home-helpers allegedly don’t want to cross the border, but
this reluctance is strongly rejected by the manager. Third the home-helpers
126
don’t seem to grasp the idea of the geographical grouping, but this is knocked
into their heads by the co-ordinating home-helper. 
In all the three instances, the geographical division is untouched, while rough
boundary work, if not boundary violence, is directed at the home-helpers to
make them conform. Only in the last part of the snippet is a more lenient
approach applied. The sensitive issue of parting with clients is handled by a
sort of deferral: the shift to geographical grouping will be gradual.
Later in the meeting there is more talk about the problems that might
come up when the geographical division is presented to the rest of the
team. The caseworkers will worry that they will have to span two
specialities (supplementary benefits and early retirement), whereas no one
works with more than one speciality today. 
Second, the caseworkers will worry about the future of the reception desk.
At the moment one caseworker is the anchor of this. She is very recognised
for effective handling of a large number of simple cases, thus leaving more
room for the other caseworkers to deal with the hard cases. The future of
this arrangement is uncertain with geographical groups.
Third, it might be hard to find caseworkers who are “motivated” to work
in one particular region, where there is a very high percentage of
foreigners. 
Finally, The home advisors have a more general worry that a lot of
experience will be “thrown away” in a new structure.
None of these problems are solved at the meeting. The manager restates
from time to time that they have to move on, that the grouping is a trial,
and the problems must be listed and solved in the team or carried to the
management team.
In this part the division is performed as an established disorder28. The
geographical grouping will entail a certain amount of mess, and this mess will
be managed along the way rather than solved beforehand. This pragmatic
boundary work uses deferral, patience and doggedness rather than the head-on
approaches of the rough boundary work. And quite obviously the
performance of pragmatics and disorder is very different from the earlier
performance of the division as an order that looks ‘incredibly good’. 
                                             
28 Phrase borrowed from Haraway
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Towards the end of the meeting, there is a discussion about how to account
for the division at the coming meeting with the rest of the team. 
Middle manager: We have to explain why we chose the geographical
division.
Caseworker: I was asked why only one model? – I actually don’t know
Middle manager: But I guess they expect one model.
Caseworker: But what are the reasons?
Home advisor: We were asked to work with two models – we have to state
the reasons for ending up with one.
Manager: We have worked with two proposals, but we have settled on
geography rather than target groups.
The manager’s comment ends the discussion at this point, but the issue comes
up a little later:
Caseworker: Why did we evade the target group model?
Manager: What I heard was that the geographical model was most
appropriate – it distributes the clients. We didn’t go deep into the
idea of target groups.
Home advisor: There was a lot to be said against it
Housing advisor: It would give an almost 100% specialisation. It would be
difficult because of the clients that fit into several target groups (e.g.
alcoholics and mentally ill)
Manager: So the argument was that it would be difficult to stigmatise
people by assigning them to a particular target group.
Middle manager: Yes, geography is very friendly to the users.
Manager: So we tried to think about what target groups might mean, but
there were too many objections for us to go into it.
In the discussion above the working group rationalises the outcome of their
work. The geographical grouping is performed as a decision – an informed
choice between two options. In the minimum version the performance of a
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decision entails either (a) the evocation of advantages to the preferred option
or (b) the evocation of disadvantages to the evaded option. In the present case
(a) and (b) are not equal. The earlier performance of the geographical
grouping as a disorder makes it difficult to evoke the unchallenged advantage
needed for the (a) version of a decision. For that reason the group has some
difficulties in performing a decision the way their colleagues expect them to.
But by focusing on an intractable problem connected to the target group
model they manage to construct an account of their work that performs the (b)
version of a decision. 
Performances in Case 3
Three meetings in the working group - Monday, Tuesday, Thursday - and all
of a sudden the team process has made a big leap forward. Groups have been
defined, Maps have been drawn, client distributions have been calculated, and
a decision is ready to be presented to the colleagues. 
This event is all the more remarkable given the visible tensions between
different performances of proper decision-making at the team training session,
and given the written proposals from the professional groups, which certainly
didn’t indicate a common solution either. 
The working group, however, seemed to be a way to proceed. The manager
would be informed, the experts would be invited into a dialogue, and the
entire team would have an opportunity to discuss the matters at a later time. 
In my analysis of the working group, I have distinguished the performance of
calculation as the key event. It attracted the manager because it was a good
ally to ‘vision’ and strong opponent to ‘paralysis’. It attracted the social
workers because it entailed the challenging fun of puzzle-solving, the power
of drawing together long networks and the potency of a new form of vision. 
Furthermore, the ability of calculation to move on in parallel, i.e. work
uninterrupted by worries made it seem unstoppable. And then, we might
speculate, the social workers were even more compelled to jump on the
bandwagon to get some influence. When the calculation performance
produced an object, the social workers were so engaged in their product that
they continued the boundary work and the accountability work necessary to
sustain ‘the solution’.  
The peculiar thing, in this rapidly forward moving story, is how the
performance of calculation manages to achieve ‘independence’ and proceed
in spite of all worries and practical restrains. I believe this ‘independence’ can
be explained by particular kinds of work which disentangles calculation from
the rest. First, the formation of the working group makes a temporary distance
129
between this group and the team, as well as a temporary distance between the
professional groups and their representatives. Second, the manager’s
performance of vision works to detach the present work from the immediate
concern about resources and workload. Through this performance, the group
members are encouraged to ‘pretend’ that the necessary conditions are
present. Third, the very idea of doing a calculation ‘on paper’ is a way to
defer full accountability. Only later will it be accounted for to the rest of the
team. Only if the team shares the responsibility, will the solution become a
real decision. Only if nothing stops it, will it gradually in the future be put
into practice. 
The construction of a network that establishes a new set of regional
boundaries is thus achieved through a series of disentanglement moves. These
moves bracket the relation between the new order and various other actors
and performances in the local centre. But the sequestration of the group and
the neat order of the solution are only temporary. At the last meeting in the
working group, the solution is gradually related to its potential others. First,
the working group performs the geographical division as an ‘order’ which
others will have to confirm to. But later the solution is performed as an
established disorder, which will have to manage its others along the way. The
pressing question is of course, to what extent the entities, which have been
tied into the geographical solution, will remain in place? Will the network
hang together or will it fall apart?
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Case 4.  Working in Geographical Groups
“Like guerrilla armies, fluids melt back into the night. 
They circumvent. They infiltrate”
Mol & Law (p.662)
In case 2, I described the entanglement of different performances over the
issue of grouping. In case 3, I analysed how this messy and potentially
blocking situation was changed through a number of disentanglement moves
allowing a performance of calculation, which resulted in an orderly
geographical division. In this section I will follow the further movement of
this geographical division through a series of events. 
First, there is the filling out of the so-called Team Profile®, a questionnaire
designed by the consulting firm. Second there are two more days of team
training. Third, there are meetings in the newly designed geographical groups,
and fourth there is a final team training session.
In the course of these events, allies of the geographical division are gradually
taken over and used by the social workers to perform a reality of professional
groups. In this way, the geographical grouping is partly chipped away by the
very ‘order’ that it was intended to replace. 
Before I tell this story, thoroughly and chronologically, I need to mention two
events which consolidated the network of the geographical solution after its
initial construction in the working group. First, the ‘solution’ was presented as
a proposal at a team meeting and approved without objections. Second, the
working group reconvened and solved the puzzle of distributing the social
workers evenly among the three geographical groups. ‘Names’ were thus
added to the network of the geographical solution. This assignment of
individual social workers to geographical groups ‘on paper’ was one of the
conditions of possibility for the next event that I will describe.
Drawing the Team Profile
On a late and warm afternoon in August, the team was summoned to
another building owned by the city of Copenhagen, just down the road
from the local centre. The purpose of this was to fill out a so-called Team
Profile - an extensive questionnaire developed by the consulting firm. 
As the social workers entered a spacious attic room, they were seated at
groups of tables. Each person was given a pen and a questionnaire. The
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consultants made sure that the first page stating the team (adult team) and
the subgroup (I, II or III) was filled out correctly. Then the consultant
explained that ‘the team’ referred to in the questionnaire is the whole team
– not the professional groups and not the geographical groups. After this
everybody worked silently on their own, handed in the questionnaire when
they were finished, and left the room one by one. 
Following the standard format of psychological tests29, the Team Profile is
designed to measure a number of dimensions in a particular phenomenon. In
this case the phenomenon is the developmental stage of the team. The Team
Profile draws on the theory that a team starts as a potential team then it
develops into a pseudo-team and finally it becomes a real team30. According
to the theory, the development from a potential to a real team is evidenced as
growth on a number of dimensions, such as clarity of purpose, the capacity
for problem solving, ability to utilise each other, and mutual responsibility
between the team members. 
These theoretical dimensions of the team development are represented in the
test as a number of scales. In this case there are 25 scales with names
referring to the dimensions: Purpose, Problem solving, Utilisation,
Responsibility, etc. Each of these scales/dimensions is assessed by the
average response to 10 statements. The ten statements on each scale are
designed to be essentially identical. If we take the Purpose-scale as an
example, the statements read: 
- All the members know what the purpose of the team is. 
- The purpose of the team is well known among the members
- The overall aim of the team is known among the members 
- The direction of the team work is clear to the members
- etc.
In the questionnaire that was presented to the social workers the 10 statements
from each of the 25 scales were blended into groups of three. So on the
surface of the test the scales are invisible. The respondent has to respond to
each statement by ticking one of 6 boxes ranging from “strongly disagree” to
                                             
29 See Anastasi (1990)
30 This was briefly explained by the consultants at the first team training session.
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“strongly agree”. And then there is an additional rule: The ticking of the
boxes within a group of three statements must all be different. So it is not
allowed to give a particular response to more than one statement within a
group.
In the chronology of the team project the Team Profile® is a new actor, which
from the very start is intimately linked with the geographical division. The
first page of the team profile presupposes that the team has been divided into
subgroups, and this in turn means that the team profile is lending support to
the geographical division by taking it for granted. In addition, the team profile
joins the geographical division in the performance of the social workers as
detached individuals; the questionnaire is filled out individually, talking to the
colleagues is prohibited, and the questionnaire does not ask the test-taker to
state his professional group. Moreover, there are several procedural elements
of the Team Profile® which helps to perform teamwork as obligatory. The
social workers are required by management to participate and hiding or
escaping is made difficult; Everybody must go at the same time, so it would
be noticed if someone stayed at the local centre. Everybody must hand in the
questionnaire to the consultant, so it would be noticed if it wasn’t filled out
properly. The requirement of using three different answers within a group of
statements makes it impossible to ‘hide’ in the neutral middle category; the
individual is thus obliged to make a choice between preferences.
So altogether, the team profile appears to be a strong ally for the team
manager and her geographical division; it cuts across professional groups and
it makes the social workers participate. However, this alliance becomes
problematic in the following.
About a week after the filling out of the Team Profile®, there were two
consecutive days of team training. On the first morning, the social workers
were again placed in the ‘horseshoe’, and the consultants started off by
handing out colour-prints of the result from the Team Profile and by
presenting these on an overhead projector. 
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Figure 6. Team profile® scores for three geographical groups and the team manager
The text below the curves reads: Area I, Area II, Area III, Team manager, The team.
The vertical text indicates different scales on the Team Profile®.
The consultants explained that 3.5 on the scale is the average, so more than
this indicates agreement with the statements (“yes, the purpose of the team
is clear”) and less than this disagreement. Then the consultants went over
the figures, talking about values over 3.5 as “good” and “not bad at all”,
whereas values below were interpreted as “problems” or “needs
development”. Furthermore the consultants commented that the three
groups followed each other “nicely”, while the team manager differed.
Several times, the differences between the manager and the groups were
emphasised. One comment went like this: “Utilisation [a scale] – that looks
better, all groups are on the right side of 3.5, but the team manager is in
doubt”. A little later, the consultant said, “The manager will be given
opportunity to justify her viewpoints”. A social worker, who sat close to
me, leaned over to one of her colleagues and said, “it is really
embarrassing”
In this part the team profile becomes a troublesome ally. The manager is
unequivocally behind the geographical division, but now the presentation of
the team profile scores singles her out as someone, who needs to justify her
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viewpoints. In the following, I will take a closer look at the consultant’s
presentation of scores and the construction of the need for justification. 
On the consultant’s plates the scores are placed on a scale, which introduces
an externally given definition of good and bad. The consultants never explain
where this scale comes from, but the standardised appearance of the
questionnaire as well as the ‘®’ after its name suggests, that there is a lot
behind. In the presentation of scores, the consultants use the scale to claim
that a large number of scores, in particular the manager’s, indicate problems. 
In addition to the placement of scores on a scale, the plates juxtapose the
scores from the three groups and the manager. It turns out that the three
groups are roughly identical, whereas the manager is different; she typically
scores ‘worse’ on the normative scale. The divergence in scores might be
explained in several different ways. One option is to assume that the four
parties are describing different things. However, it is extremely unlikely that
the consultants would interpret the scores in this way. The very idea of a team
profile or any other kind of standardised test hinges on the assumption that the
test measures something particular ‘out there’. And the consultants do in fact
talk about team profile as a measurement of the team stage. 
The second possible interpretation, the one used by the consultants, builds on
the assumption that the four different parties all describe the same thing. In
this interpretation, divergences in the scores must be caused by some
disturbance of the description process. In principle, it could be either the three
groups or the manager who is disturbed. But only one of these interpretations
is reconcilable with the credibility of the consultants. Just as it would be
extremely difficult for the consultants to defend a test that doesn’t measure a
single underlying reality, it would be very hard to defend a test that produced
wrong measurements in a majority of the cases. For this reason, there is only
one interpretation left; it must the manager that was disturbed, and
consequently she must justify her viewpoint. So whereas the team profile
previously appeared to be a strong support for the manager in her attempts to
establish the geographical division, it now becomes a troublesome ally that
questions her ability to see the team ‘as it really is’. 
Accounting for the Team Profile
After the presentation, the consultants asked the social workers to divide
into the three geographical groups. The task given to these groups was
explain “why the curve is where it is”, that is in most cases on or below
average. Each group was assigned 8 or 9 scales to account for.
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The group I followed went over the scales one by one. For each scale, the
group members suggested a number of different explanations. I will pick
out some examples: 
In several cases there was talk about the low scores on the Team Profile
being  a result of the way in which the test was taken. In the countless
statements that referred to “the team”, “meetings” or “co-operation” there
were several different interpretations of which team31, which meetings, and
co-operation with whom. 
However, these critiques were usually only mentioned at the beginning of
the discussion of a scale. They quickly gave way to a lot of ‘facts’ that
explained the score. The meeting discipline score is low because the
meeting in question was badly organised, because people have negative
experiences with not getting sufficient information, and because several
people interrupted the meeting by arriving late, and so on.
Quite a number of these corroborating explanations evoked the idea that
the team was in the early stage of a developmental process; The demarcation of
the team is low because boundary work in relation to other teams has not
been done yet. The existence of a team method is given a low score
because the team hasn’t had the opportunity to develop it yet. The attitude
toward team co-operation scores low, because no one has very much
experience with that yet.
Finally the professional groups were referred to as a fact that would explain the
low scores. There is no team method, because the professional groups all
have different methods. The ‘meeting discipline’ is disturbed by late arrivals
because the meeting times don’t fit with the work schedule of some
professional groups. ‘Team co-operation’ will inevitably be difficult,
because the professional groups have different approaches and attitudes
towards the clients. 
In the examples given above, the group casts some doubt on the Team
Profile as an epistemological tool by focusing on different interpretations of
the statements on the questionnaire. But the assumption that the team is
located on a particular team stage is not questioned. On the contrary, the
group lends support to this ontology by supplying detailed explanations
colluding with particular dimensions of this ontology such as ‘meeting
discipline’. However, in the group’s account, the team development is placed
in a universe that also contains professional groups and externally determined
                                             
31 The entire team or the professional colleagues.
136
conditions such as lack of time and resources. So the reality of the team stage
is juxtaposed with other realities. The group seems to grant that the Team
Profile is more or less true, but they simultaneously perform it as less than
the whole truth. This implies that the social workers are not ‘blameworthy’ if
the team stage is low. The team profile as a vehicle for generating moral
obligations is thus weakened, which of course also means that some support
of the geographical division is chipped away. 
In the following day - the second part of the two days of team training -
the manager was called to speak on the basis of her Team Profile scores.
With explicit references to the official plan of the team project and another
recent report from the central offices, the manager explained her vision of
the geographical groups. Each group should investigate which kinds of
users and problems there are in their particular region. Based on this, the
geographical group should establish cross-professional collaboration
including action plans, follow-ups and goals for the users. Furthermore a
contact person for every user should be selected. The team manager
stressed that flexibility in relation to professional demarcations would be
required in this process. Finally, she explained her scores on the Team
Profile by saying that she had had the whole team in mind, not the
professional groups. 
In this statement the geographical groups are performed as functional in
relation to the users’ needs. These needs are performed as realities ‘out there’
for the group to discover. The different professional traditions are performed
as interests that might thwart this discovery or hinder the effective
organisation of work that meets these needs. The manager is thus forging a
link between the user’s needs and the geographical division. This attempt to
enrol the users directly challenges the way in which social workers often
perform themselves as spokespersons of the users’ needs (cf. case 1).
On the issue of the team stage, we might note that the manager takes part in
the performance of this as a singular reality. She explains the different scores
as a matter of proper interpretation of the statements in the Team Profile;
differences are thus performed as epistemological, whereby the singular
ontology of team stage is once again performed.  
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During the remainder of the day there are two rounds of group work and
two plenary sessions. The consultants state that the purpose is to identify
problems and to make plans for solving them. 
In the group I followed there was a lot of discussion about professional
demarcations. Several people said that you shouldn’t work with something
you are not qualified to. A support person stressed that you are educated
for something particular, and you cannot ignore that. A home advisor said
that they refused to have supervision on particular cases together with
other professional groups. Only the home-helpers argued that there should
be more ‘flexibility’. In principle, the other professionals didn’t disagree
with this. But on a number of practical issues they were strongly against
changing the present demarcations. Back in the plenary session, the
concern for professional demarcation was supported by one of the other
groups. This group introduced what they called a ‘sharp distinction’
between two levels of co-operation. On the one hand there is work specific
to the professional groups on the other hand there is cross-professional co-
operation.
In the discussion summarised above the majority of the social workers are
performing social work as the exercise of professionalism and professional
groups. They do this through vigorous labour of division. The professional
demarcations are performed by enlisting a number of allies: The social
workers’ skill and comfort in working with things they know about, the
educational specialisation, and the concern for the quality of the work and the
clients’ welfare (thus taking back their ally). To some extent the social
workers try to reconcile this performance of professions with the team project
by making room for some cross-professional co-operation between the
sharply demarcated professional regions. In this way ‘the cross-professional’
is performed as a residual category negatively defined by the professions.
Obviously this performance of social work based on the ‘facts’ of professions
runs counter to the manager’s performance of social work based on the
geographical division. 
Toward the end of the day the groups present their work. One group lists a
series of demands for supervision and education. 
Manager: It looks good, though I might doubt that it is realistic. But where
are the users in your plans?
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The home advisor from the group explains that supervision is a ‘must’ in
their work, and education is important to make them think of
themselves as a team. Of course all of it has to be in relation to the
users.
Manager: but it would have been good, if it was related to an investigation
of users in your area.
Social worker: Investigation of the users requires education as a team. It is
an illusion to believe that you can put 13 people together and say
“go!”  The users have always been near to our hearts. 
Manager: I am worried about the emphasis on the staff. In my presentation
I was talking about the users, I miss that in your proposal – they are
not there as clear focus points.
Social worker: That is because we are not starting from scratch – we are the
ones that fill the needs – you shouldn’t doubt that we have that
attitude.
In this snippet, there is a struggle between two performances of the relation
between users and the professions. The social workers perform inclusion;
when they demand supervision and education for themselves, then it is
implicit that it will benefit the users. The manager performs detachment; the
users’ needs are to be investigated and discovered. They cannot be derived
from the existing professional demarcations. So in the manager’s version you
should start by identifying the users within the geographical areas, then you
should consider what resources are needed, and finally you should work out a
division of labour that would meet the needs. In the social workers’ version
you start with the fact of professional groups that know their users, then you
should consider what resources are needed to make the professions work
within a team structure, and finally an additional region of cross-professional
work can be delimited. 
With the social workers’ and the manager’s different ideas about the division,
the team and the users, two opposing ‘programs’ have been articulated.
Whether there will be a stalemate, or whether one of them will prevail,
depends on which ‘loads’ either program is able to attach. In the following
events a number of different ‘loads’ will be brought into the struggle.  
Meetings in Geographical Groups
In the three months following the team training sessions, there were a total of
9 meetings in the three geographical groups. So on average the groups met
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once a month. The meetings lasted between one and two hours and they were
all scheduled on late afternoons after the working day in the professional
groups. The team manager participated in many of these meetings including
the one referred to below.
At the first meeting in one of the geographical groups, the group members
shared information on how the different professional groups relate to the
geographical regions. The caseworkers have their case files in two groups
of file cabinets, one for early retirement and one for supplementary
benefits. Within these two domains, the cases are ordered by date of birth.
However, as a preparation of geographical grouping a label in one of three
colours, indicating the geographical region, has been added to each file. But
the caseworkers still divide the cases between them in the way they did
previously: Some caseworkers deal with early retirement, others deal with
supplementary benefit. And within the latter group some caseworkers deal
with clients born on dates ranging from the 1st to the 15th in the month,
and others deal with the 16th to the 31st. So the coloured labels is the only
thing that has been changed or rather added to the materialities and the
workflow of the caseworkers. The home advisor in the group reports that
they are criss-crossing the entire geographical area, so no changes have
been made with respect to geographical grouping. The contact person and
the home-helper explain that they try to take geographical groups into
account when they distribute new clients. But certain other criteria are more
important. E.g. which of the social workers has time, and whether the
client prefers a male or a female social worker.
In this part, the social workers talk about particular heterogeneous orderings.
The placement of case files, the allocation of cases and responsibilities
between the social workers, their physical movement, their forging of
relations to clients. All these produce particular distributions that collude to
perform a reality of professional groups. The orderings traced in the social
workers’ talk do not resonate particularly well with the idea of geographical
groups. In fact, the present orderings continually trouble the geographical
division by criss-crossing its borders. So rather than a successor reality,
geographical grouping is performed as an awkward add-on to the reality of
professions; The addition of labels to files that stay where they are, or one
extra concern to be added in the rare instances when everything else is equal. 
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As the meeting goes on, the team manager initiates a discussion about
blurring the boundaries between professional groups. A home-helper
expresses the wish to do other kinds of things than just cleaning. A social
worker says that she sympathises with the home-helpers’ wishes, but that
the caseworkers would never do cleaning work unless they were specifically
ordered. 
The manager says that according to the official project plan the teams must
tear down the professional demarcations, but also retain
professionalism. “We would serve ourselves by coming up with some
ideas of how to do this”.
A caseworker says that it is hard to think those thoughts at the moment,
because they have to work overtime one day a week just to reduce the
piles of mail. Furthermore, there are two vacant positions in the
caseworker groups at the moment. 
A home-helper states that they ought to be 15 staff to 70 clients, but at the
moment they are 12 to 130.
The manager asks if they are saying that teams are impossible?
Several of the social workers say ‘no’, but in a rather mild way. 
The manager states that geographical regions is the choice that has been
made. This makes it possible to find specific target groups within
each region. “Not 200 cases, it could be 5 – the level of ambition is
no higher than that”. 
The social workers go along with this by starting to discuss the specific
problems of getting access to the labour marked experienced by
young people with mental problems.
The manager says that it is sensible to use the meetings in the geographical
groups to prepare some project that can be carried out, when more
resources are obtained.
Towards the end, it is agreed that the caseworkers will bring about 5 case
files to the next meeting.
In this snippet, performances of professional and geographical groups get
related once again. 
In the first part the caseworker performs the professional groups in one more
way: She (and her colleagues) will not do cleaning work. This clear
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expression of interest (or lack thereof) is countered by the manager, who
evokes the project plan issued by the board of the Family and Labour Market
Administration. Now, the social workers retreat into facts. Facts about the
lack of resources. Their resistance to geographical groups is now performed
as a matter of lack of ability. And this lack is so severe that paralysis is
performed. Countering this, the manager performs the geographical groups in
a visionary way: matters should be arranged in such a way that geographical
groups can be performed in the future. This entails a level of ambition as low
as 5 cases, which considering the total number of cases in the region to be
around 1000, makes the manager take part in the performance of geographical
groups as an reality added onto the professional groups.
Some if not all of the above sound familiar. Fact, interest, paralysis, vision.
We have come across these before. And we also recognise the distribution of
political will to the manager (decision-maker) and facts to the staff (civil
servants). Furthermore, we recognise the continued performance of
professional groups as well as geographical regions. What is different in this
case, however, is the specific project or puzzle that is created. What can be
drawn together in the work with 5 cases? Which kinds of calculations can be
made? Which realities will be performed with this new set of props? The
following event will throw some light on these questions.
A month later, the same geographical group reconvenes. One of the social
workers brings 4 cases, but she soon discovers that one of them doesn’t fit
the target group of young people with mental problems. She explains that
she has been busy and she just found the cases this morning “in the top of
the pile”. A home advisor, who should bring another case, did not appear
at the meeting. But one of the other home advisors says that he has the
case “in his head”.
The manager inquires about action plans in the cases. There are none. 
The home advisor explains that they don’t make plans for the residents in
supported housing, because plans tend to become restraining. They
do however have a personal meeting with a contact person, if the
resident comes from a mental hospital. The contact person is also
invited to join a supper in the supported housing facility, and matters
are discussed on this occasion. 
The caseworker declares that if you find one action plan in a thousand
early retirement cases, you’re lucky.
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The conversation moves on to a particular activation project that the home
advisors knew about through a pamphlet they got from the caseworkers.
Apparently this was a great success for two of their residents. And there is
more talk about different projects, the general decline in the number of
these, and the scattered information. 
The manager inquires if one of the social workers could visit a housing
facility and present information to the residents. After a short discussion of
this the social workers conclude that it would only benefit 2 of the 7
residents, so it would be a waste of resources that are particularly scarce at
the moment. But as an alternative the caseworkers encourage the home
advisors to escort their clients to the local centre to get information.
The manager says that she is “getting tired” because the talk is about
resources rather than how the geographical group might work ‘in
principle’. 
The caseworker replies that she thought the question from the home
advisor was meant in a concrete way. She didn’t disagree with the
idea of visiting the housing facility in principle. 
The home advisor adds, “It was a concrete question”
The talk continues around the issue of information. The caseworkers
explain that they circulate new pamphlets in a particular folder. The home
advisors could perhaps be included on the list of recipients. There is talk
about collecting everything in a ring binder, including the minutes from the
meetings of the geographical groups. But then it is unclear where to place it
and who should maintain it. 
In the above sequence there are a number of failed attempts to draw things
together. Fewer cases than expected are brought to the meeting. Action plans
cannot be drawn from the files. The visit of a caseworker to the housing
facility does not work out. The dissemination of information is still scattered.
One way to look at this is to see the manager’s work as attempts to establish
the cross-professional group as an obligatory passage point for the solution of
particular problems: Better actions plans could perhaps be made by bringing
cases to the group. Better information about activation projects could perhaps
be given if the caseworkers visited the home advisors of this group.
Unfortunately for the manager, the social workers come up with alternative
solutions to the same problems. Action plans are not necessary because a
verbal transfer and a supper in the housing facility work better. Information
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doesn’t require the movement of the caseworker, it might just as well be
spread through pamphlets, or by having the residents visit the local centre.
With these solutions, the professional groups are performed as assemblages of
people, artefacts, and locations that make particular actions and knowledges
possible32. Furthermore, the claim seems to be that only ad hoc connections
between professional groups are necessary. This performs the geographical
group meeting as one among many occasions for ad hoc information
exchange, another add-on to the reality of the professional groups. Of course
this performance runs counter to the manager’s performance of the meeting as
a unique and obligatory passage point.
Last Team Training
After three months, during which the geographical group meetings took
place, the social workers were once more summoned to fill out the Team
Profile®. And again this was followed up by a day of team training. On this
occasion, the consultants presented new plates with results from the Team
Profile questionnaire. 
In brief, the consultants gave the following interpretation: Group I has
moved a bit forward. Group II has clearly moved forward. Group III has
moved backwards. 
                                             
32 Law (1999b) has developed the notion of knowing locations to designate such heterogeneously
constructed, temporary and local effects of knowing.
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Figure 7. Team Profile® scores ‘before’ and ‘now’ for geographical groups I and II
The text below the curves reads: Area I – before, Area I – now, Area II – before, Area II – now.
The vertical text indicates different scales on the Team Profile®.
Figure 8. Team Profile® scores ‘before’ and ‘now’ for group III and the team manager
Text below the curves: Area III– before, Area III– now, Team manager– before, Team manager– now
The vertical text indicates different scales on the Team Profile®.
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In the presentation of the Team Profile the singularity and developmental
process of the geographical groups are once again performed. The
juxtapositioning of late and recent measures on a normative scale makes it
possible to construct forward and backward movement. In addition, the
juxtapositioning of groups makes it possible to construct a ranking. Taken
together, this performs a certain distribution of morality: It is implied that
everybody should act like group II (‘moving forward’) and avoid acting like
group III (‘moving backward’). So now the Team Profile seems to have
returned to the role of a faithful ally to the geographical division. No fingers
are pointed at the manager, and the scores urge the social workers to improve
the geographical groups. However, as it will be recollected from the
description of the last team training, the moral effect of the Team Profile does
not necessarily last very long. On that occasion, the social workers as well as
the manager refused or weakened the moral claims made by the consultants.
The question is what will happen on this occasion? 
After the presentation, the social workers were asked to go into their
geographical group, and each group was requested to explain its scores and
its ‘movement’ on the Team Profile®. 
In the subsequent plenary session, the consultants asked (‘the forward
moving’) group II to make the first presentation. 
A caseworker from group II said their best guess was that the scores were
due to the small number of people that filled out the Team Profile
this time and last time. “The people who filled it out this time must
see things a bit more rose-coloured”. She went on to tell that the
group members agreed that no particular improvements had taken
place.  
One of the consultants queried why.
The caseworker explained that there was no cross-professional
collaboration in the geographical groups, because there had been
neither time nor opportunity. The cross-professional collaboration
that does take place is directly between the professional groups. The
reason for this is that nobody works with clients in just one region.
Consultant: “So the geographical grouping is actually inexpedient?”
Caseworker: “We didn’t discuss that, but that has been my personal
opinion all along.”
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In this part the consultants’ performance of team stage and moral ranking is
pushed aside. The caseworker simply points out that too few people
answered, and the epistemological value of the Team Profile is questioned to
the extent that it can easily be replaced by the group consensus. However, the
ontology of a true team stage is still performed. In this case a group stage that
hasn’t improved. This ‘fact’ is used to perform the geographical group as a
place where nothing happens, as opposed to the professional groups that are
performed as locations of real work. In this argument, ‘a low team stage’ is
placed in a set of relations, which reverses the effect that the consultants tried
to achieve. The consultants seemed to suggest that a low team stage should
oblige the social workers to put more effort into the geographical groups. But
the caseworker argues that a low team stage proves that geographical groups
are senseless and therefore unworthy of any further effort. In fact she implies
that since the work in the professional groups is what truly benefits the users,
it is morally questionable not to recognise the reality of the professional
groups. The ‘fact’ of the team stage is thus taken over and used to argue
against the geographical division. 
After this, there was a long discussion in which a number of viewpoints were
voiced. I will just mention the most significant positions: On the one hand the
chief consultant stated that the geographical groups appeared to be pseudo
groups, while the professions were the real groups. On the other hand, the
team manager stated that it was too early to change the geographical groups.
Most of the social workers supported the chief consultant’s critical evaluation
of the geographical groups, but some of them also raised concerns over target
group division, which was taken to be the inevitable alternative to
geography33. 
The discussion once more articulates a conflict between the geographical
groups and the professional groups. The social workers will not give up the
reality of the professional groups, and the chief consultant seems willing to
lend his support to this. But the manager will not give up the geographical
division, and neither will some of the social workers. So there are two
conflicting ideas of what the team is or should be. And neither of these
‘programs’ is willing to leave the scene. 
                                             
33 One problem raised by the social workers is that the division of cases may lead to unpleasant
battles over resources even among former good colleagues, especially if the lines of division are less
than crystal clear. This is precisely the case with a target group division because a number of clients
will belong to several target groups.
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In the last part of the team training, the consultants asked the social
workers to go into professional groups and discuss how they could collaborate
with the other professions. 
In the ensuing discussion, it was clarified that the caseworkers have 3000
cases of which 48 are shared with the home advisors and 124 are shared
with the home-helpers. It might be possible to discover more clients that
could be shared, but it would still be a relatively a small number. Based on
these figures, the caseworkers made the point that the extent of the cross-
professional collaboration must necessarily be very limited. 
The chief consultant asked if the shared clients might be particularly
‘heavy’.
A social worker turned this down by saying that it would be most
expedient to identify the extent of the necessary cross-professional
work and limit it.
Another social worker asked the chief consultant, “has this entire team
really been amassed for just one hundred users – I think that’s a
tremendous apparatus!“
The chief consultant says that he wouldn’t be the one to answer that
question.
The manager didn’t reply either. 
In this last snippet a calculation, based in the numbers from the manager’s
working group, is mobilised by the social workers to perform the professional
groups as a reality and a rule to which cross-professional collaboration is only
an exception. At this point, the consultants are also contributing to the
performance of professional groups: They ask the social workers to divide
into professional groups, and to speak on behalf of them. In this part, the
manager doesn’t perform alternatives to professional groups either. 
So the long story of the team project ends with a paradoxical twist. It began as
a story of how social workers were detached from their professional groups
and entangled in the team project. And the story ends at a point where the
manager, the consultants and the constructions of the team project get
entangled in the performance of the professional groups. 
148
Performances in Case 4 
Case 4 is a series of events, which I have chosen to analyse in relation to the
question that emerged from case 3, namely what happens to the geographical
division when it moves beyond the working group? The answer to this is
complicated, I think, for the following reason. The relation between the
geographical division and ‘the rest’ is not a simple tug-of-war, but rather a
game in which numerous entities are rearranged several times. 
In addition to the geographical division, the significant entities are: the
manager, the consultants, the Team Profile®, the team stage, the benefit of
the users, the function of the geographical group meetings, and then of course
the professional groups. In the following, I will try to sum up the ways in
which the geographical division meets these entities. 
The first story begins with a rather seamless incorporation of the geographical
division into the administering of the Team Profile®, and the creation of a
singular ontology of the team stage. At this time, the manager, the
consultants, the geographical division and the Team Profile are all in
accordance. But then the results are presented and a difference appears
between the manager and the social workers. The consultant and the social
workers interpret this as a lack on the manager’s behalf to see the reality of
the team. The former alliance is breaking up. Furthermore, the social workers
weaken the ‘moral force’ of the team profile by evoking the reality of
professional groups, so now an additional ‘entity’ is entering the game.  
Second, the manager makes a speech in which she argues that a geographical
division  – not a professional division - is a sine qua non for the benefit of the
users. In this way, she enrols the users to support the geographical division.
This is immediately and strongly contested by the social workers, who argue
that effective professional groups is the only way to benefit the users. So what
becomes apparent here is that the manager will not be able to recruit ‘the
users’ on her side. The social workers will directly confront this attack on
their traditional ally. 
Third, the manager requires the social workers to meet in the geographical
groups to discuss possible cross-professional projects. The meetings entail a
number of deferrals or disentanglement-moves somewhat similar to the ones
described in the case of the working group (case 3). Among other things, the
geographical group meetings only occupy a small part of the working hours,
and the manager lowers the level of ambition to projects involving five cases.
These moves create room for the performance of a puzzle – the attempt to
establish the geographical group as an obligatory passage point for cross-
professional collaboration. However, the social workers refuse to grant this
obligatory status to the geographical groups. They constantly evoke
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alternative ways to achieve the same goals, and they perform the geographical
group meetings as one among may occasions for ad hoc co-ordination
between professional groups. 
Finally, at the last team training, there is another attempt to use the Team
Profile to create a moral obligation to improve the ‘team stage’ through the
work in geographical groups. However, in this case the ontology of the team
stage is seized by the social workers, who argue that the low team stage
indicates that the geographical groups are meaningless, as opposed the
professional groups, which are the locations of real work. Moreover, the
distribution of clients (numbers originally produced by the working group) is
used to argue that cross-professional collaboration must be a rare exception to
the rule of professional groups. So in this situation, it seems that the
geographical division has lost its supports, and the proponents of professional
group have begun to take over its former allies. The effect of all this is that
the geographical division becomes increasingly hard to defend. 
Moreover, it gradually seems to erode. Its parts and allies (numbers, Team
Profile®, and team stage) are taken over and used in the performance of
professional groups. And the geographical group meetings themselves are
performed as parts of the ad hoc work of professional groups. 
But, and this is important, it does not seem that the geographical groups will
dissolve completely or disappear. They might have failed as an obligatory
passage point, but they still appear as epistemological entities on the Team
Profile®, as lists of street names and social workers on paper, and in the
manager’s emphatic declaration that it is too early to change them.
Furthermore, the social workers indicate that they do not want the option of
‘target group division’ either. So at the end of case 4, the geographical
division is only partially dissolved. It is another order, which never attained
purity. And it is another (dis)order, which is now entangled in so many actors,
locations, and materials that it will not be purged in the near future. It has
become another performance in the texture of performances that makes up the
social administration. 
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Concluding Remarks on 
the Analysis of Performances
In this chapter, I have worked through a large amount of empirical material
using the notion of performance as my primary theoretical tool. I have tried to
stay loyal to the definition of performances as unbounded, materially
heterogeneous, recursive processes that can be imputed to the social.
Furthermore, I have taken methodological inspiration from the authors in ‘the
performative turn’; I have systematically directed my attention to the
specificities of doing, to the differences in performances, and to the relation
between performances. At this point, I will attempt to summarise and
synthesise the results of my empirical analysis.  
Types of Performances
I will begin by making a brief list of the host of performances, which I have
already described. 
In case 1, I mentioned four different performances of social work. On the one
hand the statistical and the political performance. On the other hand the
performance of social work as user-functional and social work as an excise of
professionalism.
In case 2, I described different performances of decision-making or ‘due
process’ in relation to the issue of subdividing the team: The agora, the
informed managerial decision, and the expert- dialogue. In addition, I
mentioned a number of different options, which were articulated in the
process: professional groups, a geographical division, and a target group
division. 
In case 3, I depicted performances in the working group. On the one hand,
there was the performance of paralysis, labour of division, and worries. On
the other hand, the manager successfully established an alliance between the
performances of deferral, vision and calculation. 
In case 4, I outlined the complicated relations between the geographical
division, the Team Profile®, the team stage, the benefit of the users, the
function of the geographical group meetings, and last but not least the
professional groups.
Types of Relations
The next question I will address is how to describe the relations or the
relational patterns of these performances. As I have already indicated, Law &
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Mol’s notion of different spatial types is a useful way to deal with this
question. My claim is that several different kinds of space are performed in
the course of the team project. I justify this claim through a number of
snapshots: 
Regions
In the discussion of the opening hours, everybody stays on their ‘home
ground’. On the one hand there are regions of politics and statistics, which
generate one uniform opinion on the matter. On the other, there are regions of
professionalism and users, which give rise to a contrary but equally
homogeneous opinion. The social administration is thus performed as a
mosaic of stable areas, which are largely unaffected by each other. A regional
space. 
Fire
At the first team training session, the team embarks on the process of deciding
how to subdivide the team. This entails the articulation of number of mutually
exclusive options and the evocation of a number of different versions of due
process. This performs a space of ‘conjoined alterity’, a space of fire. In this
space, there is conflict and flickering between different futures, which are all
both absent and made present in the form of options. In addition, there is a
distinct immobility created by the adverse relationship between any one
option and all the others. 
Networks
The geographical ‘solution’ is the product of a long and careful process of
enrolling and aligning allies. Representatives of the professional groups have
been persuaded to participate. Numbers, categories and maps have been
gathered, and a series of calculations have been performed. The resulting
alliance is a geographical division with a fixed, functional set of relations,
designed to mobilise the social workers. Moreover this network will, like
other networks, create the effect of particular differences or boundaries, in
this case geographical boundaries.
Fluids
At the final team training, the social workers argue that the low team stage
and the uneven distribution of clients prove that the geographical groups
make no sense. In this argument ‘facts’, previously constructed as allies to the
geographical division, are now seized and used in the performance of
professional groups. The network of the geographical division is thus
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displaced and partially incorporated into the shapeless and omnipresent
creature of ‘professionalism’. 
Maintaining Spatial types and Moving Between Them
I have now listed different sets of relations between performances34. I will call
these spatial configurations or simply configurations. With the list of
configurations at least two questions can be raised. First, what kind of work
maintains a particular configuration? Second, what kind of work changes one
configuration to the next? I will answer these questions empirically35. 
Maintaining regional space
Regional spaces are maintained through labour of division; Established areas
of expertise are evoked in arguments. Speakers present themselves as
representatives of areas. Speakers avoid touching the ‘home ground’ of
speakers, who represent other areas. Border zones, which are not clearly
related to established areas, are avoided. One significant effect and part of the
labour of division is the tendency to deconstruct objects that span the
regions36. The construction of a general fact such as “we can all agree that the
opening hours are bad” is thus an uphill battle in regional space. 
From regional space to fire space
There are two kinds of work that moves the configuration from regions to the
‘conjoined alterity’ of fire space. First, there is the work of detaching the
social workers from their professional regions. This takes many forms:
cancelling clients, leaving the local centre, performing individuality in various
exercises orchestrated by the consultants. All this articulate differences,
including differences within the professional regions. Second, there is the
work of bringing these differences close together and thus increasing the
intensity; Asking the social workers to decide between “the standard program
or something else“. Listing principles next to each other. Presenting the
opinions of groups sequentially. Articulating options. Arguing for and against
                                             
34 The reader, who wishes to think in terms of systems may regard regions and fluids as loosely
coupled systems, and fire and networks as tightly coupled systems (cf. Weick 1979, Weick & Roberts
1993).
35 Because I answer the questions empirically, I can only comment on the configurational shifts in the
present material. This leaves out a number of logical options, such as a shift from fire to fluid, or a
shift from networks to regions. In fact, my material only covers 7 out of 16 options (3 out of 12 shifts,
and 4 out of 4 instances of ‘maintenance’). In the words of the Danish psychologist Tranekjær-
Rasmussen, I am building a completable model, not a complete model. 
36 Star & Griesemer’s classic article on boundary objects can be read as a description of the
extraordinarily hard life conditions for in-between objects in regional space (Star&Griesemer, 1989).
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particular options. Arguing about due process. All of this moves the spatial
configuration from a stable regional space to a hot, conflict-ridden fire space
of conjoined alterities. 
Maintaining fire space
Fire space is created, as well as maintained, by work that articulate and
juxtapose differences. But there is more: The creation of what I have termed
the empty opportunity-charged space constructs a day to be seized. This is
work that drives out differences and brings them close together in time by
constantly stressing that time is running out. It is now or never. It is the last
chance. The decision will be made soon. We must move on. This work is
closely related to the performance of due process as an informed managerial
decision. This performance also maintains the fire space in another way. I
have described how the construction of a public space and the performance of
‘civil servants’ create a particular format in which differences of opinion are
given the form of factual arguments. This generates the effect of assembling a
lot of facts on one location. The facts are of course different, but they can
nevertheless be ordered and juxtaposed. So alterity is conjoined rather than
dispersed, as would be the case if ‘interest groups’ were allowed to retreat to
their professional regions. The work of collecting facts is thus crucial to the
construction of a fire space and to the work of immobilising actors that try to
move back to regions.
From fire space to network space
The movement from fire space to network space initially entails the work of
making a difference between the alternatives that have been conjoined. The
manager does this by saying ”let’s play with the geographical division” and
by later declaring that “the professional groups must be mixed” (thus raising
doubts about the target group division). But the manager needs allies, so the
next type of work is about interessement and enrolment. She forms a working
group, which simultaneously make a number of social workers parts of her
project and detach them from their professional groups. Her idea of a
geographical division is confronted with worries and even paralysis, which
indicates that fire space is still performed; alterities are conjoined. Then the
manager intensifies the work of ‘interesting’ the group members, i.e. going
between the group members and the outside forces, which define them. “We
must try to pretend that the necessary conditions are there”, “worries
shouldn’t stop us, we must put the problems on a list, and I will take it to the
management team”. In addition, she manages to engage the social workers in
a puzzle created by drawing together even more allies (numbers, lists, maps)
and by introducing even more deferrals of alterities (“this is only on paper”).
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The manager’s efforts finally pave the way for the calculations, which
produce a solution that draws everything together in a fixed set of relations.
Allies have finally been locked into place; a network has been constructed.
Maintaining network space
Maintaining a network requires a variety of efforts. First, there is the work of
keeping disturbing others away from the ordered and fixed relations:
identifying irrelevant cases that shouldn’t count, “dead or in other
municipalities”. Second, there is the work of disciplining the actors that do
count: knocking it into the heads of the home-helpers. Third, there is
rationalisation of the reality created by the network: describing the product of
the working group as an outcome a ‘rational decision’.
The above-mentioned work secures the initial construction of the network.
But in addition, there are efforts to make the network grow and to turn it into
an encompassing reality. Actors in the network are mobilised when they are
all drawn together, and someone speaks on their behalf. The clearest example
of this is the consultants’ presentation of the Team Profile along with
comments such as, “all the geographical groups believe that...” An additional
effort to make the network grow is the work of setting up obligatory points of
passage, in order to make actors lend their strength to the network. The
manager’s attempt to define cross-professional projects on the geographical
group meetings is the prime example of this.
From network space to fluid space
The movement from networks to fluids is, to put it shortly, generated by the
work of finding other ways. There is the evocation of alternative realities;
“We grant that the geographical groups and the team stage are real, but we
also want to draw attention to the lack of resources and the importance of
professional groups”. There is the blocking of the network’s attempts to
expand; “We must protest the idea that geographical groups are the sine qua
non for benefiting the users, on the contrary the professional groups is the
only way to do it”. There is work to perform alternative realities; A vast
number of the professional groups’ daily activities criss-crosses or effaces the
geographical boundaries. And there are efforts to by-pass the obligatory
passage points of the network; Countering the managers demands for cross-
professional projects in the geographical groups by arguing that work is more
conveniently done in different ways, at different times, and at different
locations.
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Maintaining fluid space
Fluid space is maintained by work that continually dismantles ‘foreign’
elements and incorporates them into a gradually evolving mixture of relations;
the geographical team meetings are turned into occasions for information
exchange. The geographical division is turned into an additional matter that
might be considered in the distribution of clients. The low team stage is
turned into an argument that the professional groups are the locations of real
work. The figures on the distribution of cases are turned into the argument
that cross-professional work must necessarily be limited.
Furthermore, the fluid space is maintained by the practice of ad hoc casework.
Cases are handled with respect to the specific situation at hand and nothing
else. Established regions and networks may be obstacles or resources in this
work, but never its purpose. So ad hoc work is simply about moving the
present case, with whatever tools are available, and for this reason every case
may (or may not) erode established regions or networks37. 
The above descriptions of maintenance work and the work that produces
shifts between configurations are summarised in a table in chapter seven.
Development of Competence
If I were to follow a purification strategy in the study of competence, my next
question would be, what lies behind all these spatial configurations and re-
configuration. But, since my project is committed to the opposite strategy, the
strategy of complexification, my question is what the entire complex of
relations enables the team to do. 
My answer is that the competence of the team is its variety of performances.
It acts like a regional space: separating matter and dealing with them in the
pigeonholes of established expertise. It acts like a fire space: articulating and
juxtaposing alterities. It acts like network space: ‘interessing’, enrolling and
mobilising a heterogeneous crowd of actors into a fixed functional structure.
It acts like a fluid space: gradually incorporating a variety of entities into a
stream of ad hoc work. Finally and perhaps most remarkably, the team
succeeds to keep moving between these spatial configurations. It doesn’t get
stuck. 
But, what then is the development of competence. How does the competence
of the local centre change in the course of the team project?  
                                             
37 I have earlier described a professional’s work to circumvent obstacles, keep the situation moving
and incorporating numerous entities (Elgaard Jensen, 2001).
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Perhaps it might be possible to construct a functional story to answer this
question. One might take the list of maintenance and transformation work and
turn it into a story about the sequential and progressive development of
competence. Such a story would depict configurations as production events
linked in a chain that move step by step toward the final form of competence.
We would then say that the output of the regional configuration generates the
input to the fire configuration and so on. And we would say that the final
product of this developmental process is fluid space. 
However, this story doesn’t really work. The first problem is that the so-called
‘first steps’ do not stay intact when the relations between performances move
to the next configuration. A later configuration does not come into being by
elegantly translating the earlier configuration into a faithful ally. The process
is more accurately described as breaking up or dissolving other
configurations. The image is thus not one of ascending to a higher level, but
one of tensions and continual re-ordering. Configurations are not building on
top of each other; they are feeding on each other’s debris. 
The second problem with the functional story is that it suggests that the earlier
configurations disappear or become unimportant. The assumption would then
be that fluid space has come to prevail. But such an assumption is
unwarranted. The regional space of areas of expertise was temporarily effaced
at team training sessions, but it is still performed in the daily work at the local
centre. The fire space was temporarily changed when the manager pushed for
a geographical solution, but the alternatives of ‘target groups’ and
‘professional groups’ frequently re-appear in the discussions. The network
space of the geographical solution was severely criticised at the last team
training session, but the manager declared that it is too early to let it go. All of
this suggests that the so-called earlier configurations are still around. And so
the tensions between configurations as well as the opportunities to ‘feed on’
each other remain.  
The image of spatial configurations in tension, which concludes the analysis
of the four empirical cases, will be further developed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter six
Following the Objects
The argument so far can be recast the terms of my analysis in chapter 2.
Latour & Woolgar’s observer could not help noticing the striking difference
between room A and B, and I could not help noticing the striking differences
between the various performances in the team project. The observer asked
about the relation between room A and B, and I asked about the relation
between performances. The observer broadened his explanation by arguing
that the functional chain of the laboratory is actually biting something
(‘scientific facts’) which is connected to its own tail (‘inscription devices’).
And likewise, I argued that the spatial configurations are feeding on each
other. In this way my explanation takes the form of a network, which I have
carefully constructed through a series of combinations of data and ontologies.
And I might add that my empirical analysis depended on a particular
inscription device called the concept of performance. This device, a network
in its own right, was constructed in chapter 3 and 4 through a process of
evoking, ordering, and  disciplining a number of other theoretical networks. 
But where should I go with ‘my’ network from here? At this point I will take
inspiration from another network-creator in my story, the team manager. After
the effort in the working group, she attempted to solidify the network by
linking it to further allies such as arguments about the benefit of the users. In
this chapter I will make a similar attempt to forge solidifying links from my
story of competence as spatial configurations. I will do this by looking at how
objects move between the spatial configurations. But before I enter into that, I
need some further arguments to clarify my position. 
In my presentation of the performative turn in STS, I listed three different
ways to talk about performance: Modes of ordering, spatial types, and
multiple objects. I argued that these should be viewed as supplementary rather
than mutually exclusive strategies for imputing patterns to the social. In the
previous chapter, I worked through four cases, imputing patterns with labels
such as ‘the political performance of social work’, ‘the expert-dialogue’ and
‘vision’. I consider these patterns to be akin to John Law’s modes of ordering.
In the conclusion of the previous chapter, I used the notion of spatial types as
a convenient way to order my lengthy list of modes of ordering. This might be
read as a claim that spaces are made of modes of ordering. While this is not
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wrong, it is not entirely right either. I do think that a cluster of modes of
ordering can be translated to a particular spatial type. But I do not think that
the modes of ordering are simply equal to or can be reduced to that spatial
type. Furthermore, I think that a reverse move can also be made: A
description of a spatial type can be incorporated into the description of a
mode of ordering. For instance, the notion of regional space might fruitfully
be incorporated into the mode of ordering, which Law calls vocation. So my
argument is that translation can go both ways. This allows me to qualify my
previous remark that modes of ordering, spatial types and multiple objects are
supplementary. By this I do not mean that they are supplementary in the sense
of philosophical realism. They do not hold separate pieces to the same jigsaw-
puzzle, or different parts of the same singular object ‘out there’; The image of
the blind men and the elephant does not apply. Their supplementarity lies in
the fact that one can be translated into the other and the other way around. (If
the latter were not the case, one would be a helping concept not a
supplementary one). So my claim is that modes, spaces and objects are
supplementary because, they are mutually included. Each of them is made of
some of the other, and for this reason analytical resources can be mobilised by
bringing all of them into play. In addition, this means that I am now moving
away from the network metaphor, which I derived from my analysis of Latour
& Woolgar. Instead I will think of my own account as a case of different but
mutually implicated performances. Perhaps something resembling a fluid;
everything informs everything else, and but no element is an obligatory
passage point for all the others. 
With this argument, it is time to bring the third musketeer into the
performance-battle: the notion of the object. In the following I will solidify
and expand my previous account of orderings and spaces by an attempt to
follow a number of objects. I take an object to be something that retains it
shape, but what this means depends of the spatial configuration in question.
Objects and spaces are co-constituted, and therefore it is perfectly possible
that an object in one spatial configuration is merely ‘noise’ in another.
Furthermore it is possible that an object may hold together in several spatial
configurations, or that the object may move from one spatial type to another
through a more or less disfiguring process of translation. 
My analysis of objects follows the same temporal outline as my previous
account: First, I will follow a regional object into fire space, then a fire object
into network space, and finally I will follow a number of network objects into
fluid space. 
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Translation of Objects from Regional Space to Fire Space
In my analysis of the four cases, I have taken the discussion of opening hours
(case 1) as an example of regional space, and I have taken the articulation of a
decision (case 2) as an example of fire space. At present, I wish to make a
closer analysis of whether and how objects are translated from regional to fire
space. 
The first task is of course to point out some tangible object in regional space,
which I can track into fire space. The regional object,  that I will take as my
starting point, is that of the expert. 
Examples: 
• A central staff person stands before a group of social workers, claiming
that “It is a bad political signal that we are closed from 1 PM”.  
• A social worker replies by saying that “the time for reflection ...will
suffer” if the opening hours are expanded.
These events perform a world with a certain order of things. First, there are
established domains or areas such as ‘the political’ and ‘the professional’.
Second, these areas are sufficiently homogenous to give rise to singular
opinion on a particular matter. Third, the knowledge and opinion of an
established area can be packaged into a human body, who can figure as an
undisputed spokesperson of this area. The expert is thus a hybrid consisting of
a set of links between a human body, acts of representation, and an
established homogenous area of expertise. 
So what happens to the expert, this object of regional space, when it
encounters the fire space of decision-articulation? Is it welcomed or
disowned, carried or blocked, strengthened or torn apart? That’s the question. 
As it happens, differences are articulated and brought together in more than
one way in the fire space of the team training session. In fact, I described
three different performances of due process: the agora, the informed
managerial decision and the expert dialogue. I will look at each of these in
turn to analyse the fate of the expert. 
The expert and the performance of an agora
In the agora, the human body is not performed as a representative of an area
of expertise but as an individual contributor. This individual is engaged in
presenting herself to other individuals, in moving and mingling in a cocktail-
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party situation, in displaying interest in other individuals, and in speaking in
public on her own behalf. In all this, the link between bodies and areas of
expertise is cut. The social workers are no longer performed as
spokespersons. But how did this ‘cut’ in the links of the expert come about? 
Strathern (1996) has discussed the process of stopping or cutting the
expansion of particular forms of relatedness. One of her examples is about a
group of scientists who invent a blood test. When ‘doing science’ they
willingly recognise their dependence on a vast field and tradition of science;
among other things, their scientific articles contain numerous co-authors and
references. But in the event of registering a patent this expanded network is
‘cut’ or ‘truncated’ into a limited number of contributors. Strathern suggests
that this cutting is effected by the intersection of two networks. The network
of science is intersected by the network of commerce. The introduction of the
commercial network makes it possible for a moment to cut or bracket the
scientists’ extended relations to their field.
I suggest that a similar argument can be made about the way the expert (body-
representation-established area) is ‘cut’ in the agora. The consultants’ staging
of self-presentations and cocktail-party mingling evoke a network of
citizenship. A network with a long modern history, substantial institutional
supports, and strong moral claims about the rights of individuals; Everybody
can and should speak for themselves. No established areas should limit the
individual freedom of the individuals. All men are equal. The evocation of
citizenship makes it possible to perform bodies as individuals, rather than
representatives. In this way a link, which holds the object of the expert
together, is severed. The expert is thus dismantled - for a moment - in the
performance of the agora. 
I will suggest one more process, which contributes to this dismantling. In the
course of the team training session, the social workers are presented with
questions such as this one: “Do you want the standard program for the day or
something else?”. One type of response, a response which is typical of
regional space, would be to pigeonhole the issue. But in this case, the question
does not fall into the pigeonholes of established areas of expertise. It is
impossible to argue that a particular professional group is uniquely qualified
to decide how the joint meeting should proceed. Another regional strategy,
which we have come across, is to deconstruct the issue; in the discussion
about opening hours, the ‘badness’ of the opening hours was deconstructed as
a universal fact through the evocation of a number of different expert-
opinions.
But in the team training session, the social workers must make a joint decision
about what to do with the day. Neither pigeon holing nor deconstruction will
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do. They are sitting in the horseshoe, the whole day has been set aside for
team training, they cannot proceed before the decision has been taken. There
is no way, the social workers can make the issue go away. I suggest that
‘common’ or ‘universal’ issues, such as what to do with the day, are objects
that interfere with the established areas. The introduction of such boundary-
interfering objects1 is another process that cuts or dismantles the object of the
expert. Boundary interfering objects don’t fit into any of the established areas,
and therefore they force the social workers to act on behalf of something else
than their established areas of expertise. Thus the regional order of areas is
momentarily interrupted.
The expert and the performance of informed managerial decision-making
Whereas the expert is dismantled in the performance of the agora, this object
seems to do better when alterities are conjoined in the mode, which I have
described as the informed managerial decision. 
Something like this happens; The social workers start to perform themselves
as civil servants. Now, they do not claim to represent an area of expertise
inaccessible to outsiders. Instead they speak of facts, which are available to
anyone in general, and the manager in particular. But of course these facts do
not exist in and off themselves. Take this example: One of the advantages of
dividing the team into three geographical areas, is that the three caseworkers
specialised in early retirement, can go into one each. This fact may be read as
an entirely logical and practical matter, a given. But it can also be argued that
it rests on certain premises, most significantly the assumption that it is
advantageous that none of the caseworkers will have to change their
speciality. If we read it in this way, we can say that the caseworker, who
contributes this ‘information’, has successfully translated an opinion
generated within a particular area of expertise into a simple fact that will be
taken into account by the manager. And like the construction of so many other
facts, the trick is to silence the circumstances of production (cf.
Latour&Woolgar). Not a word about the premises. So in this case, the expert
is successfully translated into the civil servant, and the only thing that changes
about the expert-object is that the link to the established area of expertise is
silenced. 
However, as I have also described in case 2, not every expert-object, manages
this translation successfully. The home advisor is not able to turn his opinions
                                             
1 Through this notion, I make an indirect link to Star & Griesemer’s (1989) notion of boundary
objects, which they define as things that are adaptable to different social worlds and sufficiently
robust to maintain identity across them. However, I am critical of Star & Griesemer’s tendency to
naturalise social worlds. The omnipresence of boundary-interfering objects indicates that social
worlds are much less stable, that Star & Griesemer seem to suggest.
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into facts. When he proposes that the current professional groups stay
unchanged, it is far too easy to say “You are just saying that because you are a
home advisor”, and then the link between his ‘facts’ and his area of expertise
is made widely visible. 
In sum the translation of the expert into the ‘managerial’ version of fire space
stands or falls with the ability to silence the links to the established areas and
thus turn expert opinions into common facts. If successful, the expert can play
the role of civil servant, if unsuccessful, the expert will be considered an
interest group. In regional space, a strong and visible link to an area is an
advantage, because everybody remains on their home ground. But in a fire
space, with boundary-interfering objects such as a common decision to make,
there are no inalienable rights granted to the regions. Being an interest group
in fire space, i.e. being unable to translate opinions into facts that are
recognised by others, is thus a vulnerable position, because the boundaries are
at risk.
The expert and the performance of expert-dialogue
Expert-dialogue is the term by which I denoted a third performance of
decision-making in the team training session. In this mode, team decisions
should ideally be handled in a forum consisting of representatives from each
of the established areas. This version of decision-making is obviously very
well suited for the expert. It recognises and depends on the firm links between
bodies, representation and established areas. Furthermore, the purpose of the
forum is not to merge or change the established areas. On the contrary, the
aim is the establish a trading zone2 which allows the areas to interact, while
remaining separate. 
The trading zone seems to be a hybrid form between regional and fire space.
It depends on and endorses the regions, but it also articulates the alterities of
these regions and brings them close together in particular forum. 
However, the performance of decision-making as expert-dialogue was very
limited at the team training session. In fact, it only appeared in the proposal
from one of six subgroups and in a few of the home advisor’s remarks. So the
object of the expert was not allowed to enter fire space through this entrance. 
In sum, the fate of the expert in fire space varied considerably. In the fire
space of the agora, it was cut or dismantled by the evocation of a network of
                                             
2 The notion of a trading zone is borrowed from Galison (1997). He further argues that trading zones
develop a creole- or pidgin-like “interlanguage” to bridge the epistemic divide between separate
communities. 
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citizenship and by boundary-interfering objects. In the fire space of informed
managerial decision-making, some expert-objects translated themselves into
civil servants by silencing their link to established areas. Expert opinions were
thus translated into facts. But other expert-objects were unable to silence their
links and were rejected as interest groups. Finally, in the rather weak and
isolated vision of fire space as expert-dialogue, the expert is seamlessly
integrated thereby creating a hybrid spatial type of regions and fire3.
Translation of Objects from Fire Space to Network Space
In my analysis of the cases, I have taken the first team training session to be
an example of fire space (case 2), and I have taken the effort of the manager’s
working group to constitute a network space (case 3). I will now attempt to
follow the movement of an object between these two spatial types. 
But what would be a quintessential object of fire space? My best guess at such
an object is the articulated conflict between three different ways of dividing
the team: (a) the geographical division, (b) the target group division, and (c)
the existing division into professional groups. This conflict bears the
hallmarks of fire space. It is about alterities; the three ways of dividing the
team are articulated as different and mutually exclusive options. It is about
conjoined alterities; the options are juxtaposed and linked to each other. When
someone speaks against one, she is usually asked to defend the possible
alternatives. When someone argues in favour of one, she is often asked to
comment on the potential gains that are missed by not choosing the others.
Finally, the conflict bears the hallmark of immobility; the articulation of the
conflict implies that attempts to ‘go for’ one option is restrained by the
disadvantages in relation to this option, as well as by the (lost) advantages
related to the other options. 
So how does this fiery conflict-object fare in network space? I have argued
that the work that moves the spatial configuration from fire space to network
space hinges on making a difference between the options, and then gradually
making one option prevail. This would entail that the other options are
subdued, and that the articulated conflict is either blocked or translated into
another kind of object. 
The first event that paves the way for a shift toward network space is a team
meeting, which follows up the first team training session. On this occasion,
the manager openly declares that the professional groups must be blended. By
                                             
3 A similar case of combining areas of expertise, without reducing one to the other is described by
Dugdale (1999). She argues, that the apparently singular product of an expert-committee (a consumer
information leaflet) in fact contains multiplicity within.
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doing this, she attempts to rule out no less than two options: The existing
division of labour, which doesn’t blend the professional groups at all, and the
target group division, which would blend some but not all of the professional
groups4. How does this cut of two out of three options come about? The
answer is quite simple, the manager refers to her instructions from the
consulting firm, “The professional groups must be blended”, “They din it into
my ears”. And she refers to the official and widely publicised project goals
decided by the board of the FLMA. Strong networks of managerial rights are
thus evoked in an attempt to sever the ties between two of the options and
whatever or whoever would support them. And there is indeed a lot to cut in.
Before the manager’s declaration there was a lengthy discussion, in which
every single option, was supported by agora-individuals speaking on their
own behalf as well as experts speaking on behalf of their professional group.
So what happens next to this three-pronged conflict, which the manager
attempts to cut down to a single option? The manager forms a working group,
and the discussion continues. In the working group the social workers do not
insist on a professional or a target group division, but they constantly
articulate worries about the geographical division, which the manager seems
to favour. As the meetings move on, the managers finds more ways to interest
the social workers, that is to go in between the social workers and the worries
which pull them way. Through her performance of vision, she evokes a
situation in which the necessary conditions are present, and she argues that
the social workers should pretend that this is the case and thus leave the
worries out of consideration for a moment. Furthermore, she gathers
additional allies (such as numbers and maps), which allow her to define a
puzzle. This exercise is very powerful and compelling because it mobilises a
broad set of allies, but at the same time it can be depicted as ‘benign’ because
it is ‘only on paper’. With the solution of the puzzle, it seems that the
geographical option wins. But things are in fact more complicated. As I
pointed out, the manager argues that each geographical group should identify
some important target groups (within its region), and design cross-
professional projects aimed at these. So the target groups are still around. And
the professional groups have not left the stage either. The manager counters
the worries about professionalism by saying that each person in the
geographical group should retain his or her core area, but the group must also
jointly manage the work outside the core areas. So the objects created by the
manager are geographical groups which contain professional groups as well
                                             
4 The likely outcome of a target group division would be (1) a group aimed at mentally ill clients
containing all the support persons and all the home advisors, (2) a group aimed at substance abusers
with some of the home-helpers and some of the caseworkers,  (c) a group aimed at ‘the marginalised’
with the rest of the home-helpers and the rest of the caseworkers.
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as target groups. The former conflict-object, which juxtaposed three options,
have now been transformed to one option, which envelops the two others. 
This new containing object is different from the initial fire-object in several
respects. First, the containing object does not consist of conjoined alterities.
The three options are turned into parts of a functional arrangement; To
establish geographical groups is now a step on the way to make projects
aimed at target groups. Furthermore, the geographical group is an
unproblematic frame of the work within the professional groups. And vice
versa, the work within the professional groups as well as the work on target
group projects are ways to make the geographical groups function. So the
three kinds of grouping are mutually enabling rather than mutually exclusive.
At any rate that is what the manager argues. 
Second, the enveloped object does not imply immobility. When the containing
object is created, it becomes possible to defer the attention to professional and
target groups; geographical grouping can now be worked on without
interruption. So contrary to conjoined alterities, which constantly disturb each
other, functional parts can be handled separately. The manager’s containing
object is indeed - as she repeats time and again - a way to move on. 
The third difference between the fire-conflict-object and the containing object
is that the latter exists in - and performs - a space of distinct levels. 
Time is levelled: Initially there will be a geographical division and later there
will be target grouping. So the present time can be plotted in relation to these
two points, which makes it possible to depict the working group as moving
forward or standing still. Contrary to this, time was non-existing in fire space;
There was no now and later, the conflict between types of grouping was
‘eternal’ or ‘principled’5. 
Another set of levels that is performed by the containing object are the levels
of size: Geographical groups contain the other kinds of groups, which means
that geographical groups are made big, while the other kinds of groups are
made small. This relation of size fits into an elaborate network that establishes
relations of size between entities in the social work administration. Each
geographical group is a part of the adult team, which is a part of the local
centre, which is a part of the Family and Labour Market Administration.
Again, this is entirely different from fire space. In that spatial configuration
                                             
5 The literature on organisational structure often makes a similar performance. Differences between
organisational forms are depicted as an ‘eternal’ and ‘principled’ conflict. One particularly clear
example of this is Mintzerg’s (1983) discussion of functional grouping vs. market based grouping.
“We have the fundamental distinction between grouping activities by ends, by the characteristics of
the ultimate markets served by the organization (..) - or by the means, the functions (..) it uses to
produce its products and services” (p.54). 
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the conflict was performed as a point of impact between two clashing entities.
But the size of those entities was not a part of the reality constructed in fire
space; or to be more precise: as soon as more and more entities enlisted as
allies to the geographical option, and this option thus seemed to grow, the
spatial configuration shifted toward network space. 
So in sum, the object of the articulated conflict in fire space was thoroughly
changed in its encounter with network space. First it was cut down from three
to one option by the evocation of an extended network of management.
Second, it was translated into a ‘containing object’, which is functional rather
than conflictual, and mobile rather than immobile. Moreover this new object
exists in a space of differences in size (as opposed to a conflict that is
‘fundamental’ or ‘in principle’) and in a space of differences in time (as
opposed to a conflict that is ‘eternal’). 
Translation of Objects from Network Space to Fluid Space
Following objects from network to fluid space presents a particular challenge.
A fluid object is hard to identify and describe because it doesn’t retain a fixed
set of relations. It constantly moves, adjusts and incorporates new elements.
However, as Mol and Law also point out, the continuous and gradual change
is precisely what makes fluid objects robust. 
“In fluid spaces objects don’t collapse easily. But why? Maybe it’s because
there is no single strongpoint to be defended in order to preserve continuity.
Like guerrilla armies, fluids melt back into the night. They circumvent. They
infiltrate. For since continuity has nothing to do with the integrity of territory
in a fluid space, there are no fixed frontiers to be patrolled. Neither is there
need for police action to safeguard the stability of elements and their linkages
- for there is no network structure to be protected.” (Mol & Law, p.662)
To carry on with the guerrilla-metaphor, I will suggest that encounters
between fluid space and network space do not take the form of dramatic
battles over strategic positions in the network. Quintessential network-objects
such as the notion of teamwork as cross-professional collaboration or the
geographical grouping are not cut to pieces all at once but rather chipped
away by a series of rather uneventful events. This state of affairs has made me
deviate from the format, which I have employed in the previous paragraphs.
In the following, I will not identify a particular object and then track it into a
different kind of space. The idea of one strategic object makes little sense in a
discussion that involves fluid space. Instead, I have chosen to structure this
paragraph around three stories. Each of these exemplifies the erosion of
network objects and the incorporation of network debris into fluid space. 
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First story: Familiar faces
As a part of my contract with the FLMA, I agreed to write a couple of reports
with preliminary analyses of my observations. One of these reports had the
literary format of a critical implementation study; I listed the initial political
goals of the team project, I described a series of power-struggles between
managers and social workers on the local level, and I concluded that next to
nothing had come out of the project. Obviously, the teams had been made in
the formal organisational structure, the professional groups had been mixed in
the geographical group meetings, but no actual cross-professional
collaboration had been established, and no clients had been given a single
contact person as a result of the project. Furthermore, I pointed out that only
5% of the working hours were spent in geographical groups. 95% of the time,
everybody worked exactly the way they did before. To put it shortly, I was
claiming that the intention of the team project was to build a network, with
certain relations and effects, which were all predefined by the official project
goals. And this project had failed dramatically. 
The members of my steering committee were not particularly happy with this
analysis. Several members including the team manager pointed out that the
team project must be seen in a longer time perspective; no one has claimed,
they reminded, me that all the political goals would be realised within half a
year. Of course, they were right. Using the terms of the present text, I would
say that the managerial network may have failed for a moment to discipline a
number of allies, but it has certainly not disappeared as a mode of ordering. 
The second, and to me even more interesting response came from a social
worker (a support person). She said that I was wrong to say that nothing had
come out of the team project. “The co-operation in the individual cases is
easier now that we know the faces of the caseworkers”. In the spur of the
moment, I took her comment to be rather insignificant. But, I now believe that
this was due to my preoccupation with the evaluation of network space. My
focus on the official goals made the significance of her point invisible. The
social worker pointed to the fact that the support persons’ ad hoc work is
much easier if they know the caseworkers, with whom they will co-operate
before the cases become urgent. What this entails in practice, I can only
speculate. It could be that it is easier to get down to business quickly with
someone who is not a complete stranger. It could be that knowledge of
procedures and possibilities from previous cases may be reused. It could be
that familiarity makes it easier to drop by and make an informal inquiry. But
all of this is, as I said, speculation. However, it is quite evident that the
familiarity, which is productive in the fluid space of ad hoc work, is in part an
effect of the efforts to construct a network of cross-professional collaboration.
The placement of the four professional groups in adjacent offices in the same
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building is a direct outcome of the team project. The activities of team
sessions and geographical group meetings have provided further opportunities
to achieve ‘familiarity’. In fact these events have forcefully staged the
blending and the civil interaction between social workers. So the net-work,
which has so far been unsuccessful in its own terms, has actually fed some
measure of success in fluid space.  
Second story: “I did real teamwork today”
As a part of my fieldwork, I was invited by the co-ordinating home-helper to
follow her work for a couple of days. An important part of her job is to enter
new clients into the system. This is done by visiting their home, evaluating
their needs, making an agreement with the client, and finally upon the return
to the local centre enter the relevant data into the computerised work plans of
the home-helpers. I was invited on a number of these visits and every time the
home-helper teased me by saying that she hoped it was a ‘really trashy home’.
Obviously, she wouldn’t mind shocking this innocent-looking young man
from the University a little bit.
On one of our trips, we visited an alcoholic, who had been hospitalised after a
serious binge. He was now on Antabuse6, he had been discharged and he was
back in his apartment. When the man invited us into his apartment, we were
surprised to find it clean, in fact very clean. In the ensuing conversation with
the home-helper, he told his story. At the hospital, he wasn’t allowed to make
a slow withdrawal; he was forced to take a ‘cold turkey’, which was a horrible
experience. Now that he was on Antabuse, he felt extremely restless and he
had trouble sleeping. He couldn’t hang out with his old friends, because they
were all drinking. So what he had done for the past couple of days was to
channel all his energies into cleaning the apartment. The home-helper asked
him if he had any means of subsistence. It turned out that he didn’t. The only
money he had was from selling all his empty beer bottles7. She told him that
he was definitely eligible for supplementary benefits. He just had to visit the
local centre and fill out an application. The man seemed a little confused and
hesitant about this, but then she offered that he could walk back to the local
centre with us. And so we did. At the local centre, the home-helper directed
us to the service team, a team adjacent to the adult team, which is in charge of
the so-called lighter cases. The home-helper contacted one of the caseworkers
and got the right application form. She instructed the man to fill in the form,
and explained that he would have to wait in the line to have it processed. The
                                             
6 Antabuse is a drug used in the treatment of alcoholism; causes nausea and vomiting if alcohol is
 ingested.
7 There is a refund on empty glass bottles in Denmark. 
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home-helper and I said goodbye to the man, and we walked back to her office.
Later that day, I heard her tell about the episode to a colleague in the hallway.
She initiated by saying: “I did real teamwork today”. 
I have little doubt that the home-helper’s comment to her colleague performs
teamwork as something worthwhile pursuing, as a good. However, I could
interpret her actions with the client in some very different ways. If I wanted to
be optimistic on behalf of the team project, I could say that the home-helpers
action was caused by all the talk about teamwork in the past months. If I
wanted to be pessimistic, I could say that she possibly would have followed
the man to the right office in the local centre regardless of the team project8.
But no matter which interpretation, it is hard to deny that the home-helper
talked about teamwork as a good. So the value or ideal or morality of
teamwork is, at least in this instance, incorporated into the social accounting
of the ad hoc work. This entity, the good of teamwork, is another case of an
object, which is generated within the managerial networks of official goals
and organisational designs, and which is now incorporated into the fluid space
of daily ad hoc work. 
As an almost ironic twist to this story, I might add that the ‘teamwork’
performed by the home-helper is completely invisible in the network space of
the managerial efforts. The home-helper links a potential home-help client to
the caseworkers in another team. This work cannot be located in one of the
geographical groups of the adult team, because it doesn’t involve group
members other than the home-helper. The work is also invisible to the official
or managerial contacts between the adult team and the service team because
these contacts focus the division of big ‘chunks’ of work such as a group of
cases or a type of administration. So the ‘real teamwork’ of the home-helper
draws on an idea that is generated and distributed in network space. But at the
same time, it transgresses the boundaries created by networks (such as
geographical groups), and it undermines the idea that the boundaries created
in network space can actually contain the ‘real’ teamwork. Thus, teamwork is
made a fluid object.
Third story: The notice board
During my fieldwork with the caseworkers, I sometimes borrowed an empty
office, where I could sit and read some case files. On one of these occasions, I
raised my head from the files and took a closer look at the large notice board,
which covered the wall over the desk. The board was filled with papers neatly
organised in rows, creating an almost matrix-like formation. In one of the top
                                             
8 I might even be cynical and say, that she may have acted the way she did because she was followed
by an observer with a proclaimed interest in the team project.
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corners, there was a children’s drawing of bird. In one of the bottom corners
there was a paper produced by the managers working group: a spread sheet
showing the number of clients in the geographical group, which the
caseworker in this office had been allocated to. The number of caseworker
clients in the group was around 1000. On the sheet, the number of clients in
the other professional groups had been circled and the following note had
been written: “others about 80 clients”. On the rest of the notice board, i.e.
between the spread sheet and the children’s drawing, there were lists of phone
numbers to medical doctors, solicitors, treatment institutions and shelters.
There were official announcements describing new divisions of labour
between offices in the central administration. And there were lists of
computer codes, processing deadlines and rates in relation different kinds of
supplementary benefits. 
This notice board is yet another example of how a ‘network’ entity, the
working group’s spread sheet,  is incorporated into a different space. One
could say that the spread sheet on the notice board represents the team
project. But I would argue that the team project is also performed in certain
ways by the notice board. 
At particular times, such as the team’s introductory meeting at the FLMA, the
team project was spoken of as something big and all-encompassing; “This
project will change the ‘whole’ administration”. Contrary to this, the notice
board performs the team project as something small. The spread sheet is not
larger than any of the other pieces of paper, and the hand-written comment by
the caseworker suggests that the geographical group only concerns 8% of her
clients. 
Furthermore, the notice board performs a reality in which change is ordinary.
The papers indicate that procedures, phone numbers, division of labour get
changed all the time; the team project is just another element in this flow of
changes. This also departs from the prevalent managerial stories about the
project, which describe the changes in relation to the team project as highly
extra-ordinary. One consultant even told me that he regarded the team project
as the biggest change in social work in Copenhagen in this century. 
The notice board also performs the team project as manageable. It orders and
displays the changes, it makes all of them visible from the caseworkers chair.
It makes it possible for the caseworker to fit the team project into a stream of
daily activities. 
Finally, I will suggest that the notice board detracts from the importance of
the team project. I have already mentioned how the spread sheet is performed
as a manageable case of ordinary change. But perhaps the children’s drawing
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makes an even more effective, albeit subtle, deconstruction of the importance
of the team project. The drawing simply suggest that there are other important
things in life than administrative work. 
I have now recounted three stories about the translation of objects from the
network space of the ‘official’ team project to the fluid space of ad hoc work.
There are two conclusions I would like to draw from these. 
First, it appears that when the network-objects are translated into fluid space
they tend to become invisible, or to be more precise: invisible in eyes crafted
by network space. Easier ad hoc work because the social workers know each
other, casual accounts of real teamwork in the hallways, one-off cross-
professional contacts, pragmatic handling of ‘dramatic’ changes. All of this is
invisible, because it moves around the focal points generated by the
managerial network; It does not appear on the averaged and accumulated
group-scores in the Team Profile®. It does not pass through the ‘obligatory’
passage point of the geographical group meetings. And it does not appear
when an outsider such as myself evaluates the official goals of the project. 
Second, I have pointed out that the translation of objects into fluid space has
an erosive effect. The obligatory passage point of the geographical groups are
made less obligatory, when ad hoc collaboration becomes more efficient, and
when contacts that circumvent the official forums are referred to as ‘real
teamwork’. It is not that the ad hoc work directly confront the geographical
groups, it is rather that these kinds of work gradually undermine the
importance and usefulness of the geographical groups. The fluid work doesn’t
block the main road paved by the manager, and it doesn’t try to reverse the
traffic. But it opens a multitude of secondary roads, which gradually dries out
the traffic on the main road. Over time this makes the main road look
superfluous, oversized and out of touch with the real action. 
Conclusion: The Shapes of the Team Project
I have now followed a series of objects and their translation into different
kinds of space. Through this I have generated a list of some of the shapes, in
which the project ends up. 
In regional space, there was the object of the expert. When it moved into fire
space, the expert was  sometimes cut by the intersecting network of
citizenship. At other times it was translated into the a civil servant, rendering
invisible the links to the established areas of expertise. And in rare moments,
the expert was performed as a part of the trading zone of an expert-dialogue.
In fire space, there was the object of an articulated conflict, a conflict between
three different version of grouping. When moved to network space, this object
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was cut or intersected by a network of managerial rights. And following this,
the conflict-object was translated into a containing object with one version of
grouping engulfing the two others. 
And then there were the objects of network space, such as the geographical
groups and the notion of teamwork as cross-professional collaboration. When
these objects encountered the fluid space of ad hoc work, they were gradually
disfigured and translated into something smaller, more ordinary and less
important than the team project which was performed in network space. 
In the figure below, I have made a summary of the objects and the movements
which I have described in this chapter. 
REGIONAL
SPACE
FIRE 
SPACE
NETWORK
SPACE
FLUID 
SPACE
The 
Expert
Citizenship, boundary
interfering objects
The civil servant
Expert-dialogue
Articulated
conflict
Managerial rights
Containing object 
Groups as
obligatory points of
passage
Real teamwork as
geographical groups
Team project as 
very big, important 
and extra-ordinary. 
On-off contacts
Real teamwork 
as an element in 
casual accounting
Team project as
smaller, ordinary 
and less important
Blocking or cutting the object: Movement as a translation that
changes the object:
Movement that doesn’t change
the object:
Figure 9. The movement of objects between spatial configurations
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But what does this list of objects and movements tell us about the team
project? What struck me, as I wrote the pages of this paragraph, was that the
objects, which are translated between the spatial configuration are so cardinal.
We are not dealing with trivial, insignificant objects but rather entities which
are crucial to the constitution of the various spaces. Regional space without
experts is hard to imagine. Fire space, without the tension of a conflict makes
little sense. A network space without some measure of obligatory passage
points and fixed functional relations will collapse. So my argument is that the
objects, which were moved in the course of the team project were neither
incidental, peripheral nor insignificant to the spatial configurations. Quite the
contrary. 
This cardinality of the objects is of course an artefact of the way I initially
framed this chapter. My intention was to pick out quintessential objects and
follow their translation, and so I did. But then the surprising thing is that it
was so relatively easy. Central objects such as the expert, a conflict over
grouping and the notion of real teamwork are not the exclusive property of a
single spatial configuration; they are translated and they are moved. The point
I am getting at is about the closure or rather the lack of closure in the
configurations. When ‘quintessential’ objects are incessantly translated from
one configuration to the next, then it follows that the configurations are not
closed in on themselves. On the contrary, they are constantly being related to
their others. 
If I were to put the same point in regional terms, I would say that the
exchange of objects does not just take place in a circumscribed trading zone,
which leaves the mother countries separate and untouched. To the contrary,
the translation of objects makes links from the heart of one region to the heart
of another. And through this, the homogeneity of the regions are constantly
disturbed9. 
To draw a metaphor from Clifford Geertz’s classical analysis of Balinese
cockfights, this is not a shallow game; it is deep play. The parties are in over
their heads. Statuses are jeopardised. But, and this is the other aspect of
Geertz’s play metaphor, the status affirmations or insults are only symbolic.
In a Balinese cockfight no one10 gets seriously hurt. And this I believe is also
the case for the fight between spatial configurations in the social
administration. Even though the objects, which are translated and moved, go
the heart of each spatial configuration, these configurations are neither
                                             
9 Which in turn means that is hard to maintain a regional metaphor if this image hinges on the
homogeneity of regions.
10 Except for a very few cases of addict gamblers, and then of course the cocks.
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eradicated nor made to disappear. Regions, fires, networks and fluids
constantly regroup and continue the fight to order the world their way.
It may seem that I am contradicting myself here. One the one hand I am
saying that there are deep translations of objects which go the hearts of the
spatial configurations. On the other hand I am saying that spatial
configurations are somehow unchanged. How is this possible? I think the
answer is quite simple. It is related to the way I have been writing about the
team project: the literary format of a project story. I have narrated a sequence
of events, and by doing this I have performed the idea that the something,
which I have been following, is ‘a’ thing or even a thing in its entirety. As if
the team project were a singular reality, which only played itself out under my
magnifying glass. But, evidently I don’t take that to be the case. The spatial
configurations that I have depicted in my analysis of the four cases, are in no
way exclusive to the team project. They are, or so I claim, performed on
numerous other occasions and in many other materialities than the ones I have
described here. For that reason, the spatial configurations remain relatively
obdurate despite their relatively deep transformations in the course of the
team project.
Chapter 7
Conclusion - 
the Temporary and the Obdurate
In this chapter I will begin by summarising the argument and the theoretical
leitmotifs of this thesis. Following this I will discuss some possible theoretical
and methodological implications of the analysis of the team project.  
A Summery of the Argument
In the introduction, I suggested a constructionist approach to a study of the
development of competence in the team project. This implied attention to a
plurality of orderings and to the heterogeneity of these orderings. My express
aim was thus to describe competence as a series of ‘programs’, which extend
themselves by adding ‘loads’ of humans, words, tools, material, texts,
machines, etc. With this agenda, I committed myself to a complexification
strategy, that is the investigation of competence as an effect of a texture of
relations rather than an underlying essence. 
In the second chapter, I discussed the work of combining a heterogeneous lot
of observation data into a coherent account. Through a case study, I depicted
the construction of facts in social science as empirical-ontological tinkering
and net-work, which involves particular methods and inscription devices.
Based on this analysis, I argued that (constructionist) analyses should build on
a plurality of data types and that it might be fruitful to include a plurality of
ontological constructions within the text. 
In the third chapter I embarked on a discussion of the most prevalent way to
inscribe change processes in psychology, namely the concept of learning. I
presented a number of learning theories and I argued that they all depend on a
notion of an adapting learning system. Furthermore, I argued that the
premises of these learning systems are untenable. The boundaries of the
learning systems - whether based on the content of learning, the agent, or the
location - are leaking. For this reason, I (once again) suggested a move to the
metaphor of the network and the perspective of ANT. The virtue of this
material-semiotic approach that it makes an analysis of negotiation processes
possible without a priori assumptions about the essences and boundaries of
the actors. However, criticisms has been raised over the alleged
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‘managerialism’ of the approach. ANT seemed - at least in the eighties - to
focus almost exclusively on the construction of centredness and coherence.
However, decentredness and incoherence have been brought strongly into
focus by recent work by ANT-inspired or ‘after ANT’ authors. This second
wave in science and technology studies has been called the performative turn. 
In the fourth chapter I explored the concept of performance through some
works by John Law and Annemarie Mol. I argued that in very abstract terms,
the performative turn works by asking what kinds of differences there are and
how they get related? However, the theoretical and empirical answers to these
questions vary considerably. Law talks about different modes of ordering.
Mol & Law talks about different topologies or spaces. Mol talks about the
multiple performances of an object. But regardless of the specific kind,
performances can be defined as recursive processes, which are unbounded
and materially heterogeneous.
In the fifth chapter, I use the notion of performance to discuss a series of
events in the team project. This is summarised at the end of chapter five and
the key terms are repeated in the table below. 
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Case
no.
“Modes of ordering” Spaces Maintaining work/
transition work
1 Social work performed as: 
Political, statistical,
user-functional, professional.
Regions Staying on home ground
Offering expert-opinions
Avoiding region-spanning
objects.
2
↓
Detaching social workers from
regions
Bringing differences together
2 Conflicting versions of due
process: 
Agora, informed management,
expert-dialogue
Conflicting versions of division: 
Professional, geographical,
target group division
Fire Articulating and juxtaposing
differences
Creating opportunity-charged
space
Gathering facts
3
↓
Making a difference between
alternatives
Interessement
Deferral 
3 Deferral, vision, calculation
vs. 
Paralysis, labour of division,
worries
Network Keep disturbing others away
Disciplining actors
Rationalising the network
reality
Mobilisation
Obligatory points of passage
4
↓
Finding other ways, 
i.e. by-passing the obligatory
points of passage
4 Complicated relations between: 
Geographical division, Team
Profile®, team stage, benefit of
the users, function of
geographical group meetings,
professional groups.
Fluid Dismantling foreign elements
Incorporating debris
Ad hoc work
Figure 10. Key terms in the analysis of spaces and modes of ordering
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In chapter six, I identified a number of objects and followed their translations
from one spatial configuration to another. First, I examined the regional
object of the expert and its translation into fire space. At one point it was cut
by an intersecting network of civility; the notion of free and equal individuals
was mobilised against the linkage between experts and their areas of
expertise. At another point the linkages between areas of expertise and social
workers were troubled when they were demanded to make a common
decision on a matter that could not be dealt with in a pigeonholing fashion. 
At a later point, the figure of the expert was translated into an actor in the
performance of informed managerial decision making. In this process, the
professional opinions were turned into facts by silencing their circumstances
of production. 
Finally, one of the social workers suggested that proper decision making
should take the form of a dialogue between experts. However, this type of
translation from regional to fire space did not gather very much support. 
The second object, which I followed, was the fire object of an articulated
conflict between three options. In network space, two of the three options
were (under)cut through the mobilisation of a network of managerial rights.
Later, the conflict was transformed in such a way that the remaining option
engulfed the two others. A network object containing the differences within
was thus created. 
A third group of objects made their way from network space to fluid space.
Through an erosive process the objects of network space were dismantled and
incorporated into the fluid ad hoc work of the local centre. In this way,
network objects such as the geographical grouping, the notion of real
teamwork and the size, importance and uniqueness of the team project were
gradually circumvented and deflated. 
A Summary of the Theoretical Leitmotifs
I have now made a summary in the form a stepwise recapitulation of the
argument. Another way to summarise is to indicate some of the theoretical
leitmotifs, which run through the text. This is what I will do next. 
From discovery to construction
Post-Kuhnian science studies have challenged the traditional epistemological
account of science as a process of discovery. Through historical and empirical
studies of scientific practice, it is argued that scientific facts are outcomes of
negotiation processes, which include numerous non-methodological and
mundane elements (Knorr-Cetina, 1995). The view that emerges from these
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studies is that the work of science is about ordering, persuading, manipulating
and disciplining a number of entities into playing particular roles in a
network. Only when this network is stabilised, will a scientific fact ‘emerge’.
And only when the construction and negotiation processes have been
forgotten or silenced, will the fact appear to be a ‘naked’ fact. In the present
text, I have drawn on the field of science studies with my notions of
empirical-ontological tinkering and ontologies as inscription devices.
Furthermore, I have attempted to write my account in a way that displays
rather than conceals my own construction work.
From singularity to multiplicity
A frequently used point of reference in sociological theory is Parsons’
structural functionalism. This distinctly modernist theory presumes the
existence of a social order in the form of a grand system, which maintains
itself through the socialisation of its individual members. A host of theoretical
traditions have challenged this view. Among these ethnomethodology,
symbolic interactionism, feminism, and post-structuralism. All of these
presume and articulate ‘order’ as a temporary, precarious, impure, and locally
accomplished phenomenon. The present text follows this mode of analysis by
attending to a multiplicity of performances. 
From sociality to heterogeneity
One of social science’s greatest challenges is to move beyond “the social”.
What a social administration can do, its competence, should not be reduced to
human meaning-making, sociological factors or some combination thereof.
An analysis of the social must find ways to include the materialities of the
world. There are of course many way of doing this including the
sociotechnical system theory in organisation science and the focus on
production by Marxist sociologies. However, what has inspired me here is the
material-semiotic approach of actor-network theory. This theoretical approach
attempts to build an infra-language for a study of relations between entities of
all kinds. The study of network thus becomes the study of processes of
hybridisation of the social and the material. In the present text, this is
manifested in my commitment to a complexification strategy in the study of
competence. Nothing can, I assume, be understood without attention to its
web of relations. More specifically, the ANT-approach has inspired my
continual attempts to describe performances as heterogeneous arrangements
of furniture, texts, bodies, talk, papers, case files etc. 
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From systems to performances
Very broadly speaking I might link myself to a tradition of process
philosophy, which presumes that processes are primary to substances and that
events are internally related to their outside worlds (Gregersen; Whitehead).
This means, in Latour’s (1996a) interpretation, that it is illegitimate to
theoretically assume the existence of certain ontological scales, such as
individual-family-class-society or caseworker-adult team-team project. The
‘size’ of things is a matter of what can be drawn together and what can be
made to speak on behalf of what in a particular instance (Callon & Latour
1981). Furthermore, Callon (1999) and Law (2000) argue that the ontological
stabilities or framings, that are in fact achieved, will inevitably be subject to
overflows. In the present text my commitment to process philosophy is
evidenced in various ways. The attention to the overflows of ‘ontological
givens’ is my chief argumentative strategy vis-à-vis learning theories. This
led me to the most significant theoretical resource in the present text, the
concept(s) of performance. Performance is, I suggest, a way to talk about
processes, relations and orderings without recourse to assumptions about
essential ontological levels given in the order of things. Performance is thus
my vehicle for doing empirical process philosophy.
Decentering competence
A fifth leitmotif of this dissertation is the continual attempt to decentre
competence. These efforts are inspired by post-structuralism and by the
widespread interest in ‘situatedness’ in contemporary social psychology. In
the introduction I mentioned ‘purifying’ theories of competence, which
assume that competence is an ability located in the individual. This notion has
been strongly criticised by social learning theory that distributes competence
to the productive relations between a human subject and his or her community
of practitioners. I agree with social learning theory in this move toward a
more relational or complexifying notion of competence. However, following
actor-network theory, I take the decentering one step further by distributing
the sources of agency to non-human actants as well. With this move
competence is no longer a social psychological notion but a broad conception
of how entities, human and non-human, get connected. Although ANT
radically decentres the sources of competence it is primarily interested in
centred effects such as durable facts, technologies or centres of calculation.
Some of the sympathetic criticisms of ANT suggest that decentering may be
carried even further. It may be that competence is a widely distributed texture
of differences that are never added up or drawn together in a single point.
This is the possibility that I have tried to articulate through the analysis of
performances of the team project. 
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Theoretical Implications - Thinking about Difference
The question, which I now want to grapple with, is what to do with all this.
Which lessons can be drawn from the ‘performative’ analysis of the team
project, what is there to conclude?
I have surely articulated a host of differences in the team project: modes of
ordering (mini-discourses), spatial configurations, and the different
performances of objects. I have also articulated a number of ways in which
these differences are related. I have argued that several modes of ordering are
somehow joined in the performances of particular spatial configurations. I
have argued that spatial configurations ‘feed on’ each other and more
specifically I have described this ‘feeding’ as a number of deep translations of
objects. 
If this is our story, then how can we think about this in more general terms? In
the following I will engage with a series of metaphors in order to get a grip of
what to make of the related differences in the team project. 
Function
One metaphor, which I have already taken up and discarded, is that of
function. I have argued that the different spatial configuration cannot be
thought of as steps in a chain of production. There are two reasons for this.
First, the move from one configuration to another does not translate the latter
into a faithful ally of the former. The process is rather one of breaking up and
dissolving the former configuration with the consequence of making room for
the latter. The second problem with the functional metaphor is that it implies
that ‘earlier’ configurations disappear or become unimportant. But this is not
the case. In fact the terms new/old or earlier/later seem of little value. No
spatial configuration seems to be eradicated in the course of the project. Their
successes as well as their setbacks are only momentary. 
So a conclusion, which doesn’t work, is this: The team project went through a
series of steps, which all ended up in the production or feeding of the fluid
space. A conclusion that does work is this: Several different spatial
configurations were performed in the course of the project. There was
substantial tension and “mutual feeding” between these configurations and
there still is. 
Endangered species
Another family of metaphors would be ideas about the intrinsic value of
differences. Cultural relativism is one. The discourse on biological diversity
and the protection of endangered species is another. Applying these
metaphors, I might conclude by celebrating the sustenance of differences. I
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might say that one life form (managerial networks) at some point threatened
to drive out the natural variation, but luckily the other species (professional
fluids) managed to find new niches, so that a the eco-system is now able
maintain its high level of diversity. So although some of the infighting was
savage, the team project was, at the end of the day, a happy case of sustained
co-existence. 
By talking about the team project in this way, I would imply that the
preservation of differences is an inherent good. But this is not a position I
want to take. I frankly admit that I cannot offer a brilliant design for a better
social administration, but this does not persuade me that it is a good in and of
itself to preserve the existing social administration. 
This leads me to a second (productive) objection to the endangered-species
metaphor. By talking of the team project in this way, it seems that there is
something - fixed species - that can be preserved. The opposite ontology,
would be one of a gradual flow of mutations, aberrations, and variations,
which over time changes the ‘essence’ of what there is. I would like to
position my own account within this latter view. Bear in mind that I called the
spatial configurations snapshots, not stages or structures.  
So now I have another conclusion that does not work: The team project was a
happy case of sustained pluralism. And a conclusion that does: The team
project was a case of sustained pluralism.
Hybridity
A third family of metaphors is trying to say two seemingly contradictory
things at once: On the one hand there are incommensurable differences, on
the other hand there are profound interdependencies, or mutual implicatedness
between these differences1. 
The performative turn makes arguments of this sort. Annemarie Mol
describes how anaemia is performed very differently in the clinic and in the
hospital laboratory (see chapter 4). But then she points out that difference
does not necessarily mean separation. In fact, the laboratory performance
includes the clinical performance; the statistical norm, which is the
centrepiece of the laboratory performance, depends on a clinical screening of
the individuals, which were used as a norm group. So the apparently pure
forms turn out to be mixes. 
                                             
1 This way of thinking can be fruitfully distinguished from regional metaphors such as Star &
Griesemer’s notion of social worlds connected by boundary objects, or Galison’s idea about trading
zones as third places separated from the established fields. With regional metaphors the differences
are taken to be essential rather than dependant on their others.
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Bruno Latour’s “We have never been modern” (1993) is another case in point.
In this text he claims that the so-called modern era is characterised by
incessant attempts to separate the world into two kingdoms; Politicians, social
scientists and psychologists define a realm of human culture, whereas natural
scientists and engineers define a realm of non-human nature. However this
separation, which Latour dates back to the 17th century, appears to be highly
questionable if one reads a modern newspaper. Stories about the hole in the
ozone layer, AIDS, global warming, and other recent issues constantly weave
the social and the natural together. “The same article mixes together chemical
reactions and political reactions. A single thread links the most esoteric
sciences and the most sordid politics, the most distant sky and some factory in
the Lyon suburbs, dangers on a global scale and the impending local elections
or the next board meeting” (ibid. p.1). Based on this seemingly paradoxical
divergence between the clean ontological realms and the messy stories,
Latour argues that our contemporary world is characterised by two sets of
processes. On the surface, there are processes of purification into the human
and the non-human. This is the hallmark of modernity. Down below there is
an increasing hybridisation of elements, which produce ever more
encompassing and powerful networks. This hidden hybridisation reveals that
we have never really been modern; the separation of the human from the non-
human is an illusion, which has never been put into practice. 
In a critical comment on Latour, Mark Elam (1999) suggests that arguments
about hybridity are unlikely to wave away ontological distinctions. Elam
points out that the notion of hybridity has a very particular history. I didn’t
become prevalent until the 19th century and at that time, 
 
“ [i]t came to signify some of the worst anxieties plaguing British imperial
power and embodied some of the colonizer’s most secret fears and desires. It
reflected then and continues to reflect today (..) a broad-ranging concern with
the interbreeding of species as well as an engagement with anything derived
from heterogeneous or incongruous sources. Therefore, the history of
hybridity is the history of combinations conceived in a particular fashion;
combinations conceived, first, during the course of colonial expansion;
combinations often thought absurd, unnatural and dangerous, but still
potentially profitable; combinations associated with the forcing together of
unlike living things, the grafting of one species on to another, and the wilful
manipulation of difference into sameness; the construction of a sameness
which if not properly tended will soon revert back into difference” (ibid.,
p.14)
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Elam argues that hybridity can be contrasted to ‘amalgamation’, which is the
idea that different species can be interbred and create mixed races. In
opposition to this, the hybridity-view claims that the mixtures will inevitably
fall apart. The different races are so to speak living within the bodies of
hybrid individuals. Furthermore the hybridity-view claims that interbreeding
will inevitably lead to infertility, if not in the present generation, then in one
of the following (Elam, p.14). 
So here we have a notion of hybridity with a series of connotations: The
mixing of differences, the carrying of difference within, questionable fertility,
and the potential of breaking up into the original forms2. This extended
version of the hybrid-metaphor, suggests that it is an empirical question
whether things are in fact amalgamated or whether they will break up into
‘original’ forms. 
From this I can draw another conclusion about the team project: The project
was a case of interbreeding, which created a series of hybrids with
questionable stability. 
Temporality
With the notion of hybridity, I will take another look at the mixing of
differences in the team project. I have discussed this mixing under two
rubrics; the types of work that produce movement between the spatial
configurations and the deep translations of objects. From this I can produce
the following list: 
Regions ? fire
1. Movement work: The detachment of social workers and the articulation of
different ways to group the team
2. Deep translation: From expert-object to a civil servant object. 
Fire ? network
3. Movement work: The making and increasing of a difference between the
articulated options. 
4. Deep translation: From articulated conflict to a containing object
                                             
2 Elam points out that there is a profound ambivalence to the notion of hybridity. Does hybridity
suggest the creation of a new world of mixtures, or is it actually a way to defend an old world of
established essences? (ibid. p.15)
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Network ? fluid
5. Movement work: The making of alternatives to the obligatory point of
passage.
6. Deep translation: Translation of “real team work” into on-off contacts
outside the realm of geographical groups.
I think, there is one common characteristic to the elements on this list. None
of the ‘tactics’ above last for very long. They are all temporary. 
ad 1. The detachment of the social worker can only go on for one day. 
ad 2. The discourse of ‘facts’ and ‘civil servants’ will give way to ‘politics’
and professional interest after a while. 
ad 3. The predominance of one option can only be sustained for some period
of time.
ad 4. The geographical solution can only contain the other options for the
time being.
ad 5. The alternatives to the obligatory passage point can only live as
occasional exceptions.
ad 6. The subversive definition of ‘real team work’ can exist in a rare
moment, but it is never likely to become institutionalised. 
What this suggests, is that the team project comes with a flood of temporary
arrangements, which makes it possible to momentarily combine or live with
the differences between the spatial configurations. Despite the profound
differences between regions, fire, network and fluid, these ‘blocks’ never
collide in a fatal way. They co-exist because their encounters are greased by a
number of short-lived but efficient arrangements. 
This suggests an alternative explanation for the obduracy of old, big, and
bureaucratic organisations like the social administration in Copenhagen. The
administration is not, as organisational structure theoreticians would have it,
‘low’ on innovation. The social administration may be low on durable
innovations, but it seems to be rich on ephemeral ones.  
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Latour’s hotel manager revisited
With this argument, I will revisit Latour analysis of the hotel manager and his
loaded keys. In construction stories of Latour and other STS-authors there
seems to be a strong focus on durability. Of course STS is concerned with
science in the making, and this tradition has produced wonderful descriptions
of the initial weaving of fragile threads. However, the recurrent point of these
stories seems to be that what is interesting and what needs to be explained is
the end-point of hard and durable facts or technologies. The interest in the soft
and the fragile is only justified by what they later amount to. 
The story of the hotel manager thus ends at the moment he manages to impose
a durable discipline on his guest through the association of hard metal blocks.
The intermediary steps are exactly just that: intermediary. However, I would
suggest that soft, temporary arrangements are in fact important to explain the
persistence of “blocks” whether we call these identities, modes of ordering or
spatial configurations. 
In the case of the hotel manager, it can be argued that the “intermediary”,
short-lived, un-heroic steps are equally adding to the performance of
management and guests. Let us begin by observing that there are certain
irreconcilable differences between management and guests - differences that
have to be lived with. The manager qua manager has the right to give orders,
and the guests qua guests have the right to forget without being punished. But
what does managerial rights to order mean if the guests are allowed not to
obey? And what does the guests’ right not to obey mean if the manager has a
right to command? How is it possible to deal with this paradox in real-time?
Let us take the case of the written sign (“Please leave your room key at the
front desk before you go out”). By hanging it on the wall, the manager
performs himself as someone, who has the right to issue instructions; a guest
could not have placed a sign on the wall. The guests on the other hand treat
the sign as less than a command and through this they perform themselves as
more than foot soldiers of a manager-general; an employee anxious to keep
his job could not have ignored a written sign from the manager.  
Is it fair to say that the sign doesn’t work? If we compare it to the metal-
blocks, which will appear later in the story, the sign seems to do very little
work: It doesn’t change the behaviour of large numbers of guests. But we
might also note that the different performances of the sign make it possible to
sustain managerialism as well as guest-ism for while. These two partially
clashing isms are affirmed rather than challenged through the temporary
encounter around the sign. And for this short period of time they have in fact
co-existed. 
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Let us image what would have happened if the written sign was treated as a
permanent and established order rather than a temporary arrangement. Let us
imagine that the manager’s statement was painted on the wall or carved into
it. There are two options, which are both disastrous. If the guests keep
ignoring the sign, it will turn into a glaring symbol of the manager's
powerlessness. It would look like a law passed by a legitimate government,
which is constantly broken by the people. The second option is that the guests
should be made obey by any possible means. If people break the law, it is a
matter for the police. But if too many people break the law, the society will
turn itself into a police state if it insists that the law must be followed.
Similarly, the guests would be turned into something less dignified than
guests, if the sign had to be enforced by all means to preserve the manager’s
status as manager. So my argument is that a temporary socio-technical
arrangement may strengthen the modes of ordering, whereas a permanent one
may represents a threat. The durability of the partially irreconcilable
managerial and guest identities are made possible by the temporary nature of
the socio-technical arrangements. Latour is no doubt right that the hardness of
technology is afforded by the forging of technical and social entities into a
stable network. Durable society and durable technology is thus two sides of
the same coin. However, as my discussion of the temporary arrangements
suggest, hard constructions might conflict with other hard constructions and
therefore, the durability of stable networks also depends on the proliferation
of ephemeral arrangements.
The temporary and the obdurate in social administration
Imagine a social administration busily working in its well-established pigeon
holes of expertise. Then imagine the board of directors announcing a team
project that in the most radical interpretations would tear down the
professional demarcations and develop something completely new. If this was
a matter of principle, then one of the principles would have to be wiped out.
But in the social administration described in the present text this does not
happen. In this administration temporary arrangements are constructed.
Arrangements such as simply talking about disagreements in a conference
room and simply writing a list of divergent principles on a flip-over. Or
arrangements such as the translation of experts into civil servants. In these
ways it is possible for a moment to mingle the old and the new, expertise and
management, without wreaking havoc. Now imagine that the team manager
exercises a host of skills, resources, powers and allies in order to define a
cross-professional subdivision of the team. And image that she even succeeds
to produce a ‘solution’ that cuts away and cleans out all links to the existing
division of the team. The course would once again be set for disaster from the
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perspective of the existing way of doing things. But in this social
administration, the manager’s solution only appears to be clean and
disentangled. In practice it contains the differences that it tries to exclude and
in the months following, the solution, which aspires to be a pure order, is
chipped away at by the ad hoc work of the professionals. So once again
principles are not been settled, but temporary arrangements evolve, which
allow the established disorders to co-exist and ‘feed on’ each other in new
ways. 
What is the moral of this story? Is it a saddening tale about the deflation of the
high hopes for a new and better administration? Or is it an optimistic tale
about the administration’s skilful handling of differences that would
otherwise spell disaster? In the present text I have no answer that will settle
this principled question. And perhaps this is exactly what this text does: It
allows the two morals to co-exist for a moment rather than bringing the issue
to a clean solution.
Methodological Implications -
Inscribing the Temporary and the Obdurate
If temporary arrangements are important, then it is also important to figure
out how to study them. What are the inscription devices that may be used for
this purpose?
In this thesis, I have followed a particular sequence. First, I identified a
number of different performances and second I described some temporary
arrangements, which translate ‘deeply’ between the types of performance.
The merits of this analysis might of course be questioned. But since the text is
not yet in the hands of the readers, I will allow myself to assume that it is
possible to proceed in this way; it is possible to start with the differences and
end with the temporary arrangements. However, I imagine that it is also
possible to start with a particular temporary arrangement and then ask which
known or unknown performances it goes between. 
In the figure below, I have sketched these two methodological procedures.
‘Blocks’ refer to relatively stable and identifiable types of performances such
as modes ordering or spatial configurations. ‘Arrangements’ refer to
temporary techno-social constructions that perform deep translations between
the blocks.
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Figure 11. Two methodological procedures
[1] Finding arrangements between blocks
The first step in this procedure is to identify a couple of different
performances such as two modes of ordering or two types of space. The
second step is to look for temporary arrangements which are go-betweens3;
one method is to look for work that produces shifts between the performances,
another method is to follow objects as they are moved or translated from one
‘block’ to another. 
[2] Finding blocks through arrangements
In this procedure the first step is to describe a particular performance and the
second step is to identify a temporary arrangement, which is somehow related
to this performance. The question is now, why the arrangement is temporary?
What kind of collision would occur if it were made permanent? And what
                                             
3 I borrow the notion of the go-between from David Turnbull, who has discussed this figure at length
in relation to colonial Australia (Turnbull, 2001). 
Block A
? (Arrangement)
Block B
Arrangement X
(Block) ?
[1]
[2]
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kind of ‘other’ would the first performance be colliding with? This line of
questioning is thus a heuristic for finding additional performances. 
The zigzag line in the middle suggests that the search for arrangements and
block can be thought of as process of ontological-empirical tinkering. The
description of some entities can be used to raise more questions, order more
data, and construct more ontologies. This vaguely sketched program of
research is thus a way to keep moving in the exploration of performances,
tensions between them, and ways to live with this tension. It is also a way of
investigating competence without making a priori assumptions about the
actors.
Living With Tension
The overall conclusion of this thesis has already been indicated. My
suggestion is that living in tension is not a matter of finding durable,
principled, rational, logical, final solutions. It is a matter of establishing
temporary constructions, which can be retreated from without doing too much
damage. 
This suggestion is akin to Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s vision for a new type
of political leadership written in the magical year of 1989. The old type of
leadership, he suggests, was about victory, conquest and triumph. The new
type is about retraction, retreat, and ‘demontage’. Taking Gorbatjov’s
deconstruction of the Soviet empire as his prime example, Enzensberger
describes the hero of retreat as one, who evacuates positions, bends principles,
and leads his people back from a front where they face destruction. The ethos
of this hero lies in his ambivalence. The specialist in demontage embraces
ambiguity and accepts the losses that he will inevitably sustain. Retreat is,
Enzensberger believes, the only type of progress that is possible in the
contemporary world. 
In the spirit of Enzensberger, I would like to see this thesis as a call for
attention to the heroic retreats, which are implied in the temporary techno-
social arrangements. These soft, ephemeral hybrids never work out to become
hard and durable, but my claim is that that is precisely why they work. 
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Abstract
Performing Social Work - Competence, Orderings, Spaces and Objects. 
This thesis investigates the development of competence in a cross-professional team
of social workers during a large-scale organisational change project in the Family
and Labour Market Administration in the Municipality of Copenhagen. Through this
empirical analysis and through the preceding theoretical discussion, a decentred
conception of competence is developed. 
Chapter one introduces the thesis and outlines a number of different strategies in the
study of competence; At one end of the spectrum, competence is taken to be an
individual underlying capacity, which can be isolated and optimised. At the other
end, competence is conceptualised in terms of a texture of productive social and
material relations. The thesis chooses the latter ‘complexifying’ or ‘decentering’
strategy. 
Chapter two is a reflection on the methods by which social science constructs ‘facts’
and the methods by which facts are constructed in the thesis. Principles for a
constructionist methodology are tentatively formulated.
Chapter three is a critical discussion of learning theories in psychology and social
psychology. It is argued, that all learning theories depend on some notion of a
bounded learning system, which adapts to its surroundings. These learning systems
may be delineated by a particular content, agent, place or some combination thereof.
Through a number of examples it is argued, that the boundaries of these learning
systems tend to ‘leak’. This indicates that learning theories build on the untenable
assumption that the ‘entities’ that learn can be theoretically determined beforehand.
As an alternative the network metaphor in actor-network theory is explored. This
theory leaves open the size and the nature of the actors and for this reason, it is
argued, that the notion of network is better equipped to study evolving change
processes.
Chapter four explores a recent version of post actor-network theory, known as the
performative turn. Performances are broadly defined as unbounded, materially
heterogeneous, recursive processes that can be imputed to the social. Three different
conceptualisations of performance are presented. One conceptualisation of
performance describes the patterns of the social as a number of interdependent mini-
discourses or modes of ordering. A second conceptualisation describes the patterns
of the social as the performance of different types of space. Thirdly, the patterns of
the social have been conceptualised through the notion of multiple objects. In this
mode of analysis, an object is analysed as an assemblage of practices, that is a set of
ways in which the object is ‘done’ or performed. The three different
conceptualisations of performance are the primary theoretical tools, which are used
in the analysis of the empirical material. 
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Chapter five presents four empirical cases gathered from an observation study of a
cross-professional team of social workers, which was formed as a part of a large-
scale team project in the social administration. The four cases form a chronological
story that trace the initial discussions about the team project, the work of
subdividing the team into three smaller units, and the subsequent fate of this
arrangement. In a running commentary, patterns or performances are imputed to the
empirical material. The articulated patterns are akin to performance-as-modes-of-
ordering. 
At the end of chapter five, it is argued that the modes of ordering in each of the four
cases combine into the performance of a particular kind of space. The argument is
thus that a different kind of space is performed in each of the four cases. In
continuation of this, an account is developed of the kinds of work that maintain each
of the spatial configurations as well as the kinds of work that produces a shift from
one configuration to the next. 
Chapter six continues the empirical analysis of performances and extends it to
include performance-as-multiple-objects. Objects which are quintessential to the
spatial configurations are identified and the translation of these objects from one
kind of space to another is followed. This analysis explicates a number of
interdependencies as well as antagonistic relations between the spatial
configurations. 
Chapter seven summarises the previous argument and discusses the implications. In
continuation of the previous analyses of interdependencies between the spatial
configurations, it is argued, that the obduracy of these ‘blocks’ in part depend the
development of temporary techno-social arrangements. A crucial aspect of the
development of competence in the team project is thus the construction of a series of
short-lived arrangements that prevent ‘blocks’ such as managerial rights and
professional authority from colliding catastrophically. The assertion that temporary
arrangements are crucial to the performance of ‘blocks’ suggests a supplement to the
research agenda of science and technology studies; previously this field has focused
almost exclusively on objects that are (or aspire to be) durable. Finally, two
methodological procedures are outlined, which may guide the proposed
investigation of temporary techno-social arrangements. 
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Dansk resumé
At Performe Socialt Arbejde 
– Kompetence, ordningsmåder, rum og objekter. 
Denne afhandling undersøger udviklingen af kompetence i et tværfagligt team af
socialarbejdere i forbindelse med et omfattende organisationsudviklingsprojekt i
Familie- og Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltningen i Københavns Kommune. Gennem denne
empiriske analyse og gennem den forudgående teoretiske diskussion, udvikles et
decentreret kompetencebegreb.
Kapitel 1 introducerer afhandlingen og skitserer et antal forskellige strategier, som
anvendes i undersøgelse af kompetence. I den ene ende af spektret antages
kompetence at være en individuel underliggende kapacitet, som kan isoleres og
optimeres. I den anden ende af spektret konceptualiseres kompetence som en tekstur
af produktive sociale og materielle relationer. Denne afhandling følger den
sidstnævnte ”kompleksificerende” eller ”decentrerende” strategi. 
Kapitel 2 undersøger de metoder, hvormed socialvidenskaben konstruerer
kendsgerninger, og hvormed kendsgerningerne i afhandlingen er konstrueret. Der
opstilles et bud på principper for en konstruktionistisk metodologi. 
Kapitel 3 indeholder en kritisk diskussion af psykologiske og socialpsykologiske
læringsteorier. Der argumenteres for, at enhver læringsteori bygger på idéen om et
afgrænset system, som tilpasser sig sine omgivelser. Disse læringssystemer kan være
defineret udfra et særligt indhold, en særlig agent, en særlig lokalitet, eller en
kombination heraf. Gennem et antal eksempler argumenteres der for, at
læringssystemer har tendens til at ‘lække’. Dette indikerer, at læringsteorier bygger
på en uholdbar antagelse om, at den ‘entititet’, som lærer, kan fastlægges teoretisk
på forhånd. Som et alternativ undersøges den netværksmetafor, som anvendes af
aktør-netværks-teori (ANT). Denne teori lader spørgsmålet om aktørens størrelse og
egenskaber stå åbent, hvilket gør netværksbegrebet bedre udrustet til at undersøge,
hvordan forandringsprocesser udfolder sig.
Kapitel 4 undersøger en version af ‘post ANT’, som er udviklet i de seneste år.
Denne teoretiske bevægelse er kendt under betegnelsen den performative vending.
Performance kan bredt defineres som uafgrænsede, materielt heterogene, rekursive
processer eller mønstre, som kan tilskrives det sociale. Tre forskellige
konceptualiseringer af performance præsenteres. Én konceptualisering beskriver
performance som et antal gensidigt afhængige mini-diskurser eller ordningsmåder.
En anden konceptualisering beskriver det sociales mønstre som performance af et
antal forskellige rumlige typer. Endelig er performance blevet konceptualiseret
gennem begrebet om multiple objekter. I denne sammenhæng analyseres et objekt
som en samling af praksisser, dvs. måder hvorpå det pågældende objekt gøres eller
performes. De tre konceptualiseringer af performance er de primære teoretiske
redskaber, som bringes i anvendelse på det empiriske materiale. 
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Kapitel 5 præsenterer fire empiriske cases hentet fra et observationsstudie af et
tværfagligt team af socialarbejdere, som blev dannet i forbindelse med et omfattende
teamprojekt i en familie-  og arbejdsmarkedsforvaltning. De fire cases udgør en
kronologisk historie, der først følger nogle indledende diskussioner i teamprojektet,
dernæst arbejdet med at underinddele teamet i tre mindre enheder, og endeligt den
efterfølgende håndtering af den valgte underinddeling. 
Sideløbende med præsentationen af den kronologiske historie foretages en analyse
af performances. De mønstre, som her tilskrives materialet, er af typen perfomance-
som-ordningsmåder. Ved slutningen af kapitel 5 argumenteres der for, at
ordningsmåderne i hver case performer en særlig rumlig type. Påstanden er således,
at en særlig form for rum bliver performet i hver af de fire empiriske cases. I
forlængelse heraf redegøres der for det arbejde, som opretholder hver af de rumlige
konfigurationer, samt for det arbejde der skaber et skift fra en rumlig konfiguration
til en anden. 
Kapitel 6 fortsætter den empiriske analyse af performance og udvider den til også at
omfatte performance-som-multiple-objekter. Der identificeres et antal objekter, som
hver især er indbegrebet af en rumlig type. Disse objekters oversættelse fra én
rumlig konfiguration til en anden følges. Denne analyse afdækker såvel gensidige
afhængigheder som antagonistiske relationer mellem de rumlige konfigurationer. 
Kapitel 7 sammenfatter den tidligere argumentation og diskuterer mulige
implikationer. I forlængelse af de tidligere analyser af de rumlige konfigurationers
gensidige afhængigheder argumenteres der for, at disse ‘blokkes’ sejlivethed blandt
andet afhænger af, at der løbende skabes midlertidige tekno-sociale arrangementer.
Et afgørende aspekt af kompetenceudviklingen i teamprojektet er således
konstruktionen af en serie kortvarige arrangementer, som forhindrer ‘blokke’ såsom
ledelsesmæssige rettigheder og faglig autoritet i at kollidere på en ødelæggende
måde. Påstanden om, at midlertidige arrangementer bidrager afgørende til at
performe ‘blokke’, udpeger det midlertidige som et supplerende forskningsfelt for
videnskabs- og teknologistudier; hidtil har disse studier fokuseret næsten
udelukkende på objekter, som er (eller aspirerer til at blive) stabile og varige.
Afslutningsvis skitseres to metodologiske procedurer, som vil kunne vejlede den
foreslåede udforskning af midlertidige tekno-sociale arrangementer. 
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Appendix 1 
Project Proposal
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Undersøgelse af kompetenceudvikling i arbejdsteams
Etablering af teams i Københavns Kommunes Familie- og
Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltning er en gennemgribende organisationsudvikling, som
skaber en række nye opgaver, nye fordelinger af eksisterende opgaver og nye
omstændigheder omkring opgaveløsningen. Hovedparten af medarbejderne placeres
dermed i en situation, hvor de sammen med deres team skal udvikle en række nye
kompetencer. 
Formål
Projektets formål er at undersøge, hvordan teams udvikler nye kompetencer, at
identificere forhold som fremmer udviklingen af nye kompetencer samt at pege på
forhold som vanskeliggør udvikling af nye kompetencer, og som dermed fastholder
forvaltningens hidtidige arbejdsmønstre. 
Fokuspunkter
Projektet vil undersøge kompetenceudviklingen i teamstrukturen med udgangspunkt
i følgende spørgsmål: 
Hvordan udvikler teamet internt samarbejde og arbejdsdeling?
Hvordan udvikler teamet relationer til øvrige teams, herunder visitation og
underleverandørrelationer.
Hvilke forhold synes at være virke fremmende hhv. hæmmende for at teamet
løbende kan udvikle sin kompetence?
Metode
Den konkrete undersøgelse vil belyse forløbet af et antal sager/problemer inden for
en nærmere aftalt tidsperiode. Der fokuseres på, hvordan teamet håndterer problemet
og i sammenhæng hermed udvikler samarbejdsrelationer internt og eksternt.
Dataindsamlingen vil ske gennem deltagerobservation, interviews og evt. analyse af
relevante arbejdspapirer.
Teamet
For at få belyst problemet så dybtgående som muligt, vil jeg gerne af teamet have
mulighed for at få:
En kort introduktion til arbejdsområdet og de fysiske lokaliteter.
Assistance til udvælgelse af et antal sager og/eller et antal medarbejdere, som kan
følges gennem en periode.
Tilladelse til at deltage i relevante interne og eksterne møder. 
Tilladelse til at gennemføre opfølgende interviews med udvalgte medarbejdere.
Teamets udbytte
Jeg vil efter observationsperioden sammenfatte mine data til et skriftligt
diskussionsoplæg om  teamets kompetenceudvikling, herunder muligheder og
barrierer. 
Dette oplæg vil jeg formidle mundtligt på møder dels med teamet, dels med F&As
ledelse.
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Tidsramme
Jeg forstiller mig, at undersøgelsen vil kunne foregå på følgende måde:
Teamlederen mhp. afklaring af mulighederne for at følge teamets arbejde. 
En kort introduktion projektets formål for teamet v/lederen og undertegnede. 
Observation af teamets arbejde og interview af udvalgte medarbejdere, på
tidspunkter, hvor det kan indpasses i arbejdsflowet. (3 uger)
Analyse af de indsamlede data og udarbejdelse af diskussionoplæg. (3 uger)
Tilbagemelding til teamet og F&A.
Ansvarlig 
Projektet gennemføres af: 
Torben Elgaard Jensen, Cand.Psych, Ph.D-stipendiat, Institut for Psykologi,
Københavns Universitet.
Som faglige vejledere deltager endvidere: 
Jesper Døpping, Cand.Psych, Ph.D, Adjunkt på Psykologisk Institut, 
Århus Universitet
Arne Prahl, Cand.Psych, Lektor på Institut for Psykologi,
Københavns Universitet.
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Collaboration Agreement
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Samarbejdsaftale
mellem
Københavns universitet, Institut for psykologi
og
Familie- og Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltningen
Kontoret for Personale og Organisation 
 
Aftalen omfatter et samarbejde mellem de to parter om Ph.D- projekt om
”kompetenceudvikling i arbejdsteams”.
Formål:
Projektets formål er at undersøge, hvordan teams udvikler nye
kompetencer, at identificere forhold som fremmer udviklingen af nye
kompetencer samt pege på forhold som vanskeliggør udviklingen af nye
kompetencer og som dermed fastholder hidtidige arbejdsmønstre. Team for
voksne med særlige behov, lokalcentret [...]  står til rådighed i den konkrete
undersøgelsesfase.
Projektet indgår som et delelement i en Ph.D- afhandling om  kvalificering af
kompetencebegrebet.
Ansvarlig:
• Projektet gennemføres af Torben Elgaard Jensen, Cand. Psych., Ph.D-
stipendiat, Institut for psykologi, Københavns Universitet
• Faglig vejledere: 
Jesper Døpping, Cand. psych., Ph.D, Adjunkt på Psykologisk Institut
Århus Universitet 
Arne Prahl, Cand. Psych., lektor på institut for psykologi, Københavns
Universitet 
• Samarbejdspartnere fra Familie- og Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltningen:
Henrik Dencker, Kontorchef for kontoret for Personale og Organisation
Lone Sørensen, organisationskonsulent i kontoret for Personale og
Organisation
Metode:
Dataindsamlingen vil ske via deltagerobservation i teamet, interviews,
gennemgang af konkrete sager, analyser af relevante arbejdspapirer samt
observationer af samarbejdsrelationer til øvrige team og samarbejdspartnere,
herunder interviews.
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Vilkår:
Torben Elgaard Jensen har adgang til de oplysninger, der er relevant for
projektet, herunder konkrete sager og arbejdspapirer samt deltagelse i
relevante mødefora. Det  er en forudsætning at oplysninger, der indgår i
undersøgelsen anonymiseres, dvs. at såvel 
personfølsomme oplysninger i sager,  som interviews er anonyme.
Endvidere fremtræder centeret anonymt i projektet.
Undersøgelsens resultater:
Undersøgelsens resultater anvendes frit af Torben Elgaard Jensen i det
videre forskningsprojekt. Familie- og Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltningen
forbeholder sig ligeledes ret til at anvende resultaterne af
undersøgelsesforløbet i eget regi, dog med klar angivelse af kildehenvisning. 
Resultaterne fra undersøgelsen, som tilgår forvaltningen, samles i en
rapport, der består af 2 delrapporter. Der afrapporteres løbende til det
involverede team samt til projektets referencegruppe.
Den endelige afhandling fremsendes til forvaltningen om ca. 2 år. 
Referencegruppe:
Referencegruppens formål er at understøtte Torben Elgaard Jensen i
projektforløbet. Referencegruppen holder regelmæssige møder. På møderne
fremlægges projektets status og foreløbige resultater. Referencegruppens
drøftelser tilrettelægges med henblik på den fremadrettede proces i
undersøgelsesforløbet. 
Referencegruppen består af følgende repræsentanter:
Henrik Dencker, formand
Carsten Stæhr Nielsen (deltager efter behov)
Torben Elgaard Jensen
Jesper Døpping 
Arne Prahl
[.....], teamchef, lokalcentret [.....]
1 medarbejderrepræsentant, lokalcentret [.....]
Lone Sørensen, koordinator
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Tidsramme:
Maj 99: Aftaler med teamet om projektets formål omfang og
metoder 
Maj 99- september 99: Observationer i teamet (TEJ)
August 99: Referencegruppen mødes 
September 99: 1. delbeskrivelse/diskussionsoplæg (TEJ) 
September/oktober: Referencegruppen mødes
September-december: Observationer i teamet og analyser af data (TEJ)
December 99: Referencegruppen mødes (evt)
Januar 2000: 2. delbeskrivelse (TEJ)
Februar 2000: Referencegruppen mødes
Marts/april 2000: Endelig rapport (TEJ)
Marts/april 2000: Referencegruppen mødes
Marts/april 2000: Afmelding i teamet (TEJ)
Dato:
For Københavns Universitet   For  Familie-og 
Arbejdsmarkeds-
forvaltningen
_______________________________________ ______________
 Torben Elgaard Jensen og Jesper Døpping Henrik Dencker

